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This research considers the interface between the restraint of trade doctrine 
(hereinafter ROTD) and competition law in England and Wales (comprising 
the UK Competition Act 1998 and Articles 101-102 TFEU). The ROTD and 
competition law overlap in cases where both laws appear to be applicable to 
certain restrictions on professionals (e.g. non-competition clauses).  
 
 It will be argued that the ROTD and competition are different legal regimes 
whose prima facie concurrent applicability creates an interface problem for 
some professionals who are precluded from relying on the ROTD to resist a 
particular restriction. The most acute problem, in cases of overlap, arises 
where a restriction does not infringe competition law but falls foul of the 
ROTD.   
 
By examining developments in UK law and in EU law this study analyses 
how the interface problem evolved incrementally. UK competition legislation 
may be interpreted so that the ROTD applies only in a residual fashion. 
Moreover, Art 3 of EU Reg. 1/2003 delineates the interface between EU 
competition law and national competition law. The High Court has 
interpreted Art. 3 so that once EU competition law is applied to a restriction 
the court cannot reach a different conclusion under the ROTD. For reasons of 
consistency, this conclusion may also hold true for the interface between the 
ROTD and UK competition law. The scale of persons affected by this 
problem becomes greater if some professionals in employment are classified 
as “undertakings” because such classification would increase the overlap and 
interface between competition law and ROTD.  
 
This thesis proposes fresh solutions for courts when applying the ROTD. The 
solutions aim to ensure the availability of the ROTD’s unique protection to 
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This thesis considers the overlap and interfaces between the common law restraint 
of trade doctrine (hereinafter ROTD) and competition law in England and Wales. 
The relevant competition law comprises UK competition legislation (chiefly, the 
Competition Act 1998) and, if there is sufficient effect on trade between Member 
States, EU competition law (chiefly, Art 101 TFEU). This research identifies 
interface problems for some professionals who are subject to restrictive provisions 
and offers some solutions for courts in England and Wales. 
 
The focus is on an area of intersection/overlap between the ROTD and competition 
law which arises where the ROTD and competition law are both applicable to a 
restriction. In order to undertake a contained and in-depth analysis, this research 
does not examine the entire overlap area of concurrent applicability. Its particular 
focus is on selected restrictions (such as non-competition provisions) on 
professionals that are contained in either personal contracts or in “rules” of, for 
example, professional associations. Interface difficulties occur where a restrained 
person is precluded from relying on the ROTD to resist an unreasonable restriction 
on the grounds that (either UK and/or EU) competition law applies to but does not 
prohibit the restriction. The problem arises because the applicability of competition 
law apparently jeopardises the traditional protection available under the ROTD to 
persons restrained by unreasonable restrictions within the overlap area that are not 
prohibited by competition law. This research proposes how courts in England and 
Wales should respond to these challenges in order to ensure the ongoing 
availability of the ROTD to resist the enforcement of unreasonable restrictions 




This research is organised into three Parts and each Part is next summarised in 
order to give a concise map of the research.  
 
Part I (Chapters One to Three) aims to demonstrate why the interface between the 
ROTD and competition law matters to some persons. It argues that the interface is 
important by showing that the ROTD and competition law are different. To this 
end, it examines how restrictions on professionals are treated by the ROTD 
(Chapter One), by EU competition law (Chapter Two) and by UK competition law 
(Chapter Three). Each chapter takes the perspective of restrained persons in order 
to highlight how their interests are treated. These chapters explain why some 
restrained professionals might prefer to rely on ROTD rather than on competition 
law. 
 
Part II (Chapters Four to Six) identifies and explores the sources, the nature and 
potential extent of the problematic interfaces between the ROTD and competition 
law in England and Wales. Chapter Four traces the ROTD’s interface with UK 
competition law. Chapter Five considers the ROTD’s interface with EU 
competition law. These chapters portray the problem for restrained persons where a 
court feels precluded from deciding that a restriction falls foul of the ROTD on the 
basis that competition law is applied to but does not prohibit the same restriction. 
Chapter Six explores the potential scale of the interface problem. It argues that 
“undertaking”, a key jurisdictional criterion in competition law, could include some 
professionals in employment. It highlights how an expansive interpretation of 
“undertaking” would increase the overlap area and, thereby, extend the interface 
problem to affect some employees. 
 
Part III (Chapter Seven) proposes solutions for judges in England and Wales. The 
solutions aim to prevent the ROTD from being, in effect, emasculated by 






Greater detail about each chapter is next provided in order to convey the narrative 
of this research and its argument.   
 
Part I (Chapters One, Two and Three) argues that the ROTD and competition law 
are different in substantive and procedural terms. The next paragraphs briefly 
sketch some of the important elements of the ROTD, EU competition law and UK 
competition law. In order to illustrate their differences, in a succinct manner, 
attention is drawn to their contrasting treatment of franchisees.  
 
Chapter One explains how the ROTD is a valuable legal instrument as it allows 
some professionals to resist unreasonable restrictions contained either in personal 
contracts or in third party measures such as rules of associations. It is valuable 
because the interests of the restrained party are discretely taken into account when 
courts apply the ROTD. The ROTD presumes that all “restraints of trade” are void 
unless they are justified as being reasonable both in the interests of the parties 
(“inter partes”) and in the “public interest.”1 In deciding whether a particular 
provision is a “restraint of trade” courts take account of its negative effects for the 
restrained person. A “restraint of trade” is not justifiable as reasonable inter partes 
if it “goes further than to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it 
was granted.”2 In Vendo plc v. Adams, the High Court in Northern Ireland refused 
to grant an injunction to enforce a post-termination non-competition clause in a 
franchise.3 It stated that to prevent the franchisee from “carrying on vehicle 
washing services within the franchised area would deprive the defendant effectively 
                                                 
1  The classic test was stated in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] 
AC 535, 565 HL (Lord Macnaghten) affirming [1983] 1 Ch 630 (CA) as follows: “[T]he public 
have an interest in every person’s carrying on his trade freely: so has the individual. All interference 
with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade themselves, if there is nothing 
more, are contrary to public policy and, therefore void. That is the general rule. But there are 
exceptions: restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified by 
the special circumstances of  a particular case. It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only 
justification, if the restriction is reasonable- reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the 
parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so 
guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the 
same time it is in no way injurious to the public.”  
2 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd  [1968] AC 269, 300.  
3 [2002] NI Ch 3. 
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of earning a livelihood in a field where he has acquired an expertise.”4 This 
quotation indicates the ROTD’s concern for the economic interests of the 
franchisee. 
 
Chapter Two examines EU competition law. Greatest attention is paid to Art 
101(1) which prohibits agreements (with an actual or potential effect on interstate 
trade) whose object or effect is the actual or potential restriction of competition. 
This chapter evaluates determinations of the EU Courts and of the European 
Commission that certain restrictions on persons are not prohibited even where their 
freedom to compete is restricted. In Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de 
Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, the Court of Justice stated that Art 101(1) does not 
prohibit restrictions on franchisees that are “strictly necessary in order to ensure 
that the know-how and assistance provided by the franchisor do not benefit 
competitors” and “provisions which establish the control strictly necessary for 
maintaining the identity and reputation of the network.”5 In practice, this test does 
not apply a standard akin to “essential” and, thus, Art 101(1) does not prohibit 
restrictions where they are commercially convenient (rather than truly “necessary”) 
for the franchisor.6 Moreover, some restrictions on franchisees that are prohibited 
by Art 101(1) may be exempted under Art 101(3).7 Automatic exemption  to 
certain franchises is available under Block Exemption Reg. 330/2010 even if they 
contain a post-termination restriction on ex-franchisees of up to one year.8 Thus, 
competition law may take a comparatively benign view of restrictions on 
franchisees on the grounds that franchises may improve competition by helping 
new entry and encouraging inter-brand competition.9 Competition law takes the 
                                                 
4 [2002] NI Ch 3, 8 (emphasis added). 
5  Case 161/86 Pronuptia  de Paris  GmbH v. Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353.  
6 For example Case 161/86 Pronuptia  de Paris  GmbH v Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR  353, 
para 21 where the Court of Justice states that Art 101(1) does not prohibit exclusive purchasing on 
franchisees where it would be “too expensive” for the franchisor to ensure that objective quality 
standards were observed due to the large number of franchisees. 
7 Art 101(3)  provides that Art 101(1) may be declared inapplicable to an arrangement “which 
contributes  to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit and which does 
not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives and  (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.” 
8 Art 5(3). 
9 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed.  2011)  
675. 
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view that certain restrictions must be borne by franchisees in order for franchises to 
function well in the market.10  
 
Chapter Three starts by explaining the strong influence exerted by EU competition 
law on UK competition law.11 Then, it demonstrates how a restriction may be 
treated differently under competition law in the UK (comprising UK competition 
law and EU competition law) than under the ROTD. It shows that the ROTD and 
competition law may produce different outcomes when applied to the same 
restriction. For example, in Days Medical Aids Ltd. v. Pihsiang Machinery 
Manufacturing and Ors, the High Court stated that an unlimited renewal clause in 
an exclusive distribution contract did not infringe Art 101(1) but would be void as 
an unreasonable “restraint of trade” under the ROTD.12 This chapter also shows 
that, even where the ROTD and competition law produce the same outcome in a 
case, the reasoning under each legal regime is different. Moreover, some 
differences may make litigation under the ROTD more attractive to a restrained 
party than under competition law.13 In Meridian VAT Reclaim UK Ltd v. 
Lowendahl Group, Gross J., in the absence of detailed economic evidence on the 
definition of markets, was reluctant to conclude that there was a serious 
competition law issue to be tried.14 By contrast, the judge easily concluded that 
there was a serious issue to be tried under the ROTD just by examining the terms 
of the contract. For similar reasons, an interlocutory injunction may be more easily 
obtained, in practice, under the ROTD than under EU competition law.15   
 
                                                 
10 Case 161/86 Pronuptia de Paris  GmbH v Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR. 353 para 15. 
11 Understanding the influence of EU competition law is additionally important for Chapter Six 
which explores the possibility of UK competition law following EU competition law’s possible 
movements towards interpreting “undertaking” to include some professionals in employment. 
12 [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm)  Langley J. 
13 For example, under the ROTD the party seeking to rely on the restriction (the restraining party) 
must establish that the restriction is reasonable inter partes.  By contrast under competition law, the 
party alleging that the restraint infringes (the restrained party) must discharge the evidential burden.      
14  [2002] EWHC 1066. 
15 See A. Kamerling & C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London: Thomson Sweet &Maxwell, 4th ed.  2004)  preface xvi where the authors state that “ … in 
interlocutory proceedings  it will be considerably easier to show that a clause on its construction is 
unreasonable, rather than to try and argue that the object or effect of an agreement on competition 
means that it is void under Article [101](1) and should not benefit from an exemption under Art 
[101](3) - an economic assessment  which national judges  post-May 2004 will increasingly be 
called upon to do, but are unlikely to relish.”  
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Part I demonstrates that ROTD and competition law are different regimes when 
considered from the perspective of a restrained professional. Each regime 
approaches restrictions differently, even where their outcomes are not different. 
Where a restriction falls in the overlap area between competition law (EU and/or 
UK) and the ROTD, a restrained party may be disadvantaged if he is not allowed to 
rely on the ROTD. It is for this reason that the delineation of their interface is a 
matter of importance. 
 
Part II (Chapters Four, Five and Six) examines problematic interfaces between the 
ROTD and competition law in England and Wales. It traces their origins and 
explores their potential extent. 
 
Chapter Four examines the interfaces between the ROTD and UK competition 
legislation. The Competition Act 1998 does not make express provision for its 
interface with the common law. General rules on statutory interpretation suggest 
taking a “residual” approach whereby the ROTD would apply only to the extent 
that the legislation does not apply.16 This chapter argues that the “residual” 
approach may prevent the application of the ROTD where the competition 
legislation applies but does not prohibit the clause. This is a problem for some 
restrained professionals as it, in effect, ousts the ROTD’s traditional protection. 
This chapter traces how the ROTD’s interfaces with the pre-1998 legislation on 
restrictive practices and fair trade were unproblematic in the sense that a restriction 
could be void under the ROTD even where it was not prohibited by the legislation. 
The analysis of the pre-1998 legislation also emphasises some of its operational 
shortcomings. This examination supports the argument that the Competition Act 
1998 intended to remedy particular difficulties with the previous legislation 
(including its poor fit with EU competition law). It questions whether the 1998 Act 
was intended to muzzle the ROTD’s applicability to restrictions that also come 
within the reach of the competition legislation. It argues that the current interfaces 
between competition legislation and the ROTD emerged incidentally as a 
                                                 
16 See A. Kamerling and C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2004)  preface xvi where the authors state “[O]nly if 
competition law does not apply will the restraint of trade doctrine apply….” Also see  M. Furse, 
Competition Law of the UK and EC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 4th ed.) 361 where the 
author  comments  that “... the common law occupies only a residual role in relation to competition 
law generally.” 
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consequence of enacting EU style legislation designed to cure particular 
operational problems that were not related to its interfaces with the ROTD.  It 
concludes that the general rules on the interface between legislation and the 
common law are unsatisfactory because they apparently permit the ROTD to apply 
only in a residual manner with the consequence of muzzling the ROTD. 
 
Chapter Five considers the past and current interfaces between EU competition law 
and the ROTD. It analyses the evolution of Art 3 of EU Reg. 1/2003 which 
delineates the interface between EU competition law and national competition law. 
It considers the implications of Art 3 for the ROTD’s interface with competition 
law. Criticism is directed at the 2004 judgment in Days Medical Aids Ltd. v. 
Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co. Limited and Ors where the High Court 
stated that:  
“once EU competition law applies and either strikes down or permits the 
restriction involved, the court is not permitted to reach a different result as 
regards the application of a restriction to trade between EU Member States 
under the domestic law of restraint of trade.”17  
This conclusion was repeated in 2010 in Jones v Ricoh.18 Its effect is to prevent a 
court from finding that a restriction falls foul of the ROTD where EU competition 
law applies but does not prohibit the restriction. Moreover, this conclusion may 
affect the ROTD’s interface with national competition law because it is logical and 
practical for the ROTD’s applicability to a “restraint of trade” not to differ 
according to whether EU competition law or national competition law is applied.19 
 
Chapter Six explores the potential extent of the interface problem by considering 
the expansion of the overlap between competition law and the ROTD. Competition 
law applies only to activities involving “undertaking” which makes “undertaking” 
an important jurisdictional concept. Chapter Six predicts that some professionals in 
employment might be treated as “undertakings” under EU and/or UK competition 
law. This development could bring some employment contracts within the reach of 
competition law, create a greater overlap with the ROTD and increase the scale of 
the interface problem. In this light, the delineation of the interface between the 
                                                 
17 [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm) para. 49.  
18 [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch) Roth J.  
19 A. Scott, “The Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in the United Kingdom”  LSE Working 
Papers 9/2009 p5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344807. 
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ROTD and competition law acquires even greater importance as the valued 
protection offered by the ROTD to many employees may be under threat.   
 
Part III (Chapter Seven) seeks and proposes solutions to the interface problems. It 
considers options for their resolution under, firstly, UK law and, secondly, EU law. 
One of the examined options is for UK competition law to diverge from EU 
competition law so that it prohibits more restrictions. Another option is to interpret 
UK competition law according to particular canons of statutory interpretation in 
order to produce a better interface with the ROTD for restrained persons. Then, the 
quest to resolve the ROTD’s problematic interface under EU law concentrates on 
Art 3 of EU Reg.1/2003.  After closely examining the intended scope of Art 3 of 
EU Reg.1/2003, it is suggested that Art 3(3) offers a viable route to allowing the 
application of the ROTD. Art 3(3) allows the unimpeded application of national 
laws that do not predominantly pursue the same objective as that pursued by EU 
competition law. Chapter Seven presents two general and seven specific proposals 
which are supplemented by detailed studies of key judgments under the ROTD. 
The proposals aim to ensure that the ROTD could benefit from the options 
identified under national law (canons of statutory interpretation) and/or under EU 
law (Art 3(3) of Reg. 1/2003) so that it may be applied within the overlap area 
(with UK competition law and/or with EU competition law) to restrictions that do 
not infringe competition law.  
 
 
AIMS and METHODOLOGY 
 
This research is not a study of how best to regulate restrictions on professionals. 
Nor is it a comparative evaluation that places the ROTD and competition law in 
direct juxtaposition. This research identifies interface problems between the ROTD 
and competition law in England and Wales and proposes how to resolve them. The 
central hypothesis of this research is that the ROTD differs from competition law 
(because of why and how it protects restrained persons) and that, therefore, it ought 
not to be incidentally displaced merely on the grounds that competition law is also 
applicable to the same restriction. 
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This research aims to make a substantial contribution to the relatively understudied 
field of the relationship between competition law and the common law. There is no 
great bank of literature exploring this area, either from the perspective of the 
ROTD or from the perspective of competition law. There has been little debate 
over how Art 3 of EU Reg. 1/2003 affects the operation of national law that is not 
national competition law. This study is new research in its examination of the 
implications for the ROTD of past and future developments in EU competition law 
and UK competition law. 
 
The methodology adopted is to examine cases and the pre-legislative debates in the 
UK and in the EU. The review of this material provides the foundation for the 
argument that the interfaces between the ROTD and competition law have been 
misinterpreted. Specifically, it is argued that the High Court has misread the 
combined impact of the Competition Act 1998 and of Art 3 of EU Reg. 1/2003 on 
the ROTD. It is suggested that careful reading of the sources offers guidance as to 
how the 1998 Act and Art 3 should be interpreted so that the ROTD is not unduly 
ousted. This research challenges the view (of the High Court and some 
commentators) that the ROTD cannot lead to a different conclusion after 
competition law is applied and does not prohibit a restriction. It proposes fresh 
solutions for judges to ensure the continued vitality of the ROTD within the studied 
overlap area. 
 
This study of the interfaces between a longstanding common law doctrine and 
competition law in England and Wales identifies how problematic interfaces 
between the ROTD and competition law arose, highlights the negative 















The central hypothesis of this research is that the ROTD differs from competition 
law (because of how and why it protects restrained persons) and that, therefore, it 
ought not to be incidentally displaced where competition law is also applicable to 
the same restriction. The aim of this chapter is to establish that the ROTD is a 
valuable instrument for some professionals who are restrained by various 
provisions contained in either personal contracts or in third party measures (e.g. 
rules of associations).20 To this end, this chapter maps the protection offered by the 
ROTD to professional persons in various circumstances. It takes an intentionally 
brief and descriptive approach that sketches the ROTD’s field of application. Later 
chapters analyse and evaluate the significance of key ROTD judgments.21 
In order to show the extent of the protection offered by the ROTD, this chapter 
examines the scope of the ROTD and its test. It explores why a wide variety of 
measures have been regarded by courts as “restraints of trade” and, thus, subject to 
scrutiny under the ROTD.22 It appraises the ROTD’s test which presumes 
                                                 
20  See A. Kamerling and C. Osman,  Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London:Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2004);  J.D. Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 2nd ed. 1999);  M.J.Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis (Toronto: The Carswell Company, 1986); H.M. Blake,  “Employee 
Agreements Not to Compete” [1962] 73 Harv LR 625;  F. Dawson, “Contracts in Restraint of  
Trade: Meaning and Effect” [1974] 90 LQR 455 and C-W Yuen, “Exclusive Purchasing at Common 
Law and under Antitrust Law: A Re-examination of the Restraint of Trade Doctrine” [1987] 16 
Anglo Am Law Rev 1. 
21 Chapters Three and Seven present detailed analyses of  interesting judgments including Days 
Medical Aids v. Pihsiang Machinery & Ors [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm.);  Hendry v. World 
Professional Billiards and Snooker Association Ltd. Sub.nom. Hendry v. WPBSA [2002] 
U.K.C.L.R.5, [2002] E.C.C. 8 Ch D; Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd  
[1968] AC 269;  A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone ) sub nom. 
Macauley (formerly Instone) v.  A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308;   HL 
affirming [1974] 1 All ER 171 CA, and  Proactive Sports Management Ltd v. Wayne Rooney, 
Stoneygate 48 et al [2010] EWHC 1807, on appeal [2011] EWCA 1444. For this reason, these 
judgments are not analysed in depth in this chapter.   
22 There is debate over where the margins of the ROTD should lie, see, for example, S. Smith, 
“Reconstructing Restraint of Trade” (1995) OJLS 565. This question is not addressed in this 
chapter, the aim of which is to map the protection that has been provided by the ROTD to persons.  
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“restraints of trade” to be void and refuses to uphold them unless they are justified 
as being reasonable both in the parties’ interests (inter partes) and in the “public 
interest.” How courts interpret and apply these two elements of the ROTD’s 
reasonableness test (i.e. inter partes and in the “public interest”) in ways that 
protect restrained professionals is highlighted.  
For clarity, personal contracts are examined in this chapter separately from rules of 
associations.23 Section 1.2 examines personal contracts and section 1.3 examines 
third party measures. Each section considers, firstly, why a particular measure may 
be treated as a “restraint of trade” and, secondly, how the “reasonableness” test 
may be applied. The aim is to show that the ROTD allows professionals to resist 
the enforcement of various restrictions on their economic freedom and that, for this 
reason, the ROTD is a valuable legal instrument for some persons.24 Essentially, 
this chapter details and explains the protection that may be available under the 
ROTD to persons who are subject to various restrictions. 
 
 
1.2 PERSONAL CONTRACTS  
 
The ROTD has been applied to restrictions contained either in employment 
contracts and/or in agreements for the transfer of a business. It has also been 
applied to restrictions contained in other types of personal contracts. Notably, 
courts have refrained from strictly classifying the categories to which the ROTD 
applies. Lord Wilberforce insisted that “the classification must remain fluid and the 
categories can never be closed.”25 Commentators accept that the ROTD applies 
beyond the two standard categories (of employment contracts and contracts for sale 
of business) but struggle to provide a comprehensive definition of such other 
categories.26 For this reason, it is important to explore the basis for deciding 
                                                 
23These two groups are not always entirely discrete. For example, a standard form personal 
management contract may be one that is prescribed by a sporting authority, see Watson v. Praeger 
[1991] 1 WLR 726 (Ch D).   
24 It is not suggested that restrained persons invariably succeed in actions under the ROTD.  
25 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd. [1968] AC 269, 337. 
26 See J.D. Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (Sydney: Butterworths, 2nd ed. 1999) 171 
where the author refers to “a residual third” category. See further A. Kamerling and C. Osman, 
Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 
2004) 16 where the authors define another category as “any situation, not necessarily involving a 
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whether a particular provision is a “restraint of trade” in the sense intended by the 
ROTD.  
 
1.2.1 “Restraint of Trade”  
Classic examples of “restraints of trade” in personal contracts include post-
termination non-competition clauses and non-solicitation of customer clauses. 
Importantly, other types of clauses may be regarded as “restraints of trade” even if 
they are not framed as express prohibitions. Whether a particular clause is a 
“restraint of trade,” according to the Privy Council, must be “determined not by the 
form the stipulation wears but ... but by its effect, in practice.”27 The High Court 
framed the issue as follows: “if an artiste is effectively able to be prevented from 
reaching the public over a prolonged period of time I find it unrealistic to say that 
this is not a contract in restraint of trade.”28 This pragmatic approach, based on the 
effect of the measure on the restrained party, ensures the availability of the ROTD 
to challenge a wide range of measures that may cause injury to the restrained party.  
On this basis, various measures in employment contacts that restrict the employee’s 
post-termination freedom have been classified as “restraints of trade.”29 Thus, a 
“profit sharing agreement” which allowed a former employer to claw-back income 
that the employee had already earned may be in “restraint of trade.” 30 Similarly, a 
clause providing that if an insurance broker places business with a different 
insurance company in a specified lengthy period following termination of his 
employment, a high percent of any commission must be paid to his former 
employer may be in “restraint of trade.”31 So-called “retention” provisions that 
cause the post-termination forfeiture of an employee’s earned commission to the 
ex-employer may be in “restraint of trade.” In Finnegan v. JE Davy, the Irish High 
                                                                                                                                       
contract, in which it appears that a party has acted unreasonably, unfairly or oppressively so as to 
restrict another party, usually the plaintiff in the action, in the exercise of his trade, profession or 
employment.”  
27 Stenhouse Australia v. Phillips [1974] AC 391, 402-03 (Lord Wilberforce).   
28 Silvertone Records v. Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152, 160.  
29 Covenants restricting employees during their employment do not come within the ROTD, see, for 
example, McArdle v. Wilson (1876) 10 ILTR 87. 
30 Stenhouse Australia  v. Phillips [1974] AC 391, 402 (Privy Council). 
31 Stenhouse Australia  v. Phillips [1974] AC 391. Also see Marshall V. NM Financial Management 
Limited [1995] 4 All ER 785, 791 (Jonathan Sumption QC) and Prudential Assurance Co. v. 
Rodrigues [1982] 2 NZLR 54.  
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Court refused to uphold a unilaterally imposed clause that deferred payment for 
one year of forty percent of a discretionary bonus to those employees believed to 
be likely to “defect” to a rival stock-broking activity.32 The Court rejected the 
employer’s depiction of the policy as an economic incentive to stay which did not 
restrict the employee because he was free to enter another employment. Once the 
Court had ascertained the substance and effect of the provision on the employees, it 
decided that the scheme was an absolute bar to any type of employment anywhere 
in the stockbroking business and, clearly, was in “restraint of trade.” For similar 
reasons, a clause whose effect, in reality, is to make the payment of pensions 
conditional upon post-employment fidelity to ex-employer is in “restraint of 
trade.”33 These examples show that the ROTD is available to ex-employees to 
resist the enforcement of de facto shackles that make any aspect of their income 
(such as bonus, commission, and pension) dependent on not competing with their 
former employer.  
It is significant that courts have recognised “restraints of trade” in several types of 
personal contracts other than employment contracts.  Examples of such other types 
of agreements to which a professional may be party include joint venture 
agreements,34 transfer of patents agreements,35 licensee agreements,36 franchises,37 
management and promotion contracts,38 independent contractor agreements,39 
agency agreements40 and consultancy agreements.41 A “Release Contract” that 
restricted the release of a rugby player from his club came within the scope of the 
ROTD even though, as the Court noted, it was “sui generis and far removed from 
                                                 
32 [2007] IEHC 18. 
33 See Wyatt v. Kreglinger and Fernau, [1933] 1 K.B. 793, 809 where Slesser LJ refused to find a 
distinction between the case in which an individual “expressly covenanted to exclude 
himself…from entering a specified trade and the case in which a person has agreed that a right 
which he would otherwise have would be defeated by entering the trade.” Similarly, in Bull v. 
Pitney Bowes, [1966] 3 All ER 384, 390 Thesiger J. stated that “ … the employer cannot achieve by 
the inducement of a continued pension that what he could not achieve by obtaining a direct promise 
in return for particular wages or salary.” 
34 Dawnay Day & Co v. de Braconier d’Alphen [1998] ICR 1068, [1997] I.R.L.R 442. 
35 Dranez Anstalt v. Hayek [2003] FSR 32. 
36 Office Overload v. Gunn [1977] FSR 39 (CA).  
37 Vendo  v. Adams [2002] NI Ch 3. See also Fleet Mobile Tyres Ltd v. Stone and Ors [2006] EWHC 
1947 (QB). 
38 Watson v. Praeger [1991] 3 All ER 487, [1991] 3 All ER 487. See also Proactive Sports 
Management Ltd v. Wayne Rooney, Stoneygate 48 et al [2010] EWHC 1807 (QB). 
39 Winnipeg Livestock Sales Ltd. v. Plewman 192 D.L.R. (4th) 525 Court of Appeal in Manitoba. 
40 Marshall v. NM Financial Management Ltd  [1995] 1 WLR 1461. See also Berry, Birch & Noble 
Financial Planning Ltd v. Berwick & Ors [2005] EWHC 1803 (QB). 
41 John Michael Lapthorne v Eurofi [2001] EWCA Civ 993. 
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the ordinary run of cases” where the ROTD usually comes into play.42 The scope or 
applicability of the ROTD to provisions is affected by the consideration that the 
measure may, in practice, negatively impact the economic interests of the 
restrained professional. 
 
A diverse range of provisions in non–employment contracts can be regarded as 
“restraints of trade.” As Chapters Three and Seven examine several such examples 
in detail, this section gives only a flavour of the type of provision that may be 
regarded as a “restraint of trade.”  The first example is that of “solus” (exclusive 
purchase) obligations in standard motor fuels supply agreements. In  Esso 
Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd, three judgments of the 
House of Lords took the view that the ROTD applies to restrictions on existing 
freedom.43 For example, Lord Reid stated that the ROTD applies where someone 
“contracts to give up some freedom which he would otherwise have had” and noted 
that the garage owners had restricted their right to sell petrol supplied to them by 
others.44 The second example comes from Schroeder where the House of Lords 
applied the ROTD to restrictions in an exclusive services contract because they 
appeared to “be unnecessary or to be reasonably capable of enforcement in an 
oppressive manner.”45 Thus, a one-sided standard form lengthy exclusive services 
contract between a writer and a music publishing company was in “restraint of 
trade.” The third example comes from Days Medical Aids where an unlimited 
renewal clause in an exclusive distribution contract was held to be in “restraint of 
trade.”46 A fourth example of a “restraint of trade” is “financial incentive to the 
agent not to carry on business in the specified field.”47 In Marshall, a self-
employed agent was paid wholly on the basis of commission which comprised 
initial commission and renewal commission. His contract provided for the 
continued receipt of renewal commission post-termination only if he complied with 
                                                 
42 Leeds Rugby Limited v. Harris & Bradford Bulls Holdings Ltd [2005] EWHC 1591 (QB) para 46. 
43 [1968] AC 269. 
44 [1968] AC 269, 298. See p 309 for the view of Lord Morris Borth-y- Gest and  for Lord Hodson’s 
view see  p 317. 
45 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308;  1314 (Lord  
Reid) HL affirming [1974] 1 All ER 171 (CA). The songwriter was granted a declaration that the 
contract was contrary to public policy and void. The decision was affirmed by Court of Appeal and, 
unsuccessfully, appealed to the House of Lords.  
46 Days Medical Aids Ltd v. Pihsiang Machinery & Ors [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm.).  
47 Marshall v. NM Financial Management Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1461, 1465. 
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highly restrictive conditions, including not working for a rival for one year post-
termination. In light of the diversity of these provisions (that are all contained in 
non-employment contracts) it is important to seek the reason why they are regarded 
as “restraints of trade.” 
In deciding whether a particular provision is a “restraint of trade” courts can 
examine its potentially negative implications for the restrained person. This focus 
on the person ensures the ROTD is available to protected restrained persons who 
are not employees even where the provision is drafted in an apparently innocuous 
format. That the ROTD’s scope is determined according to the negative de facto 
impact of a provision on the restrained party makes the ROTD a valuable legal 
instrument for professionals in many circumstances. Furthermore, the ROTD’s 
scope and, consequently, the protection it may offer to professionals is enhanced 
because courts are not swayed by the form or title of a clause when determining 
whether a “restraint of trade” exists.  
 
1.2.2 Test of Reasonableness  
 
This section shows how the ROTD’s test of reasonableness can protect the interests 
of professionals who agreed to “restraints of trade” in employment and other types 
of contract.48 The restrained party may be either a defendant (resisting an 
application for an Order to enforce the restriction) or a plaintiff (seeking an Order 
that the “restraint of trade” is void). 
 
                                                 
48 It is not suggested that all “restraints of trade” are invariably struck down. See, for example, 
Thomas v. Farr plc [2007] EWCA Civ 118 where an ex-employee unsuccessfully sued his former 
employer for breach of contract and the Court of Appeal ordered that the restrictive clause be 
enforced. See also TFS Derivatives v. Morgan [2005] IRLR 246 (Cox J.).  
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Lord Macnaghten set out the classic statement of the test and its rationale in 
Nordenfelt as follows: 
“All interference with individual liberty of action in trading and all 
restraints of trade themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to 
public policy and, therefore void. That is the general rule. But there are 
exceptions: restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of 
action may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case. It 
is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the 
restriction is reasonable - reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of 
the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the 
public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the 
party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way 
injurious to the public.”49  
 
The starting attitude of the ROTD towards “restraints of trade” is an antipathetic 
one. It insists that “all restraints of trade” must be justified as reasonable if they are 
to be enforced by courts.50 The ROTD presumes all “restraints of trade” to be void 
unless they have been justified as being reasonable both inter partes and in the 
“public interest.”51 The question of reasonableness is one of law for a court to 
adjudicate.52 There are two elements or limbs to the reasonableness test. The first 
limb tests whether the restrictive measure is reasonable inter partes.   
 
1.2.2.1 Reasonable inter partes 
 
When deciding whether “restraint of trade” has been justified as being reasonable 
inter partes, courts have to take account of the interests of the restrained party and 
of the restraining party. The ROTD takes a sterner attitude to post-termination 
restrictions in employment agreements than to post-termination restrictions in 
agreements for the sale of business.53 This distinction recognises that ex-employees 
                                                 
49 Nordenfelt v.Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd [1894] AC 535, 565.  
50 Some “restraints of trade” cannot be justified. For example, a bare prohibition against competing 
(sometimes termed “a covenant in gross”) irrespective of the amount of consideration is void. See 
British Reinforced Concrete v. Schieff [1921] 2 Ch 563, 576; Mc Ellistrem v. Ballymacelliott Co-
operative Agricultural and Dairy Society Ltd [1919] AC 548, 564; Vancouver Malt and Sake 
Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Vancouver Breweries Ltd [1934] AC 181, 190 (Privy Council) and Apple Corps 
Limited and Another v. Apple Computers Inc [1991] 3 CMLR 49 (CA). 
51 Judicial and academic opinion is divided as to whether a “restraint of trade” is void or voidable. 
See S. Mehigan and D. Griffiths “Restraint of Trade and Business Secrets: Law and Practice” 
(Longman 1985), 28. 
52 Mulligan v. Corr [1925] IR 169,175. 
53See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd [1894] AC 535, 566 where 
Lord Macnaghten stated that courts should subject “apprenticeship and cases of that sort” to closer 
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are in different relationships with their other contracting party than vendors of a 
business. The relative status of the parties affects how their respective interests are 
treated by courts. 
 
Employment contracts are next examined in order to show the high level of 
protection available to ex-employees under the reasonableness inter partes test. 
This research is interested in the protection accorded to ex-employees for two 
reasons. Firstly, the fundamental principles that guide the application of the test to 
employment contracts may be applied to other types of personal contracts such as 
exclusive services agreements, consultancy agreements and franchises. Secondly, it 
will be argued later that ex-employees are disadvantaged if the applicability of the 
ROTD is ousted by the application of competition law to employment contracts. 
 
When applying the inter partes limb of the reasonableness test, courts decide which 
interests of the restraining party are worthy of protection. Some examples where 
courts narrowly define the legitimate protectable interests of the restraining party 
are next examined. 
 
1.2.2.1.1 Employment contracts  
The ROTD does not allow an employer either to prohibit a former employee from 
competing54 or to unilaterally impose financial or practical restrictions on an 
employee departing to compete.55 An employer may protect only “legitimate 
interests.” The classic “legitimate interests” of employers are “trade connections” 
and trade secrets. 
In order to be allowed protect something on the basis that it is “trade connection,” 
the employer must satisfy the court that there is something more than merely 
                                                                                                                                       
scrutiny, than agreements for “the sale of a business or dissolution of partnership.” For more recent 
similar statements see JA Mont (UK) Ltd v. Mills [1993] FSR 577.  
54 See Countrywide Assured Financial Services Ltd v, Deanne Smart, Marc Pollard  [2004] EWHC 
1214, para 20 where Laddie J. observed that what counsel for the employer “is really saying is that, 
because (the employee) has been an exemplary employee of the claimant and that will no doubt 
have generated good will for the claimant, his client does not want him to work with somebody else. 
That does not appear to me to be a legitimate interest to be protected by the employer.” 
55 See Finnegan v. JE Davy [2007] IEHC 18 where the Irish High Court noted that the bonus could 
be paid to an employee departing to a non-competing activity (but not if he went to a rival) and, on 
this basis, rejected the employer’s argument that its purpose was to finance the recruitment of a 
replacement employee.   
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customer contact at stake. Recently, in Russ v. Robertson the employer of an estate 
agent was not allowed to protect his customer base.56 Frequent contact, alone, 
between the employee and customer is not a sufficient basis for seeking 
protection.57 Restriction will only be permitted if the employer establishes that the 
employee has a certain level of “magnetism” 58 or influence vis-à-vis customers. To 
quote the Irish High Court, a restriction will not be upheld unless the employer 
shows that an employee “might obtain such personal knowledge of, and influence 
over, the customers of his employer as would enable him, if competition were 
allowed, to take advantage of his employer's trade connection.”59 Thus, an 
employee cannot be restricted merely by an employer claiming that “trade 
connection” is at stake.  
When deciding whether particular information constitutes a protectable “trade 
secret” courts may similarly take a strict approach. In order to be allowed 
protection the information must be a secret of the “particular employer and not a 
general secret of the trade.”60 In addition, the secret must be essential to the 
employer’s business, one that he disclosed to the employee during the employment 
in confidence and be of “such character that if disclosed to a rival they would 
seriously prejudice employer; and that if employee is allowed to work for rival 
there would be imminent, real danger of those secrets being disclosed to and 
confiscated by rival.”61 The Court of Appeal in Faccenda Chicken Ltd v. Fowler 
                                                 
56 [2011] EWHC 3470 (Ch). 
57 See Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland  Inc. v. Witter (1952) 105 NE 2d 685,695 where 
Hoover J. gave the example of  an elevator operator, whose departure,  notwithstanding the most 
frequent contact with his employers’ customers, would not cause tenants to quit their apartment 
building. He further speculated that if the  “….Deans  of the Harvard and Yale Law Schools 
exchanged chairs it might be very unflattering  to see how few if any of their students would try to 
follow them.” 
58 See Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland  Inc v. Witter (1952) 105 NE 2d 685, 699 where 
Hoover J. explained that, as the employer  seeks to show “that the customer will automatically 
follow the employee” four questions should be addressed. These are: “1. How powerful a hold did 
the employee get on the customer? There are strong magnets and weak ones. Some can lift only a 
small coin. Some can lift tons. 2. How difficult is the particular customer to move? What are the 
employer’s holds? What are the customer inconveniences? A magnet must be considered in the light 
of the load to be lifted. 3. How far does the employee have to move the customer? 4. Does this 
employee have a powerful enough hold to pick this customer up and move him that far?”  
59 Murgatroyd and Co v. Barry Purdy [2005] IEHC 159. 
60 Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland  Inc. v. Witter (1952) 105 NE 2d 685.  
61 Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland  Inc. v. Witter (1952) 105 NE 2d 685, 696. See also 
Thomas v. Farr, [2007] EWCA Civ 118 where the Court of Appeal upheld an earlier decision that a 
firm of insurance brokers specialising in social housing had a legitimate continuing interest in 
protecting information from being used by its former managing director in the following categories 
i) business development  through the use of a captive insurer, ii) exploitation of new areas of 
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did not allow a restraint on ex-employees using information on the former 
employer’s pricing and customer details.62 It can be difficult to convince a court 
that important commercial information is a trade secret which may be protected by 
a “restraint of trade” clause.  
Any claim by an employer for protection outside these two categories of 
“legitimate interests” must be founded on the “identification of some advantage or 
asset inherent in the business which can properly be regarded as, in a general 
sense, his property.”63 This is a strict test and, as such, takes good care of 
employees’ interests. Some employers have sought to restrain their employees from 
soliciting colleagues and have argued that protecting the stability of “their” 
workforce is a legitimate interest. This argument has been accepted by some 
courts,64 while other courts refuse to regard staff as company assets “like apples or 
pears or other stock.”65 Another knotty issue is whether an employer can restrain 
the exercise of his employee’s personal talents. Lord Wilberforce was keen to 
ensure ex-employees’ post-termination freedom to use “to the full any personal 
skill or experience even if this has been acquired in the service of his employer.”66 
In Lord Shaw’s view, “a man’s aptitudes, his skill, his dexterity, his manual or 
mental ability … are not his master’s property: they are his own.”67 Under the 
“property” paradigm it can be difficult for employers to establish a “legitimate 
interest” to restrain the employee’s personal skills.68  
                                                                                                                                       
business within social housing, iii) exploitation of new geographical markets, iv) business 
development through acquisition of other businesses and v) pricing and financial information 
relating to clients and insurer. 
62 [1987] 1 Ch 117 and applied in AT Poeton (Gloucester Plating) Ltd v. Michael Ikem Horton 
[2001] FSR 169. At an earlier stage in the litigation in Faccenda Chicken [1987] 1 Ch 117,137, Mc 
Neill J. was prepared to allow the protection of “material which, while not properly described as a 
trade secret, is in all the circumstances of such a highly confidential nature as to require the same 
protection as trade secret eo nominee. His judgment mentions four criteria: firstly the nature of the 
employment, secondly the nature of the information, thirdly, the extent to which the confidential 
nature was impressed on the employee and finally the ease of isolating the information from other 
information which the employee was free to use.  
63 Stenhouse (Australia) Ltd. v. Phillips  [1974] AC 311, 322 (Privy Council). 
64 See Alliance Paper Group v. Prestwick [1996] IRLR 25 where the restriction was limited to 
senior staff. See further Dawnay Day & Co v. de Braconier d’Alphen [1998] ICR 1068, 1111 where 
Evans LJ stated that “an employer’s interest in maintaining a stable well trained workforce is one 
which he can properly protect within the limits of reasonableness.”Also see SBJ Stephenson v. 
Mandy [2000] IRLR 233, 238-9. 
65 Hannover Insurance Brokers v. Schapiro [1994] IRLR 82 (Dillon LJ). 
66 Stenhouse (Australia) Ltd. v. Phillips [1974] A.C. 391 (Privy Council).  
67 Herbert Morris v. Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688, 714. 
68 See Thomas v. Farr [2007] EWCA Civ 118 at para 39 where Toulson LJ noted that the word 
“property” was being used only in a general sense as it is established that (apart from any 
 29
 
It must be noted that even “legitimate interests” are entitled only to an adequate 
level of protection. Thus, if a restraint “goes further than to afford adequate 
protection to the party in whose favour it was granted” the restraint is prima facie 
void.69 In assessing the reasonableness of “restraints of trade,” courts examine the 
type of restraint and its scope in terms of subject matter, duration and geographical 
reach.70 Courts will not allow a “restraint of trade” if the employer’s interest can be 
adequately protected by a less restrictive covenant. Thus, a non-competition clause 
will not be permitted where less restrictive types of clauses such as a non-
solicitation clause and a confidentiality obligation would offer adequate 
protection.71 Courts will not enforce a restriction whose scope exceeds the 
operation of the employer in terms of customers72 or territory.73 That courts make a 
calibrated assessment is evident from the statement that “…as the time of the 
restriction lengthens and the space of its operation extends, the weight of the onus 
on the covenantee grows.”74 This comment shows that the burden of justification 
borne by the employer increases in proportion to the level of restrictions that he 
seeks to impose on the employee. Courts’ strict scrutiny of the extent of protection 
sought by an employer benefits the former employees. 
 
The inter partes analysis requires that thorough consideration be given to the 
circumstances and interests of both parties. This chapter is more interested in the 
protection the ROTD offers to restrained party. When judging whether the desired 
level of protection is reasonable inter partes, courts must be sensitive to the impact 
                                                                                                                                       
obligations undertaken by contract) the law relating to confidential information is an equitable 
invention and is not based on the concept of information as property.  
69 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 300 (Reid L.J).  
70 See Allan Janes v. Johal [2006] EWHC 286 where a six mile radius from a small solicitor’s office 
was found to be excessive because it included a large number of businesses which had not been 
clients of the employing firm.  
71 Russ v. Robertson  [2011] EWHC 3470 (Ch) is a  recent example.  
72 Murgatroyd and Co v. Barry Purdy [2005] IEHC 159. 
73 See Greer v. Sketchley Ltd [1979] IRLR 445 where it was decided that a restraint on an employee 
from entering new employment in “any part of the United Kingdom” when the employer was active 
only in part of the UK is excessive. It distinguished Littlewoods Organisation [1977] 1 WLR 1472 
which is a majority decision of Court of Appeal enforcing a 12 month post- termination restraint on 
a senior executive which, if literally interpreted, could include very far flung employers. See also 
Mulligan v. Corr [1925] 1 IR 169, 175 where the Irish Supreme Court stated that “a restriction 
imposed to protect a business which was not in fact being worked and might never be set up was 
quite unreasonable.”  Also, see Allan Janes LLP v. Johal [2006] EWHC 286 (Ch). 
74 M&S Drapers v. Reynolds [1957] 1 WLR 9, 12 (Hodson LJ). 
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of the provision on the former employee’s interests. It is clear that courts can take a 
strict attitude when assessing whether the interest of the employer is a legitimate 
one that may be protected. How the ROTD’s protective attitude to former 
employees may benefit persons who have agreed to “restraints of trade” in other 
types of contracts is next discussed.  
 
 
1.2.2.1.2 Personal Contracts other than Employment Contracts 
 
Sometimes, when courts assess the reasonableness of a restraint in non-
employment contracts, they treat the restrained individual as if he is an employee 
and thereby accord him a higher level of protection. For example, if a salaried 
partner is treated as an employee when assessing a restraint in the sale of business 
contract, it gives him greater protection than he would otherwise receive as a 
vendor of a business.75 One licensee was even described in a judgment from the 
Court of Appeal as “a kind of “cross-breed” and the judge expressly assumed that 
he was an employee for the purposes of the case.76   
 
In Fleet Mobile Tyres Ltd v. Stone and Ors, the High Court took an interesting 
approach when deciding how to regard a one year post-termination non-
competition clause in a franchise.77 The Court specifically stated that while the 
analogy of vendor and purchaser is helpful and, often, determinative, this particular 
franchise had features that showed it was not an “at arm’s length” relationship.78 In 
particular, the Court noted the franchisor’s control over pricing, branding and re-
branding and that he had treated franchisees as if they were “truculent 
employees.”79 On this basis, the Court found the franchise relationship to be more 
analogous to an employment relationship and expressly declined to follow earlier 
case law which had found a one year post-termination non-competition clause in a 
                                                 
75 Briggs v. Oates [1991] 1 All ER 405; Clarke v. Newland [1991] 1 All ER 397 and  Kerr v. Morris 
[1987] Ch 90, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 662. 
76 See Office Overload v. Gunn [1977] FSR 39, 43 where Lawton LJ stated that “... he is like a 
labrador ‘with a touch of white’-he may have had an ancestor who was a pointer, and therefore 
cannot be called a true labrador, but he looks like a labrador, and for the purposes of this case I am 
prepared to assume that the defendant is an employee and to apply the employee tests.”  
77 [2006] EWHC 1947 (QB). 
78 Para 119. 
79 ibid. 
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franchise to be reasonable.80 Even where the person is not expressly treated as an 
employee, courts may take account of his de facto weaker position in the 
relationship. In Vendo plc v. Adams the High Court in Northern Ireland (Girvan J.) 
noted that the franchisor set the price of the service, bore the risk of bad debts, 
negotiated with customers and passed their orders onto the franchisee, subtracted 
an administration fee from the payment by customer and insisted that the 
franchisee use products exclusively supplied at prices set by the franchisor.81 
Girvan J. refused to grant an injunction to enforce a post-termination non-
competition clause.  
 
There is evident concern for a relatively weaker contracting party in the judgments 
of the House of Lords in Schroeder deciding that the publishing house had failed to 
justify as reasonable its lengthy and “one sided” exclusive services contract.82 
These judgments will be analysed in Chapter Seven and, for this reason, this 
section makes only brief observations about their focus on the impact of the 
contract on the songwriter. Lord Diplock asked whether the bargain was “fair” and 
enquired whether the restrictions on the songwriter are “both reasonably necessary 
for the protection of the legitimate interests of the promisee [publishing company] 
and commensurate with the benefits secured” to the promisor songwriter.83 Lord 
Reid stated that duration is an important factor when assessing reasonableness and 
noted there was no evidence as to why the lengthy duration period was necessary to 
protect the publishing company’s interests.84 While the contract specified duration 
of five years, the Court noted it could be extended to ten years if the royalties 
exceeded a specified modest sum. The Court further noted that the songwriter 
would receive no payment (apart from an initial small sum) unless his work was 
published but the publishers were not obliged to publish. Additionally, it noted that 
he had no right either to terminate the contract or to get the re-assignment of 
                                                 
80 It expressly did not follow Dyno Rod plc v. Reeve [1999] FSR 149 where Neuberger J. had 
decided that the franchise was far more similar to a transfer of business agreement than to an 
employment agreement and, on that basis, allowed a one year post-termination non-competition 
clause.  
81 [2002] NI Ch D 95 
82 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R.1308, 1315  (Lord 
Reid).  
83 ibid 
84 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1312. 
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copyright in the event of non publication. Finally, the contract assigned 
full copyright from the songwriter globally in every musical composition in which 
he would have an involvement. 
 
It is important to note that the protection available under the ROTD is not confined 
to performers in the field of sport or entertainment and may extend to other 
professionals. The Court of Appeal in Credit Suisse expressly accepted the 
relevance of the case law on performers in a case involving restrictions on 
chartered accountants.85 Self-employed professionals in the commercial sector have 
been protected by the ROTD. Lapthorne v. Eurofi involved a self-employed 
chartered accountant who entered a consultancy agreement which provided that if 
he provided services other than the “Services” to clients of the company, payment 
could only be made to the company [and to not the accountant].86 The Court of 
Appeal found that the clause was too wide to protect “legitimate interests” of the 
company. It noted that the company was not obliged to provide the consultant with 
work, and the clause was not limited to clients with whom the consultant had 
contact during the course of providing services. The Court decided that the 
company’s legitimate interests could have been adequately protected by a suitably 
worded post-termination clause.87 In Marshall v. NM Financial Management Ltd, 
the Court decided that a clause prohibiting the self-employed agent from engaging 
post-termination in any business or employment was  impossible to justify as 
reasonable and decided that the business of the agent “including the goodwill 
arising from his reputation and connections was his own property.”88 In Berry, 
Birch & Nobel Financial Planning Ltd v. Berwick & Ors, a company was denied 
an interim injunction against its former agents to enforce prohibition on dealing 
with the company’s 20,000 clients and other potential clients when the agents had 
dealings with a maximum of 1,500 clients.89 The Court decided that the clause was 
“effectively a clause against competition” which would be too wide to be 
                                                 
85 Credit Suisse Asset Management v. Armstrong [1996] ICR 882, 893 where Neill LJ remarked on 
how persons have a “concern to work and a concern to exercise their skills” and that this applies not 
only to artists and singers who depend upon publicity but also to “skilled workmen and even to 
chartered accountants.” See further the remarks of Dillon C.J. in Provident Financial Group v. 
Hayward [1989] ICR 160, 168. 
86 [2001] EWCA Civ 993 (Tuckey L.J.).  
87 Para 28. 
88 [1995] 1 WLR 1461, 1465. 
89 [2005] EWHC 1803 (QB).  
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reasonable.90 It also decided that the contract’s definition of “confidential 
information” was so broad as to encompass information that was trivial, and/or 
publicly available and to encompass “matters which are part of an agent’s general 
skill and knowledge which he is entitled to take away” with him.91 These cases 
evidence two important points. Firstly, the protection of the ROTD is not limited to 
inexperienced persons in the entertainment world and, secondly, self–employed 
professionals can be protected by the ROTD.  
 
The ROTD will not allow a restraining party to enforce “restraints of trade” 
contained in either employment or other contracts that are unreasonable in the 
interests of the restrained party. When deciding what is reasonable inter partes, 
courts examine the reality of the relationship as between the parties. The ROTD 
allows courts to take account of the extent to which the restrained person’s 
economic interests are intimately intertwined with and, in effect, determined by the 
restraining party. The reasonableness inter partes limb of the test protects parties in 
many circumstances because it specifically directs courts’ attention to ascertaining 
the impact of the impugned measure on the party, even if he is not an employee.  
 
1.2.2.2. Reasonable in the “public interest”   
Where a “restraint of trade” is justified as reasonable in the parties’ interest, courts 
will not enforce it unless it is justified as reasonable in the “public interest.” The 
insistence that restrictions must be reasonable in the “public interest” may render 
some restrictions on professionals contained in personal contracts unenforceable. 
While the inter partes limb undoubtedly offers good protection, the “public 
interest” limb may, on occasion, also protect some restrained professionals who 
seek to resist a restriction. 
A court may recognise a “public interest” in ensuring that the public enjoys 
unfettered choice when selecting their preferred provider of professional personal 
services.  In Sherk, the Ontario High Court of Justice refused to enforce a restraint 
                                                 
90 Para 30. 
91 Para 15. The restriction was drafted so broadly that it would prevent the disclosure of information 
so trivial as, for example, the venue for the Christmas party. 
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against an obstetrician by his former employers.92 In its view, pregnant patients 
who had consulted an obstetrician before he left the clinic were “part of the public 
who, having confidence in the defendant, are entitled to have the benefit of his 
continuing care.”93It noted how restrictive covenants between medical people 
tended to “further limit the right of the public to deal with a profession.”94 In 
Oswald Hickson Collier v. Carter-Ruck the Court of Appeal examined a 
Partnership deed that prevented a departing partner from approaching or acting for 
any of the solicitor firm’s clients unless they had been introduced by him to the 
firm.95 Lord Denning MR stated that the “client ought reasonably to be entitled to 
the services of such solicitor as he wishes.”96These judgments show how the 
scrutiny of the restriction through the “public interest” lens shifts attention on to the 
freedom or right of the public to have unrestricted access to their preferred 
professionals.  
A restriction on a person’s political freedoms may be unreasonable from the 
perspective of the “public interest.” Neville v. Dominion Canada News Co involved 
an agreement not to report a financier’s financial matters in a particular newspaper 
in return for cancelling some of the newspaper owner’s debt to the financier.97 
Following the publication of material in violation of the agreement, the financier 
tried to sue for the debt. Lord Cozens-Hardy found the clause to be unreasonable. 
While the court did not refer expressly to the “public interest”, Buckley argues the 
clause could not be “regarded as otherwise than against public policy.”98 The same 
reasoning may be taken to particular contractual obligations on professionals. For 
example, contracts between the Irish Health Service Executive (HSE) and medical 
consultants since 2008 reportedly include a “gag” clause that forbids new 
consultants to talk about the terms and conditions under which they treat public 
patients. It may be that such clauses that limit freedom of speech may not be 
reasonable in the “public interest.”   
                                                 
92 Sherk v. Horwitz [1972] 2 OR 451. 
93 Sherk v. Horwitz [1972] 2 OR 451, 458. 
94 Sherk v. Horwitz [1972] 2 OR 451, 456. 
95 [1984] 2 All ER 15. 
96[1984] 2 All ER 15, 18. 
97 [1915] 3 KB 556 (CA). 
98 R.A. Buckley, Illegality and Public Policy (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed. 2009) 564. 
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These judgments show that, sometimes, the requirement that the clause must be 
reasonable in the “public interest” can lead to a restriction in a personal contract 
being declared unenforceable.  
  
1.2.3 Conclusion on Personal Contracts  
 
Section 1.2 demonstrated how the ROTD offers protection to various professionals 
who are party to diverse “restraints of trade” contained in employment and/or other 
contracts. Essentially, the ROTD allows a restrained party to resist the enforcement 
of unreasonable contractual clauses. The ROTD’s protection stems, firstly, from 
the basis of its decisions on the scope of “restraint of trade.” The inclusive and 
effects-based attitude of the ROTD makes it widely available to various persons 
(not just employees) who wish to resist measures that negatively affect their 
economic interests.  It is significant that the ROTD is available where the 
restrained party is relatively weaker and the terms are either unnecessary or capable 
of enforcement in an oppressive manner.  Secondly, the ROTD’s protection stems 
from its test because it insists that “restraints of trade” must be justified as 
reasonable. In particular, the inter partes element of the reasonableness assessment 
is important as it requires discrete account to be taken of the restrained party’s 
interests. While most cases involving restraints on personal contracts are resolved 
under the inter partes limb, sometimes, the “public interest” limb may be useful for 
some professionals.  
 
The key point is that how courts approach the ROTD’s scope and its test make it a 
valuable measure for professionals in diverse circumstance who are party to 
various types of restrictive personal agreements.   
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1.3. RULES & THIRD PARTY ARRANGEMENTS 
  
This section examines how the ROTD may be applied to various clauses contained 
in measures that were not directly negotiated by the restrained person. Such a 
measure may be in either an arrangement made by third parties (for example rival 
employers) or in rules issued by an authoritative body.99 Section 1.3, firstly, 
considers interpretations of “restraints of trade” and, then, examines how the 
“reasonableness” test has been applied.  
 
1.3.1 “Restraints of Trade” 
 
Agreements by two parties that restrict the opportunities of others (third parties) to 
compete may come within the reach of the ROTD. For example, a mutual “non 
poaching agreement” between two rivals not to employ each other’s staff without 
each other’s written consent may be in “restraint of trade.”100 In Consultants & 
Designers, Inc v. Butler Service Group, Butler agreed to supply skilled engineering 
and design persons to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).101 The contract 
precluded employees who were contracted by Butler from working for TVA or for 
any other technical service firm on TVA projects for a specified period following 
the termination of Butler’s contract. When a rival (C& D) tried to hire Butlers’ 
employees for a TVA project, Butler obtained an injunction under the ROTD.  
 
The first reported case of the ROTD applying to restrictive rules of an association 
involved prohibitions on any member from employing “any traveller, carman, or 
outdoor employee, who has left the service of another member, without the consent 
in writing of his late employer, until after the expiration of two years from his 
leaving such service.”102 The association unsuccessfully sought to prevent an 
employer from employing an ex-employee of a fellow member. In Gunmaker’s 
                                                 
99 Trades union and trade associations are exempted from the ROTD for several purposes by s. 11 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. See, for example, Goring v. British 
Actor’s Equity Association [1987] IRLR 122. 
100 Kores Manufacturing Co. Ltd .v Kolok Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1959] Ch. 108. 
101 720 F2d 1553 (11th Cir 1983) discussed by M. Glick, D. Glick and D. Hafe, “The Law and 
Economics of Post –Employment Covenants: A Unified Framework” [2002] 11 Geo Mason L Rev. 
357. 
102Mineral Water Bottle Exchange and Trade Protection Society v. Booth (1887) 36 Ch D 465. 
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Society v. Fell, the Society fined a member for breach of its rule which prohibited 
members either supplying gun barrels to non-members or stamping gun barrels on 
their behalf.103 Trebilcock has described this case as a bridge between the old guild 
cases and the modern cases dealing with self-governing professions.104 Binding 
provisions of commercial entities and collective organisations may be “restraints of 
trade.” In McEllistrim, the House of Lords applied the ROTD to a cooperative 
scheme that altered its terms so that it penalised members who sold their milk other 
than to the cooperative and, moreover, did not allow membership to be terminated 
without permission.105 
 
Courts have identified “restraints of trade” in third party measures (not only where 
there are express direct non-competition edicts) where there are de facto 
impediments to a professional working or competing as he wishes. For example, 
restrictions on hours of its members’ operations, conditions of employment 
(including wages) and resale prices of goods contained in byelaw of a Society 
established by a Royal Charter were “restraints of trade.”106 The ROTD was 
applied to a prohibition in a code of conduct against registered architects practising 
as surveyors, real estate agents or valuers.107 De facto restrictions on sports 
professionals contained in regulations have been found to be “restraint of trade.” In 
Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd and Ors, Wilberforce J. applied 
the ROTD in an action against Newcastle United Football Club, the Football 
League and the Football Association because their “retain and transfer” system 
restricted players’ freedom to play with other clubs and, thus, was in “restraint of 
trade.”108 In general, rules made by organisers of professional sports competitions 
which “seek substantially to restrict the area in which a person may earn his living 
in the capacity in which he is qualified to do so” may be in “restraint of trade.”109 
Even a partial restriction on freedom may, depending on its impact on the 
restrained persons, be in “restraint of trade.” In Adamson, the Australian High 
                                                 
103 Gunmakers Society v. Fell 125 E.R. 1227. 
104 M.J.Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(Toronto: The Carswell Company, 1986) 201.  
105 McEllistrim v. Ballymacelliot Cooperative  Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548.  
106 Jenkin v. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1921] 1 Ch 392.   
107Hughes v. Architects Registration Council of the United Kingdom [1957] 2 QB 550.  
108 [1963] 3 WLR 574 (Ch). 
109 Greig v. Insole [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302, 345.  
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Court applied the ROTD to a complex “mechanism agreed by rugby clubs that 
limited the professional players’ freedom to play for their club of choice within 
Rugby League” competitions.110 Other disqualification rules have been classified 
as “restraints of trade.” Examples include a change in rules which retrospectively 
disqualified cricketers if they played for rival promoter,111 rules preventing member 
snooker players from joining a rival tour without written consent112 and rules 
denying New Zealand players “clearance” to play abroad.113 Rules prescribing 
qualifications may be “restraints of trade.” A residency requirement may be a 
“restraint of trade” if a professional player is prevented from playing for his club of 
choice.114 This shows the ROTD’s concern to ensure not just a theoretical freedom 
to contract or to work but also to ensure real freedom of choice. In Johnston v. 
Cliftonville, Football League regulations which capped the maximum bonuses and 
wages payable by football clubs were held to be in “restraint of trade.”115 This 
decision is interesting because it ensures the players’ opportunity to earn 
marketplace levels of income rather than artificially capped income.  
 
The key point is that courts will recognise a “restraint of trade” even where the 
provision falls short of an express prohibition on competing. The concept of 
“restraint of trade” is interpreted inclusively by courts with a keen eye to 
identifying de facto negative impact on restrained persons’ interests and 
opportunities. 
 
1.3.2 Test of Reasonableness   
 
How the ROTD’s test can be interpreted and applied by courts in ways that protect 
persons who are restrained by third party measures is next examined. Under the 
ROTD, a “restraint of trade” contained in rules of associations or in third party 
                                                 
110See Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League. (1991) 31 FCR 24, para 29 where Gummow J. 
identified the “essence of the restraint is in the operation of the combination which controls the 
affairs of the League and the clubs.”  
111 Greig v. Insole [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302. 
112 Hendry v. World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association Ltd. Sub.nom. Hendry v. 
WPBSA [2002] U.K.C.L.R.5, [2002] E.C.C. 8 (Ch D). 
113 Blackler [1968] NZLR 547. 
114 Avellino v. All Australia Netball Association Ltd [2004] WL 366, 522.  
115 Johnston v. Cliftonville Football and Athletic Club and Irish Football League Limited [1984] 2 
NIJB 9. For similar outcome in a New Zealand judgment see Stiniato v. Auckland Boxing 
Association [1978] 1 NZLR 1, CA (NZ).  
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contracts cannot be enforced unless it is justified as being reasonable inter partes 
and in the “public interest.” This test is next examined in three steps as follows: 
first, the requirement of inter partes reasonableness, then, reasonableness in the 
“public interest” and, thirdly, the level of justification required.  
 
1.3.2.1. Reasonableness inter partes  
 
Although, the restrained person is not a strictly a “party” to restrictions in third 
party contracts or rules of an association, the ROTD may take account of his 
interests when assessing the reasonableness of  “restraints of trade.” A player’s 
freedom to choose his club (especially where it is the prestigious one) has been 
recognised as an important interest under the ROTD.116 How courts may focus on 
the impact of a restriction on the restrained professional is next highlighted.  
 
 In Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd and Ors, Wilberforce J. 
emphasised that the effect of the transfer and retention scheme operated by football 
clubs was to prevent footballers from escaping the club league.117 He stated that 
ROTD does not allow restrictions on sportsplayers using elsewhere skill acquired 
during training or from experience gained through membership of a club’s 
organisation.118 In Greig, the Court recognised that restrictions on a professional 
cricketer would derive him of the opportunity of “making his living in a very 
important field of his professional life.”119  
 
Only “legitimate interests” of the restraining entity may be protected. If these 
interests are strictly defined the position of the restrained person is protected. In 
Hendry, the High Court accepted that the “legitimate interests” of the incumbent 
snooker promoter (WPBSA) included its broadcasting contracts and its support of a 
wider group of players than those which would interest the putative rival tour 
promoter (TSN) and also included a wider spread of prize money than newcomer 
                                                 
116 Greig v Insole [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302. See also Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd 
(1991) 31 FCR 242. 
117 [1963] 3 WLR 574. 
118 See Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club and Ors [1963] 3 WLR 574 (Ch) 431 where 
Wilberforce J. relied on Leng v. Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763. 
119 Greig v. Insole [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302, 354.  
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TSN which was motivated solely by commercial profit.120 Financial investment in 
training and in overseas tours were recognised as protectable interests of the New 
Zealand Rugby League which sought to protect them  with a “clearance” system to 
ensure that players on whom the League expended money would make a 
contribution to the sport.121 Stability of team membership and strength of team has 
been accepted by the High Court of Australia as “legitimate interests.”122 The case 
law on the stability of sports teams may guide UK courts in relation to defining the 
interests of employers in protecting their employees in the financial services 
against poaching by departing colleagues.123  
 
1.3.2.2 Reasonableness in the “public interest”  
  
Sometimes, a broad attitude to defining the “public interest” may benefit restrained 
professionals. When assessing the reasonableness in the “public interest” of rules 
courts may take into account some cultural or other intangible criteria. For 
example, a New Zealand Court did not uphold a restriction on sportspersons 
playing overseas and noted that in a “young country it is necessary that its citizens 
should have the opportunity of gaining wider experience in their chosen field in the 
larger overseas countries.”124 In Macken v. O’ Reilly, a showjumper challenged an 
official policy requiring Irish riders to use Irish bred horses when competing 
internationally.125 Hamilton J. in the Irish High Court accepted that the policy 
inhibited an Irish showjumper’s efforts to maintain his position as one the “world’s 
leading showjumpers and if he fails to maintain that position the public will be 
deprived of a great deal of pleasure.”126 In these cases, because a broad attitude is 
taken to defining the “public interest” the restriction is unenforceable and the 
restrained professional happens to benefit.  
 
                                                 
120 Hendry v. World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association Ltd. Sub.nom. Hendry v. 
WPBSA [2002] U.K.C.L.R. 139 
121 Blackler [1968] NZLR 547, 572. See also  Kemp v. New Zealand Rugby Football League Inc 
[1989] 3 NZLR 17  and  J .D. Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (Sydney: Butterworths, 2nd 
ed. 1999) 206. 
122 Buckley v. Tutty 125 CLR 353.   
123 Hannover Insurance Brokers v. Schapiro [1994] IRLR 82, (CA). See also P.J. Sales, “Covenants 
Restricting Recruitment of Employees and the Doctrine of Restraint of Trade” (1988) 104 LQR 600 
124 Blackler [1968] NZLR 547, 555. 
125 [1979] ILRM 79. 




Professionals who are restrained by third party measures may be protected when 
courts take a strict attitude to the standard of justification expected from the 
restraining entity. When courts decide whether the restraining entity has adduced 
satisfactory evidence to justify a restriction, they may take account of the relative 
vulnerability of the restrained person. For example, a judge of the Australian 
Federal Court stated that where a professional sportsperson is de facto compelled 
by a scheme agreed by football clubs to join a club that is not of his choice, the 
level of justification for the restriction would have to be “extraordinarily 
compelling.”127 In Johnston v. Cliftonville, the High Court of Northern Ireland 
decided that the Irish Football League had not adequately substantiated its claim 
that its caps on the maximum bonuses and wages payable by football clubs 
prevented the two wealthiest clubs from “capturing the best players by offering 
higher wages than the other clubs could afford.”128 The Court decided that 
insufficient evidence was adduced to support the argument that the effect of a 
“free-for–all on wages” would lead to financial disaster for the smaller clubs. The 
Court took an exacting view of the level of evidence required. It decided that a 
general survey of the League clubs’ finances and not just those of Cliftonville 
would need to have been adduced.129 These cases show that courts may take a stern 
attitude as regards the evidence needed to establish justification and, in this way, 
protect the restrained person’s interests.  
  
                                                 
127 See Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League. (1991) 31 FCR 242, para 61 where Wilcox J. 
stated “[T]o restrain a person from entering the employment of a particular person, or from 
following a particular trade or occupation, so as to safeguard the interests of the covenantee by 
whom that person was once employed or to whom the covenantor has sold a business is one thing; 
to compel a person – on pain of surrendering his or her occupation altogether- to enter the service of 
someone whom he or she has not chosen  is another. If the rule which has the latter effect can ever 
be said to be reasonable, the case in justification must be extraordinarily compelling.”  
128 Johnston v. Cliftonville Football and Athletic Club and Irish Football League Limited [1984] 2 




1.3.3 Study: Dickson v. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain 
 
In order to give a deeper appreciation of how the ROTD may be applied to third 
party measures, this section studies one case in detail. Dickson v. Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain was selected for this study because it is the first case in 
which the ROTD was applied to the regulatory type activities of a professional 
association in the UK.130   
 
A motion was passed by a special general meeting of the Pharmaceutical Society of 
Great Britain. It provided that (except with Council approval) new pharmacies 
should be situated only in physically distinct premises and may sell only 
pharmaceutical professional and traditional goods. In addition, it prohibited 
existing pharmacies from extending the range of non-traditional products. This 
measure was successfully challenged by a director of Boots Pharmacy as being, 
inter alia, in “restraint of trade.” Pennycuick J granted a declaration and 
injunction.131 His decision was unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal and, 
again, appealed unsuccessfully to the House of Lords.132  
 
Pennycuick J. first had to deal with the question of the ROTD’s scope. It was 
argued that the Society’s motion itself was not enforceable in a court or before a 
tribunal and was at most a “statement of the views of the society to be taken into 
account by members in honour and by the statutory committee when considering 
whether a member has been guilty of misconduct.”133 Pennycuick J. cited the test 
set down by Macnaghten J. in Nordenfelt which provides that “all interferences 
with individual liberty of action in trading” are in “restraint of trade.” Pennycuick 
J. decided that courts must look at the content of a given operation and “the steps 
which may be taken to carry it out” and if the measure interferes “with a liberty of 
action in trading, then it [is] a restraint of trade for the purposes of public 
policy.”134 This approach to deciding what is a “restraint of trade” is an “effects” 
                                                 
130 Dickson v. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1970] AC 403(HL). 
131 [1967] Ch. 708. Pennycuick J. 
132 [1970] AC 403. 
133 [1967] Ch. 708. 719, Pennycuick J.  
134 [1967] Ch. 708. 717. 
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based test which takes account of commercial realities over form and, as such, 
benefits the restrained person. The Court decided that the Society’s measure was a 
“restraint of trade.” Thus, it fell to the Society to offer evidence to the Court that 
the measure was justified as being reasonable in the interest of parties and in the 
“public interest.” However, the Society chose not to make this pleading and, on this 
basis, Pennycuick J. disposed of the case.135 
 
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning MR appeared keen to subject the measure to 
the ROTD rather than to dispose of the case on a pleading point. He observed that 
the Society’s measure was not agreed to by all members.136 He further noted that 
professional associations, unlike trades union, do not have any statutory exemption 
from the ROTD. Although the Society chose not to plead justifications, Lord 
Denning MR expressly considered the three circumstances that it had “fully 
canvassed” before Pennycuick J.137 These were, firstly, that selling non-traditional 
goods distracted pharmacists from proper pharmaceutical work and meant they 
could not supervise it properly; secondly, that selling non-traditional goods affected 
the number and quality of new entrants; and thirdly, that selling non-traditional 
goods negatively affected the status of a pharmacist. Lord Denning MR noted the 
absence of evidence to support these arguments and commented that the leaders of 
the profession in fact sold non- traditional goods such as photographic goods and 
wine. He decided that the rule was not reasonable in the interests of the members of 
the profession. This finding meant it was unnecessary to consider whether the 
measure was reasonable in the “public interest.” Nonetheless, he expressed 
considerable doubt that the measure was reasonable in the “public interest” on the 
grounds that “if pharmacists are to be confined to traditional goods it may lead to 
fewer pharmacies available only at great distances.”138 
 
                                                 
135 See [1967] Ch. 708,720 where Pennycuick J. expressed himself to be unhappy to decide the 
matter on an issue of pleading but noted it was the deliberate choice of defendants not to make the 
pleading. 
136 [1967] Ch. 708, 747. Of the 29,004 members only 5, 026 members cast votes. Of these only 1, 
346 members voted in favour. 
137 [1967] Ch. 708, 748. 
138 [1967] Ch. 708, 749. 
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Sachs LJ., similarly, did not want the case to turn on a pleading point and dealt 
with the points “canvassed with exemplary care” before the lower court.139 He 
agreed with Lord Denning MR’s assessment that the measures were not reasonable 
inter partes. Then, he further opined that the measure would be unreasonable in the 
“public interest” for three reasons. These are that the measure would; firstly, cause 
smaller pharmacies to close for economic reasons; secondly, lessen the profitability 
of pharmacies and increase dispensing charges to customers and, thirdly, tend 
against opening of new shops and expansion of existing to “meet the wishes” of the 
public. Sachs LJ expressed the view that these consequences outweighed any 
advantage to be gained by improving the status of pharmacists.  
 
Taking a similar tack, Danckwerts L.J. observed that it is a convenience to the 
public to have the opportunity of buying many types of goods and it would be 
plainly contrary to the “public interest” if pharmacists “had to close down for 
financial reasons and it would obviously be against the interests of pharmacists if 
this should occur.”140 
 
Although the Court of Appeal judgments can be criticised from procedural 
perspectives, they offer some interesting insights for this chapter. In particular, they 
show the eagerness of the Court of Appeal to apply the ROTD, on substantive 
grounds, even where the restraining entity refused to submit pleadings. This shows 
a determination to ensure that the ROTD’s broad scope and applicability was both 
secured and well understood. Their concern for the restrained professional’s 
freedom is notable. It seems clear that the Court of Appeal  intended the ROTD to 
be an effective instrument for professionals whose freedom to trade in a desired 
mode was restricted by rules or regulations.  The dicta in judgments on the “public 
interest” are also interesting. The perceived detriment to the public (decreased 
choice of shop) was confidently asserted by the judges notwithstanding the absence 
of any evidence in the form of economic studies of market impact. Without doubt, 
the effectiveness of the ROTD from the perspective of a restrained professional 
was enhanced by these judgments from the Court of Appeal 
 
                                                 
139 [1967] Ch. 708, 758. 
140 [1967] Ch. 708, 750. 
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The judgments delivered by the House of Lords in this case are also noteworthy for 
establishing stoutly how the ROTD applied to this type of restriction on 
professionals. They clearly addressed the scope of the ROTD by stating clearly that 
the measure was in “restraint of trade” and, thus, required justification.141  
 
Lord Upjohn expressly rejected the argument that professional bodies are outside 
the ROTD and noted there is no exception in favour of professions.142 Nonetheless, 
he said that professionals must submit to some rules because clients can expect 
from professionals “the highest standards of ethical conduct.”143 In his view:  
“a profession is a vocation of the highest standing: it calls on its members to 
serve (no doubt for reward) the public by offering them highly technical 
and always confidential advice and services which require a different 
standard of conduct from tradesmen.”144  
Thus, in his view, certain restraints on professionals are justifiable “for they are not 
only necessary in the interest of the profession but of the public who trust to the 
peculiarly high standing and integrity of a profession to serve it well.”145  
 
In Lord Wilberforce’s view, it was immaterial that the members were not bound 
contractually to observe the rule as the ROTD had never been limited to contractual 
arrangements. In support, he referred to Lord Macnaghten’s statement in 
Nordenfelt that the ROTD applies to all “interferences with individual liberty.”146 
This indicates a willingness to take a broad approach to defining the availability of 
the ROTD. Lord Wilberforce noted that the Society refused to plead justification 
and commented that Pennycuick J had correctly dealt with the case on that basis. 
He continued by remarking on how the Court of Appeal gave the Society the 
benefit of a position it did not take up and how this creates a difficulty for judging 
evidence. Lord Wilberforce was not prepared to accept unquestioningly arguments 
that were not supported by evidence that the restraints might cause a reduction in 
                                                 
141 [1970] AC 403. For Lord Reid’s view see p 420-1.  Lord Morris of Borth-y –Gest found it 
“beyond argument” that compliance with the rule was in “restraint of trade” (p 426). Lord 
Wilberforce stated that the measure was plainly on its face in “restraint of trade” (p440). 
142 [1970] AC 403, 436. 
143 [1970] AC 403, 437. 
144 [1970] AC 403, 436. 
145 [1970] AC 403, 436-7. 
146 [1970] AC 403, 440. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd [1894] 
AC 535, 565. 
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the number of pharmacies.147 Wilberforce LJ preferred to base his decision on a 
more certain ground which was that there was nothing “to displace the normal 
proposition that the public has, in the absence of countervailing considerations, an 
interest in men being able to trade freely in the goods they judge the public wants 
and that these restraints clearly, severely and arbitrarily restrict this freedom.”148 In 
this way, Lord Wilberforce, robustly, cemented the wide ranging scope of the 
ROTD and the onus it places on restraining entities to justify restrictions that they 
seek to impose. 
   
The Dickson case is notable for the clear insistence by the Courts, at each stage of 
the litigation, that the ROTD applies to restrictive measures on professionals’ 
businesses even if the professional is not a contracting party. Additionally, it is 
important to note that the judgments specifically focus on the potential negative 
impact of the measures on the professionals’ economic freedom and, in this way, 




This chapter showed that restrained professionals may call on the ROTD to resist 
many types of restrictive clauses whether contained in personal contracts 
(including but not limited to employment contracts) or in measures concluded by 
third parties such as an association. For presentational reasons, personal contracts 
are treated separately from third party measures. Nonetheless, there are threads or 
strands that are common to section 1.2 and section 1.3 regarding the protection 
offered by the ROTD to a professional irrespective of whether the restrictive 
measure is contained in a personal contract or a third party measure.  These 
common strands pertain to: firstly, the type of provision that may be regarded as a 
“restraint of trade”; secondly, the types of “legitimate interests” that may be 
protected and, thirdly, the approach to the “public interest.”  
 
                                                 
147 See [1970] AC 403, 441where Lord Wilberforce stated that he would require persuasion that it 
was proper to take such consideration into account under the ROTD (as opposed to proceedings in 
the Restrictive Practices Court) and moreover it would need to be evidenced rather than assumed. 
148 [1970] AC 403, 441. 
 47
The first common strand is that the scope of “restraint of trade” is broadly 
interpreted so that it captures not only express interdictions on competing but, also, 
de facto burdens/obstacles. From the perspective of a restrained person, this 
inclusive attitude to classifying “restraints of trade” is important as it ensures that 
the ROTD is available to protect professionals who are subject to practical 
shackles. The inclusive scope of the ROTD is secured when courts focus on the 
“practical workings of the alleged restraint rather than merely ... its legal form.”149 
This approach allows courts to go behind the express terms in order to appraise the 
potential impact on the restrained person. The result is that ROTD may apply to a 
wide variety of de facto restrictions whether contained in contractual or non-
contractual measures even if they are not drafted in expressly restrictive terms. 
While this activism may be criticised for being paternalistic, the key point for this 
chapter is that the scope of “restraint of trade” is inclusive because it is informed by 
the impact of a clause on the restrained person’s economic interests and, 
consequently, the protection available under the ROTD is effective and valuable. 
  
The second common strand is that restrained professionals are protected when 
courts recognise only some interests of the restraining party/entity as meriting 
protection. By strictly defining the “legitimate interests” of the restrainor under the 
inter partes examination, courts keep a rein on what may be protected. Moreover, 
the inter partes nature of the test protects the restrained professional’s freedom to 
choose another contracting party such as his manager or his employer.150 The 
freedom of a professional to choose is closely connected with liberty to give his 
professional services (such as songwriting or sporting services) exclusively to a 
chosen entity. An analogous point can be made in relation to a professional’s 
freedom to decide how to trade without undue impediment from third party rules.  
 
The third strand is that the ROTD flexibly accommodates diverse and intangible 
criteria under the umbrella of the “public interest.” This may be useful, sometimes, 
as protecting these interests may happen to benefit the individual restrained 
                                                 
149 Petersville v. Peters (WA) Carr J (1999) FCA 5 para 14. For a similar view expressed by the Irish 
High Court see Finnegan v. JE Davy  [2007] IEHC 18. 
150 See Warren v. Mendy (1989) ICR 525 where the Court of Appeal refused to grant an injunction 
to a manager seeking to prohibit a rival manager from acting for a sports professional because this 
order, in  reality, would compel the sports professional  to keep the original manager. 
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professional. This may occur where the court identifies a public interest in enjoying 
the fruits of the services performed by the liberal professional (obstetrician/ lawyer) 
or sports person in an unrestricted way.  
 
These three strands ensure that significant protection is available under the ROTD 
to professionals to resist enforcement of a wide variety of restrictions. The breadth 
and depth of the ROTD’s protection is valuable. Moreover, its attention to the 
interests of the restrained person makes it a valuable legal instrument for 









This research argues that the interface between the ROTD and competition law is 
significant because restrained persons’ interests are treated differently under each 
of these legal regimes. Chapter One showed that the interests of restrained persons 
are discretely considered and protected by the ROTD because it refuses to uphold 
“restraints of trade” unless they are justified as being reasonable both in the parties’ 
interests and in the “public interest.”  
 
This chapter seeks to explain how the interests of restrained professionals may not 
be protected by EU competition law. To this end, it examines some determinations 
of the EU Courts and of the European Commission that certain restrictions on 
persons are not prohibited by Arts 101-2 TFEU. These determinations demonstrate 
that, in certain circumstances, EU competition law does not strike down particular 
restrictions on professionals even in situations where the person’s freedom to 
compete is restricted. It is important to emphasise that the aim of this chapter is not 
to argue that EU competition law takes the wrong approach but, rather, to explore 
why it does not protect the interests of some restrained professionals. This chapter 
is a companion to Chapter One and, together, they seek to demonstrate that, from 
the perspective of restrained persons, the ROTD and competition law in the UK are 
significantly different legal instruments.    
 
 
Section 2.2 provides an overview of Art 101. Section 2.3 analyses some 
determinations that restrictions contained in bilateral personal contracts are not 
prohibited by Art 101(1). Section 2.4 examines determinations that certain 
restrictions contained in rules are not prohibited by Art 101(1). Section 2.5 
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sketches how some restrictions on persons may be permitted by Art 101(3). 
Finally, section 2.6 briefly examines how Art 102 does not prohibit some 
restrictions on persons contained in rules of associations. 
 
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF ARTICLE 101 
 
Art 101(1) prohibits some restrictions on competition and Art 101(3) exempts some 
restrictive provisions that are otherwise prohibited by Art 101(1). Specifically, Art 
101(1) prohibits agreements and concerted practices between undertakings and 
decisions of associations of undertakings which have as their object or effect the 
distortion of competition and which may appreciably affect trade between Member 
States. If, following an objective assessment of a provision’s aims, pursued in the 
given economic context,151 a provision is found to have an anticompetitive object, 
then a finding that Art 101(1) is infringed can be made without further analysis.152 
However, where the object of a provision is not found to be anti-competitive, a 
determination of an infringement of Art 101(1) can be made only if the provision 
may produce an appreciable, actual or potential, restrictive effect on competition.153 
When assessing the effect of a provision, account must be taken of the actual 
economic and legal context. This contextual analysis includes examining the 
products/services covered by the agreement, the relevant market structure and the 
actual conditions of its operation.154 Also, the state of competition that would exist 
in the absence of the particular provision can be taken into account in assessing the 
effect of the provision.155  
 
This chapter is most interested in determinations that a restriction is either i) not 
prohibited by Art 101(1) or ii) is permitted by Art 101(3). The relationship between 
Art 101(1) and Art 101(3) has been much debated. The two main lines of argument 
                                                 
151 Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83 CRAM & Rheinzink v. Commission [1984] ECR 1679, para 262. 
152 Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig Verkauf s GmbH [1966] 
ECR 405 para 39. See also Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer v. Commission [1987] ECR 
405, para 39. 
153 See Case 6/69 Volk v. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295 para 7 where the Court of Justice states that 
Art 101(1) is not infringed if the arrangement’s effect on competition is not significant  “taking 
account of the weak position which the parties concerned have on the market.”  
154 Case 56/65 Sociéte Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 234, 249-50. 
155 Case 42/84 Remia BV and  NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia v. Commission [1985] ECR 2545.  
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can be summarised as follows:156 The traditional view of the European 
Commission is that restrictions of competition infringe Art 101(1) and are void 
under Art 101(2) unless they satisfy the criteria of Art 101(3).157 However, the EU 
Courts (and sometimes the European Commission) have decided that certain 
restrictions on competition do not infringe Art 101(1). Determinations that a 
measure is not prohibited by Art 101 [either paragraphs (1) or (3)] are significant 
for restrained persons because their interests are not safeguarded by these 
determinations. In such situations, the interface between Art 101 and the ROTD is 
crucially important because of the possibility that the interests of restrained persons 
may be better treated by the ROTD.158 
 
 
2.3 ARTICLE 101(1) and PERSONAL CONTRACTS 
 
To date, there is relatively little case law on the application of Art 101 on restraints 
on professionals contained in personal contracts. The paucity is, perhaps, due to the 
requirement to establish an appreciable effect on interstate trade before Art 101 
becomes applicable.159 That said, it is important to note that the interstate effect 
requirement is not insuperable in light of, firstly, the expansive interpretations 
accorded to this requirement by the EU Courts and, secondly, the easily traversed 
border between certain Members States. Consumers readily travel from Ireland to 
avail themselves of professional services (such as dentistry) in Northern Ireland. 
Thus, the applicability of EU competition law to restraints on professionals in other 
types of bilateral contracts such as consultancy agreements, quasi-employment 
agreements and exclusive services contracts is not fanciful. In any event, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, EU competition law deeply affects the 
interpretation of domestic competition law in the UK.  
 
                                                 
156 A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed. 2004) 258.  
157 White Paper on the Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) [1999] C 132/1, para 57. 
158 The interfaces between the ROTD and competition law are examined in Chapters Four and 
Five. 
159 Case 6/69 Volk v. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295.  
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Some determinations under Art 101(1) that do not prohibit restrictions on persons 
are next examined. The aim of the examination is to explore the reasoning of these 
decisions because of their negative implications for restrained persons.  
 
2.3.1 Art 101(1) and Franchises 
 
Franchises were selected as an example of personal contracts for two reasons. The 
first reason is that a franchise agreement is a viable business structure for various 
professionals such as optometrists, pharmacists and providers of veterinary and 
dental services.160 The second reason is that, as Chapter One showed, the ROTD 
specifically examines any negative implications for franchisees and ex-franchisees 
and it may render some post-termination restrictions unenforceable. For example, 
in Fleet Mobile Tyres Ltd v. Stone and Ors, the High Court applied the ROTD and 
decided that a one year post-termination non-competition clause was unreasonable 
because it prevented the ex-franchisee from carrying out his “occupation for a long 
time in so many places.”161 The extent to which Art 101(1) specifically recognises 
and vindicates the interests of franchisees is next explored.  
 
The Court of Justice considered the applicability of Art 101(1) to restrictions in a 
distribution franchise in Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard 
Schillgallis.162 It decided that Art 101(1) prohibits market sharing provisions and 
restrictions on price competition as between franchisees.163 However, from the 
perspective of a restrained franchisee, the Court took a narrow view of what 
constitutes “restrictions on competition for the purposes of Art 101(1).”164 
Crucially, the Court of Justice expressed the view that Art 101(1) does not prohibit 
provisions that are “essential” to avoid the risk that the franchisor’s “know-how” 
and assistance benefits, even indirectly, his rival(s).165 Additionally, the Court of 
                                                 
160 Specsavers is an example of a  well known franchise for optometrist services and products. 
Vetfranchise.com and easyvets.com are examples of veterinary franchises.  The website 
www.franchisemall.com lists many medical, optical and dental related franchises. 
161[2006]  EWHC 1947 (QB)  para 120. Also see Vendo v. Adams [ 2002] NI Ch 3 where the High 
Court of  Northern Ireland expressed concern for the negative impact of the restrictions on the ex-
franchisee’s ability to earn a livelihood. 
162 Case 161/86 Pronuptia de Paris  GmbH v Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] E.C.R. 353. 
163 Para 23. 
164 Para 16. 
165 Para 16. 
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Justice decided that Art 101(1) does not prohibit provisions that establish the 
control “necessary” for “maintaining the identity and reputation of the network.”166 
The Court of Justice’s approach, in this judgment, to Art 101(1) is significant 
because it does not assist franchisees who are subject to certain post-termination 
non-competition prohibitions and/or exclusive purchasing obligations in particular 
circumstances. The lynchpin of the Pronuptia test is the standard of “necessity.” It 
is interesting to explore how the “necessity” test operates when Art 101(1) is 
applied to restrictions in other types of agreements before returning to appraise its 
use in the Pronuptia judgment.  
 
In Reuter/BASF, the European Commission decided that a non-competition clause 
restraining a research chemist in an agreement for the sale of his business did not 
infringe Art 101(1).167 The Commission took this view because it specifically 
recognised that the restriction was essential to secure the transferred worth of the 
undertaking where the sale included not only material assets but also goodwill 
(including relations with customers) and know-how.168 It emphasised that any such 
restriction must be limited in its material scope and duration to attaining the 
legitimate object of the agreement which is to secure for the purchaser the full 
commercial value of the transfer.169 It is important to highlight the Commission’s 
view that “[C]ompliance by the seller with such non-competition clause means no 
more than he must respect his obligation under the agreement to transfer the full 
value of the undertaking.”170  
 
The Reuter/BASF Decision was expressly followed by Nutricia where the European 
Commission decided that Art 101(1) did not prohibit non-competition clauses in an 
agreement for the transfer of material assets and goodwill of two subsidiaries.171 It 
repeated its view (expressed earlier in Reuter/BASF)172 that restrictions against 
                                                 
166 Para 17 (emphasis added). 
167 Decision 76/743/EEC, Reuter/BASF [1976] 2 CMLR D44. 
168 Para 3. The Commission further noted at para 3 that “[W]hen the material assets of a business 
are sold it is not normally necessary to protect the purchaser by imposing a prohibition on 
competition on the seller. In the present case, however, the sale included goodwill and know-how; 
indeed these items constituted a substantial part of the assets transferred.”  
169 Para 3.  
170 Para 3. 
171 Decision 83/670/EEC  Nutricia[1983] OJ L 376/22. 
172 Decision 76/743/EEC, Reuter/BASF [1976] 2 CMLR D44, para 3. 
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“competition by the seller is a legitimate means of ensuring the performance of the 
seller’s obligation” to transfer the full value.173 It emphasised that the “protection 
accorded to the purchaser cannot be unlimited. It must be kept to the minimum that 
is objectively necessary for the purchaser to assume by active competition, the 
place in the market previously occupied by the seller.”174 On appeal, Remia BV and 
NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia v. Commission, the Court of Justice agreed that 
some non-competition clauses in a transfer of business agreement might not be 
prohibited by Art 101(1).175 It stated that “in order to have that beneficial effect on 
competition, such clauses must be necessary to the transfer concerned and their 
duration and scope must be strictly limited to that purpose.”176 Some words are 
emphasised by this author in order to convey the narrowly based stipulation that 
justifies the “necessity” approach which is to produce a beneficial effect on 
competition with a strictly limited restriction. The Pronuptia judgment is a 
worrying application of the “strictly necessary” standard that was expressed in 
Remia to deal with sale of business contracts.177 It is worrying (from the 
perspective of a franchisee) because the Court of Justice in Pronuptia apparently 
envisages a rather low standard of “strictly necessary.”  
 
In Pronuptia, the Court of Justice expressed the view that Art 101(1) does not 
prohibit two types of restrictions on franchisees.178 The first of these involves 
restrictions that are “essential” to prevent rivals benefitting from the franchisor’s 
“know-how.”179 On this view, Art 101(1) does not prohibit a ban on the franchisee 
either “opening a shop of the same or of a similar nature in an area where he may 
compete” with another member of the network for a “reasonable period” after the 
franchise ends or transferring his shop to another party without the prior approval 
                                                 
173 Decision 76/743/EEC, Reuter/BASF [1976] 2 CMLR D44, para  26. 
174 Decision 76/743/EEC, Reuter/BASF [1976] 2 CMLR D44, para 27. 
175 Case 42/84 Remia BV and NV Verenigde Bedrijven .Nutricia v. Commission [1985] ECR 2545, 
para  20. 
176  Ibid (emphasis added) . 
177 See V. Korah, “Pronuptia Franchising: The Marriage of Reason and the EEC Competition 
Rules” [1986] 8(4) EIPR  99, 120  where the author comments that if the clauses in Pronuptia can 
be justified even if the main transaction does not restrict competition then the Court of Justice went 
“a trifle further” than it did in Remia. 
178 The Court concluded that Art 101(1) prohibits franchisors from imposing resale price 
maintenance on franchisees.  
179 Para 16. 
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of the franchisor.180 It is important to highlight that the extent of post-termination 
restriction on the franchisees that is permitted by the Pronuptia approach can be 
considerable. The type of protection is absolute as it allows a ban on engaging in 
competing business and extends not only to secret know-how but includes 
commercial know-how.181 However, the judgment did not stipulate that, when 
deciding whether the post-termination restrictions were really “necessary,” courts 
must tease out whether the franchisors’ interests could be protected by measures 
that place a lesser restriction on the franchisees. The judgment does not insist on an 
inquiry as to whether the franchisors’ interests could have been adequately 
protected by lighter proscriptions on the franchisees such as, for example, 
stipulations against him passing himself off as a franchisee and/or against 
disclosing commercially sensitive information.  
 
Secondly, the Court of Justice stated that Art 101(1) does not prohibit restrictions 
on franchisees to create the control “necessary” to maintain a franchise network’s 
identity and reputation.182 On this basis, the Court of Justice specifically accepted 
that obligations on the franchisee “to sell only products supplied by the franchisor” 
(or his nominee) may be considered “necessary” for the protection of the network’s 
reputation in circumstances where it may be “impractical” (for retail fashion items) 
to set down objective quality specifications or “too expensive” to ensure that the 
standards are observed, for example, where there is a large number of 
franchisees.183 From the perspective of the restrained franchisee, the criteria of 
“impractical” and “too expensive” appear to be unduly indulgent views of what 
constitutes “necessary.” This view means that Art 101(1) will not assist the 
franchisee to challenge various exclusive purchasing obligations that restrict his 
opportunity to source goods (complying with the acceptable standard) elsewhere 
and, thereby, improve his competitive position. The Commission, in oral argument, 
had conceded that exclusive purchase obligations would allow the franchisor to 
foreclose the supply of other manufacturers’ products and, therefore, amounted to 
                                                 
180 Para 16. 
181 See J. Venit, “Competition and Industrial Property- Pronuptia- Ancillary Restraints or Unholy 
Alliances?” [1986 ]11(3)  ELR 213, 217 where the author draws attention to the privileged status 
granted by this judgment to commercial  as opposed to secret know-how.  
182 Para 17 (emphasis added). 
183 Para 21 (emphasis added). 
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non-competition clauses.184 The standard of “necessary” in Pronuptia does not 
offer protection to a restrained franchisee (and some third parties) against the 
negative consequence of the restriction. The Court of Justice accepted the exclusive 
purchase type of restriction because by “means of the control exerted by the 
franchisor on the selection of goods offered by the franchisee, the public is able to 
obtain goods of the same quality from each franchisee.”185 Arguably, the term 
“public” aggrandises the scale of the beneficiaries and they would be more 
accurately described as potential purchasers of the Pronuptia bridal paraphernalia.   
 
Restrained persons are disadvantaged if the “necessity” approach is applied to 
agreements which differ, in key aspects, to agreements for the transfer of non-
material assets. For this reason, it is important to examine how the “necessity” 
approach treats restrictions in contracts for transfer of such assets before assessing 
its use in relation to franchises.  
 
Restrictions such as non-competition clauses in contracts for the transfer of non 
material assets (such as goodwill) raise particular considerations. The Court of 
Justice has rightly recognised that following these agreements there is a risk that 
the vendor:   
“with his particularly detailed knowledge of the transferred undertaking, 
would still be in a position to win back his former customers immediately 
after the transfer and thereby drive the undertaking out of business. Against 
that background, non competition clauses incorporated in agreements for 
the transfer of an undertaking in principle have the merit of ensuring that 
the transfer has the effect intended.”186  
 
This quotation reveals that the Court of Justice’s view of the restriction is shaped 
by the need to ensure that the purchaser of goodwill gets what he bargained and 
paid for and, also, that he is protected against any subsequent raids on the goodwill 
by the already remunerated vendor. A properly negotiated and compensated 
                                                 
184 See J. Venit, “Competition and Industrial Property- Pronuptia- Ancillary Restraints or Unholy 
Alliances?” [1986]11(3)  ELR 213.  
185 Para 21. 
186 Case 42/84 Remia BV and NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia v. Commission [1985] ECR 2545  
para 19 (emphasis added). 
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restriction on the vendor may benefit both parties.187 The vendor gets a higher price 
because he agrees to a restriction and the purchaser gets the benefit of protection. 
Thus, there may be some convergence of the economic interests of both parties that 
is not undermined by the restriction.  
 
However, parties to other types of agreements have a different type of relationship. 
There are, at least, two key differences between restrained franchisees and 
restrained vendors of assets. These are, firstly, the balance of financial reward 
between the parties and, secondly, the commercial threat existing between the 
parties.  
 
Firstly, the financial relationship between the parties is different in a franchise 
agreement compared to an agreement for the transfer of business assets. It is “a 
virtual truism” that competition law does not prohibit limited restraints on vendors 
on the grounds that the buyer should receive what he has purchased.188 This is 
accepted because the restrained person is the vendor and accepts the restriction in 
order to inflate the price he receives. By contrast in a franchise, it is the restrainor 
and not the restrained person who receives the direct financial reward of the 
franchise entry fee and the ongoing royalty payments. Moreover, in a franchise, the 
restrained franchisee bears considerable financial risk within the relationship. The 
franchisee, at his own financial risk, sells the franchisor’s goods in premises 
bearing the franchisor’s name and symbol. The franchisor, of his own volition, 
offers the use of his know-how in return for both financial payments (initially and 
during the currency of the contract) and, additionally, the benefit of other 
restrictions on the franchisee during and after the contract. The franchisor bears 
comparatively less financial risk because he grants “independent traders, for a fee, 
the right to establish themselves in other markets using its business name and 
methods…”189  This relationship has been described by the Court of Justice as a 
                                                 
187 Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-250/92 Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforening and Ors v. Dansk 
Landbrugs Grovvareseskab AmbA [1994] ECR I-5641 offered exclusive supply brewery agreements 
as another example of a restraint supporting convergent interests.  
188 See J. Venit, “Competition and Industrial Property- Pronuptia- Ancillary Restraints or Unholy 
Alliances?” [1986] 11(3)  ELR 213, 219. 
189 Para 15. 
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“way for an undertaking to derive financial benefit from its expertise without 
investing its own capital.” 190  
 
The second important difference between franchises and agreements for the 
transfer of assets involves the balance of power in the parties’ dealings after the 
contract is concluded. A post-termination non-competition clause in a sale of 
business cushions the initial operation of the buyer at a time when he is most 
vulnerable to the recent vendor of goodwill. A post-termination restriction in a 
franchise excludes the ex-franchisee from competing when he no longer has the 
right to use the “know-how.” The ex-franchisee, in contrast to a recent vendor of 
the goodwill of a business, is far less equipped to be a competitive threat in the 
period just after the relationship is concluded.  
 
Following the Pronuptia approach, Art 101(1) does not prohibit certain restrictions 
on franchisees although the restrictions may negatively impact on the competitive 
position of third parties. For example, in an optometrist franchise, an exclusive 
purchase obligation of spectacle frames restricts the commercial freedom of the 
franchisee to source competing products from third party producers. Thus, the 
restrictions may affect competition not just between the parties or between the 
optometrist franchisor and his rivals but also competition among producers of 
spectacle frames who cannot sell to the franchisees.  
 
The term “ancillary restraints” is not expressly mentioned in the decisions and 
judgments of either Remia or Pronuptia.191 However, this term has been used by 
some commentators to describe the approach taken in some cases.192 For example, 
Venit comments that Pronuptia applies the “ancillary restraint” doctrine in the 
                                                 
190 Para 15. 
191 See Métropole Television v. Commission [2001] ECR II 2459, [2001] 5 CMLR 1236, para 104  
where  the General Court described an ancillary restraint as one that is “directly related and 
necessary to the implementation of a main operation” and cited the Commission’s Notice on 
Ancillary Restraints OJ [1990] C 203/5 (which has since been replaced).     
192 See J. Venit, “Competition and Industrial Property- Pronuptia- Ancillary Restraints or Unholy 
Alliances?” [1986]11(3)  ELR 213. There is debate over whether the term “ancillary restraints” 
doctrine is the correct one to use in relation to what occurs under Art 101. See G. Monti,  EC 
Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007) 35-6 where the author suggests 
that “collateral restraint” is a better label for the EU practice and identifies a suggestion in the case 
law that “a restraint is ancillary when it concerns the behaviour of the parties outside the framework 
of the agreement (e.g. the agreement is about the sale of a business, the non-compete clause is about 
restricting the seller’s activities).”  
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sense of “identifying the legitimate purpose of the contractual arrangements and 
then excluding from the prohibition on restrictive agreements all contractual 
provisions that are reasonably related to the successful realisation of these 
legitimate purposes.”193 He argues that the Court in Pronuptia went further than the 
European Commission’s traditional approach which would have found the 
exclusive purchasing and post-termination non-competition clauses to infringe Art 
101(1) and then, most probably, to satisfy the criteria in Art 101(3).194  
 
There is debate about how this doctrine is employed under Art 101. For example, 
Jones and Sufrin argue that the “ancillary restraint” doctrine is difficult to accept 
because it relies on an alleged distinction between proportionate restraints 
objectively necessary to the implementation of a main non-restrictive operation 
(which are ancillary and fall outside Art 101(1)) and, on the other hand, restraints 
which are indispensable to achieve efficiencies which offset anti-competitive 
effects of the transaction which can be assessed only under Article 101(3).195 In 
their view, the “ancillary restraints” doctrine separates the main transaction from 
restraints.196 This chapter does not attempt to resolve this debate and is interested in 
the “ancillary restraints” doctrine only as a grid for conducting an analysis of how 
the interests of restrained persons are treated by Art 101. The doctrine is useful as a 
structural grid to isolate what interests are analysed under each paragraph of Art 
101. This grid highlights the level of protection that is offered to restrained 
professionals under Art 101(1) and (3). The grid is also useful because it attaches 
importance to whether the determination (that the restriction is not prohibited) is 
made under Art 101(1) or under Art 101(3).  
 
This chapter’s interest in the debate regarding the relationship between Art 101(1) 
and Art 101(3) is narrowly focussed on where within Art 101 the interests of 
restrained persons are considered. In Pronuptia, when the Court of Justice took the 
                                                 
193 See J. Venit, “Competition and Industrial Property- Pronuptia- Ancillary Restraints or Unholy 
Alliances?” [1986]11(3)  ELR 213, 219. 
194 This is the approach envisaged under the then applicable EU Regulation 1983/83.  
195 A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text , Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed.  2011) 232. 
196 See ibid where the authors state that the ancillary restraints view is “hard, if not impossible to 
square with the view that pro-competitive effects cannot be weighed against anti-competitive effects 
identified” in the context of Article [101](1).  
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perspective of a prospective franchisee, it accepted that he may not wish to invest 
his own money (“paying a relatively high entry fee and undertaking to pay a 
substantial annual royalty”) without his prospect of profitability being enhanced by 
some degree of protection against competition by the franchisor and other 
franchisees. This consideration, however, according to the Court of Justice, “is 
relevant only to an examination of the agreement in light of the conditions in Art 
101(3).”197 Notably, the Court did not envisage these interests being addressed 
when Art 101(1) is applied. Thus, it seems that Art 101(1) need not pay great 
attention to the impact of the restrictions on the restrained franchisee. 
 
However, Art 101(1) takes care to understand and protect the interests of the 
franchisor and his network of franchisees. Art 101(1)’s attitude to franchisees may 
be explained by the view that franchises are valued business mechanisms that are 
encouraged in order to enhance market competition.  In Pronuptia, the Court of 
Justice described franchisees as fortunate “traders who do not have the necessary 
experience” who gain access to methods which they could not have learned without 
considerable effort and who benefit from the reputation of the franchisor’s business 
name.198 This view suggests that franchisees, in order to receive the benefits of 
involvement in a franchise, must accept some restrictions that protect the 
intellectual property of the franchisor. Art 101(1)’s permissive approach to some 
restrictions can be explained by a desire to make franchises an attractive business 
method to potential franchisors and thereby encourage new entry and promote 
competition for the benefit of consumers.  
 
The European Commission, too, takes the view that, in general, vertical restrictions 
may produce benefits such as efficiencies and the creation of new markets.199 Some 
negative effects of vertical restraints have been recognised and debated.200 Notably, 
                                                 
197 Para 24. 
198 Para 15. 
199 See Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ [2010] C 130/1, para 6 which states 
“[V]ertical restraints are generally less harmful  than horizontal restraints and may provide 
substantial scope for efficiencies” and para 107 which sets out nine (non-exhaustive) arguments in 
favour of vertical restraints.   
200 For example, see Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in Competition Policy, COM (96) para 54 
which states “[E]conomists are becoming more cautious in their assessments of vertical restraints 
with respect to competition policy and less willing to make sweeping generalisations, and vertical 
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in the main, any negative effects are so classified on the grounds of their impact on 
consumers201 and on the integration of the market202 rather than on their negative 
impact on the economic freedom of the restrained party.  
 
2.3.2 Conclusion on Art 101(1) and Bilateral Contracts 
 
From the perspective of a restrained person, Art 101(1) takes a lenient approach to 
certain restrictions in personal contracts. This is understandable when the restrained 
person is a vendor of non-material assets. However, from the perspective of other 
types of restrained persons, such as franchisees, this approach to Art 101(1) fails to 
safeguard their interests.203 It is clear that Art 101(1) may determine that a 
restriction is necessary to give effect to a particular contract and reach this 
determination without taking fullest account of the restriction’s impact on the 
restrained person’s interests. In practice, even onerous restrictions on franchisees 
may be seen as being “necessary” because alternatives are either impractical or too 
expensive for the franchisor. Thus, the “necessity” approach to Art 101(1) does not 
thoroughly safeguard the interests of some restrained professionals. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
restraints cannot all be regarded as per se beneficial for competition.” See also R. Bork, The 
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself  (Basic Book 1978 reprinted in 1993)  
201 See W.S. Comanor “Vertical Price-Fixing,Vertical Market Restrictions and the New Antitrust 
Policy” [1985] 98 Harv LR 983. 992-3 where the author states that “the mere fact that the services 
are profitable for the manufacturer is not sufficient evidence that all-or even most- consumers 
benefit from their supply....Economic theory alone cannot predict whether the imposition of vertical 
restraints .... will benefit consumers and enhance efficiency.”   
202 For example, see The Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in Competition Policy, COM (96) 
721 para 7 which states that “market integration enhances competition in the Community. 
Companies should not be allowed to recreate private barriers between Member States where State 
barriers have been successfully abolished.”Also see Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ [2010] C 
130/1, para  100 which lists four negative effects on the market that may stem from vertical 
restraints including “the creation of obstacles to market integration, including, above all, limitations 
on the possibilities for consumers to purchase goods or services in any Member State they may 
choose.” 
203 See Case 26/96 Metro SB –Grossmaerkte v. Commission [1977] ECR1875, [1978] 2 CMLR 1 
where Art 101(1) did  not prohibit restrictions in a selective distribution agreement. See also Case 
258/78 LC Nungesser KB v. Commission [1982] ECR 2015, [1983] 1 CMLR 278 where Art 101(1) 
did not  prohibit restrictions in open exclusive licences of plant breeders’ rights. 
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2.4 ARTICLE 101(1) and RULES  
 
This chapter treats the application of Art 101(1) to rules separately from its 
application to bilateral contracts, not just to match the layout of Chapter One 
(which is important) but also because, in practice, rules receive a particular 
treatment under Art 101(1). The Treaty (unlike competition legislation in some 
Member States and in other jurisdictions) does not make express provision to 
temper the application of competition law to rules of professional associations. 
While the EU Courts and the European Commission have declined to exclude rules 
of professionals from the remit of Art 101, they interpret Art 101(1) on a case by 
case basis.204 Art 101(1) does not prohibit some restrictive rules, in some 
circumstances, even where they impede a professional’s capacity to offer 
innovative competition that is undesired by the restraining entity. Three cases 
where restrictive rules imposed on members were found not to infringe Art 101(1) 
are next examined. 
 
2.4.1 Selected Cases  
 
The first analysis is of Gottrup Klim and it shows that Art 101(1) does not prohibit 
certain restrictions contained in the rules of a commercial cooperative.205 This case 
is interesting because it influenced the reasoning adopted in the other two 
examined cases that involve restrictions on professionals (namely patent agents and 
lawyers). The common focus of the analyses in the three cases is on how the 
interests of the restrained members were treated by Art 101(1). This focus or 
inquiry is sharpened by highlighting where the analyses take greater care of 
interests other than those of restrained persons. 
 
In Gottrup-Klim, the Court of Justice stated that Art 101(1) does not invariably 
prohibit rules of a purchasing cooperative that prohibit concurrent membership of 
                                                 
204 See T- 144/99 Institute of Professional Representatives v. Commission [2001] ECR II- 1087, 
para 64, where the General Court refused to accept that “rules which organise the exercise of a 
profession fall as a matter of principle outside the scope of Article [101](1) merely because they are 
classified as rules of professional conduct by the competent bodies.” (Emphasis added).  
205 Case C-250/92 Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforening and Ors v. Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareseskab 
AmbA [1994] ECR I-5641.  
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rival entities.206 The Court accepted that dual membership of a competing 
cooperative would “jeopardise both the proper functioning of the cooperative and 
its contractual power in relation to producers.”207 Notably, the Court of Justice 
sought to protect the proper functioning of the cooperative which was a wholly 
voluntary commercial venture that individuals chose to join and abide by its 
mandatory rules which were designed to maximise its profitability for their benefit. 
The cooperative had no public law status or role either in law or in reality. It could 
be argued that safeguarding the cooperative’s “proper functioning” has the effect of 
enhancing its purchasing strength. From another perspective, the restrictive rule 
placed the cooperative’s members “off limits” for rival cooperatives and, also, 
prevented the members from the benefits of concurrent membership of another 
cooperative. In this case, the unsuccessful challenge under Art 101(1) came from a 
potential new entrant that sought to compete with the incumbent cooperative which 
enjoyed a monopsonistic position. It is plausible that a restrained member may 
wish to challenge this kind of rule.208  
 
In the next two cases that are selected for study, Art 101(1) did not prohibit certain 
restrictions in rules binding professionals. The first case is Institute of Professional 
Representatives European Patent Office which arose following the notification to 
the European Commission of a Code of Conduct for patents agents.209 The second 
case is Wouters which is an Art 267 TFEU preliminary reference judgment 
following a challenge to the rules of the Dutch Bar by a restrained lawyer. These 
cases were chosen for analysis because they demonstrate how poorly Art 101(1) 
may protect the interests of professionals whose freedom to offer innovative 
competition is restrained by rules of a professional body. The important point is 
that, in these cases, justifications or excuses for the restrictions prevailed and, 
consequently, no protection was available under Art 101(1) to the individual 
professionals. Two types of justifications or excuses were accepted. The first type 
of justification arises where Art 101(1) is construed within an “overall context” 
which admits broad ranging and somewhat “public interest” type excuses. The 
                                                 
206 C-250/92 [1994] ECR 5641, [1996] 4 CMLR 191. 
207 Para 45(emphasis added). 
208 An analogous situation arose in Hendry v World Professional Billiards & Snooker Association 
Ltd [2002] UKCLR 5 where snooker players tied to one organiser wanted to play in tournaments 
run by a rival organiser. This case is studied in Chapter Three.  
209 IV/36.147,  Dec 1999/267 EPI Code of Conduct  [1999] OJ L 106/14. 
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second type of justification arises when it is accepted that the “proper functioning” 
of the restraining association merits protection. Arguably, by accepting these types 
of justifications, Art 101(1) does not protect the interests of the restrained 
professionals but, in effect, subjugates them to the interests of the restraining entity.  
 
In Institute of Professional Representatives European Patent Office the European 
Commission assessed heavily amended notified versions of the European Patents 
Institute’s (EPI) Code.210 Every European patent agent or representative is a 
member of the EPI, a non profit organisation set up by the European Patent Office 
(EPO), itself an inter-governmental entity, to collaborate with the EPO on matters 
of discipline and qualifications and “to promote compliance by its members with 
the rules of professional conduct.”211  
 
The Commission decided that Art 101(1) does not prohibit restraints that are 
necessary: 
 “in view of the specific context of this profession to ensure impartiality, 
competence, integrity and responsibility on the part of representatives, to 
prevent conflicts of interest and misleading advertising, to protect 
professional secrecy or to guarantee the proper functioning of the EPO.”212  
This is a list of justifications based on non-economic and non-competition criteria 
that are not expressed in Art 101(1). As such, the list gives an indication of the 
priorities pursued under Art 101(1) which, it must be noted, do not include the 
interests of restrained professionals.  
 
Specifically, the Commission decided that Art 101(1) does not prohibit a ban on a 
patent agent representative approaching a client of another representative when the 
client is involved in a case being handled by another representative.213 This means 
that Art 101(1) does not strike down a restriction on a professional’s freedom to 
seek out customers with a live involvement with a rival professional. Furthermore, 
the Commission did not strike down the Code’s prohibition on members charging 
                                                 
210 Amendments included the removal, after receipt of the Statement of Objections, of the ban on 
individual advertising and the ban on supply of  unsolicited services and the deletion of the 
requirement to charge fees that were reasonable and sufficient to maintain independence. 
211 The EPO was set up by the Convention on the Grant of European Patents signed in 1973. The 
worldwide recipients of the services comprise business or individual inventors (seeking to protect 
their work or to challenge the grant of a patent) or patent agents from non contracting states. 
212 Para 38 (emphasis added). 
213 Para 37. 
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fees related to the outcome of the service: a higher fee if the application is 
successful or lower fee if unsuccessful. This decision is noteworthy because it 
seems to collide with the Commission’s conventional view that professionals’ 
merit and the quality of services are essential elements of competition. For 
example, the Commission has expressly stipulated that competition among liberal 
professionals should additionally cover “elements such as fees and advertising.”214 
Nonetheless, in this case, the Commission decided that the Code’s “restriction on 
members’ freedom of commercial action must be viewed in the overall context by 
which the EPO grants patents, a system which is one of the major factors of 
economic growth.”215 This broad economic vision emphasises the importance of 
patents to the entire economy and this view is, apparently, accepted as justification 
for Art 101(1) not prohibiting a rule restricting fee rivalry among individual 
professionals. The Commission decided that: 
 “[E]ven if in other circumstances it might constitute a restriction on 
competition to prohibit fees from being determined according to outcome, it 
is necessary in the economic and legal context specific to the profession in 
question in order to guarantee impartiality on the part of the 
representatives and to ensure the proper functioning of the EPO.”216   
 
In this case, the Commission identified three risks that might arise in the absence of 
the restriction. Firstly, there may be a temptation for representatives to take on 
cases offering good short-term prospects rather than cases with a long-term 
outcome. Secondly, there could be lengthy uncertainty about the eventual fee 
payable by the client and, thirdly, representatives may initiate procedures for 
“purely commercial motives.”217 Similar risks could be identified in respect of 
other professional fields (for example, in law or arbitration) and, consequently, a 
significant range of professionals could find themselves in the same impotent 
position as the patent agents if their professional association adopted similar 
restrictions. In other words, other professionals could be precluded from depending 
on Art 101(1) to prohibit restrictions on their freedom to compete on price where 
the restrictions in rules are seen as necessary to ensure professionals’ impartiality 
and the association’s proper functioning. The reasoning in this case seems to give 
                                                 
214 Report on Competition in Professions, COM (2004) 83 final. 
215 Para 35 (emphasis added). 
216 Para 35(emphasis added). 
217 Para 36. 
 66
greater weight, on the one hand, to the interest of the public and the restraining 
association than, on the other hand, to the economic interests of the restrained 
professional in competing vigorously on price.  
 
The next judgment selected for examination is Wouters where the Court of Justice 
stated that Art 101(1) does not prohibit certain rules of the Dutch Bar 
Association.218 The contested rules prohibited contracts between lawyers practising 
in the Netherlands and accountants which provided, in any way, for shared decision 
making, profit sharing or for the use of a common name.219 The questions referred 
by the national tribunal stated that the measures aimed to safeguard the 
independence and duty of loyalty to clients of lawyers providing legal assistance.220 
The Court of Justice decided that Art 101(1) does not inevitably prohibit this type 
of rule because the association “could reasonably have considered that that 
regulation, despite the effects restrictive of competition that are inherent in it, is 
necessary for the proper practice of the legal profession” in the Netherlands.221 
Because the Court of Justice delivered a judgment that has been described as 
“surprising and controversial,”222 “puzzling”223 and “difficult”224 it is illuminating 
to consider, first, the Opinion of the Advocate General because he adopted a 
different approach than that subsequently taken by the Court of Justice.  
 
In a lengthy Opinion, Advocate General Léger details how courts in the U.S.A. 
developed the “ancillary restraints” doctrine because the Sherman Act 1890 does 
not make any provision for exemptions. Under the “ancillary restraints” approach, 
restrictions of competition necessary to the performance of an agreement (that is 
lawful in itself) are not prohibited by the 1890 Act. Advocate General Léger noted 
that this approach prevailed until the US Supreme Court adopted the “competition 
                                                 
218 Case C-309/99 Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten [2002] 
ECR I-1577, [2002] 4 CMLR 913.  
219 In effect, this rule renders any form of effective partnership with accountants difficult. See para 
18 where  Advocate General Léger noted that lawyers had been authorised to enter into partnership 
with “notaries, tax consultants and patent agents.”  
220 Case C-309/99 Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten [2002] 
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221 Para 100 (emphasis added). 
222 R. Whish, Competition Law (London:Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th ed. 2003) Preface. 
223 D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2003) 94. See 
also Vossestein, Casenote on Wouters (2002) 39 CMLRev 841. 
224 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
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balance-sheet method.”225 In his view, judgments such as Remia, Pronuptia and 
Gottrup Klim show that the “rule of reason” approach in EU law is “strictly 
confined to a purely competitive balance-sheet of the effects of the agreement.”226 
The Advocate General stated:  
“[W]here taken as a whole, the agreement is capable of encouraging 
competition on the market, the clauses essential to its performance may 
escape the prohibition laid down in Article [101](1) of the Treaty. The only 
legitimate goal which may be pursued in accordance with that provision is 
therefore exclusively competitive in nature.”227  
 
Advocate General Léger’s Opinion portrays a narrowly based version of the 
“ancillary restraints” doctrine. It may be described as narrow because it specifies 
that the “ancillary restraints” doctrine only applies where i) the type of agreement 
was “capable of encouraging competition,” ii) the restrictive clause was “essential” 
and iii) the only legitimate goal was an “exclusively competitive” one.  
 
After summarising the Court of Justice’s approach, Advocate General Léger 
applied it to the case at hand. He opined that the ban obstructed the emergence of 
“associative structures capable of offering integrated services for which there exists 
potential demand on the part of consumers.”228 He further opined that multi-
disciplinary partnerships between lawyers and accountants would accord to each 
profession both qualitative and quantitative improvements.229 He detailed 
advantages for professionals and consumers including economies of scale for the 
providers of an integrated service and potential savings (in time and money) for 
consumers.230  
 
It is important to emphasise that Advocate General Léger stoutly refused to 
consider under paragraph (1) of Art 101 any arguments (made by the Commission 
and interveners) that went beyond the “competition balance-sheet” approach. In his 
view, any arguments that the ban protected aspects of the legal profession such as 
independence and client loyalty involved an attempt to introduce considerations 
                                                 
225 Para 101. 
226 Para 104 (emphasis in original).  
227 Para 104 (emphasis added).  
228 Para 121. 
229 Paras 117-118. 
230 Para 119. 
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“linked to the pursuit of a public-interest objective.”231 In his firm view, Court of 
Justice  case law allowed account to be taken of “the particular nature of different 
branches of the economy, social concerns and, to a certain extent considerations 
connected with the pursuit of the public interest” only under Art 101(3) and not 
under paragraph (1) of Art 101.232   
 
Advocate General Léger’s approach is good for restrained persons because it does 
not readily excuse restrictions from Art 101(1). His view is that only competition 
criteria should be assessed under Art 101(1) and this focus, arguably, may allow 
account to be taken of harm to the competition interests of the restrained 
professionals.  
 
Unfortunately for restrained persons, the Court of Justice adopted an entirely 
different approach to Art 101(1) and decided that Art 101(1) did not prohibit the 
ban.  Notably, the Court specifically accepted that the one-stop advantages of 
combining complementary accountancy and legal expertise to offer a wider range 
of services to satisfy “needs created by the increasing interpenetration of national 
markets and consequent necessity for continuous adaptation to national and 
international legislation” supported the conclusion that the rules prohibiting 
absolutely all forms of cooperation restricted competition.233 It is interesting that 
the Court’s negative view of an absolute ban is not based on the injury to the 
professional’s freedom to earn livelihood. Instead, its view is shaped by the 
consequences of an absolute ban in terms of preventing the emergence of a new 
business structure which would benefit consumers. In other words, the problem 
was formulated in terms of injury to users rather than of injury to the potential 
providers of professional services.234  
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233 Paras 86- 87..  
234 This point is made as an observation about how the interests of restrained persons are treated 
and it is not necessarily a criticism of how competition law is interpreted.  
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For this chapter, the key passage of the Wouters judgment is contained in 
paragraph 97 which is next reproduced (with added emphasis) before it is analysed. 
The Court of Justice stated: 
“.. however, not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of 
an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the 
parties or of one of them necessarily falls within  the  prohibition laid down 
in Article [101](1) of the Treaty. For the purposes of application of that 
provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the 
overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was 
taken or produces its effects. More particularly account must be taken of its 
objectives which are here connected with the need to make rules relating the 
organisation, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability, 
in order to ensure that the ultimate consumers of legal services and the 
sound administration of justice are provided with the necessary guarantees 
in relation to integrity and experience (see to that effect Case C-3/5 
Reiseburo Broede [1996] ECR I -6511, paragraph 38). It has then to be 
considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are 
inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.” 
 
Each of the above sentences is next appraised, from the standpoint of a restrained 
professional, in order to highlight its implications. The first sentence refers to the 
freedom of the “parties or of one of them.” The term “parties” obscures the reality 
that the restrained members were not really parties in the sense of negotiators but 
were more like subjects to the rules. The second sentence insists that account be 
taken of the “overall context in which the decision of the association of 
undertakings was taken or produces its effects.” This calls for a Janus-like 
assessment of the “overall context” because it has two foci. One focus is 
retrospective (taking of the decision) and the other focus is prospective (effects of 
the decision). Crucially, the retrospective focus admits justifications concerning the 
operation of the restraining association. Moreover, the second focus (on effect) 
does not specify that attention must be paid to the effect on the restrained. It seems 
that the respective interests of the restrainers and restrained are not being 
considered on a parity basis. The third sentence directs that particular account be 
taken of the “objectives” of the restraint. This focus skews the assessment towards 
justifications in favour of the restriction. To this end, the Court lists objectives that 
are framed in terms of the needs of the restrainor (including organisation and 
supervision) and of the public/consumers (including qualifications, ethics, liability 
and the sound administration of justice). Finally, the Court articulated a test 
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explicitly based on inherency and consequential restrictions. This test leans in 
favour of accepting a restriction and the focus on inherency ignores the negative 
effects on restrained persons. The slant in favour of allowing restrictions is further 
bolstered by the later sentence stating that the restraining association “could 
reasonably have considered that that regulation, despite the effects restrictive of 
competition that are inherent in it, is necessary for the proper practice of the legal 
profession” in the Netherlands.235 Under this test Art 101(1) does not prohibit some 
admittedly anti-competitive restraints. It is clear that the interests of the restrained 
professional are not vindicated by this approach to Art 101(1). Plainly, Art 101(1) 
did not assist the lawyer in the Netherlands seeking to offer innovative competition 
contrary to the restrictive provisions of the Dutch Bar. 
 
This judgment has been criticised by commentators on various grounds, such as, 
for example, its departure from previous case law and its failure to respect the 
distinction between determinations under Art 101(1) and (3).236 The interest of this 
chapter in this judgment lies in highlighting how it treats the interests of restrained 
professionals. To this end, it is interested in the types of justifications that were 
accepted by the Court under Art 101(1). Whish points out that the judgment 
significantly extends “previous law, since it explicitly allows for the balancing of 
non-competition criteria against restrictions of competition when determining 
whether Art [101](1) is infringed; in doing so it would seem to allow arguments to 
be raised in defence of agreements (or rules) which would not be available under 
Art 101(3).”237 Jones and Sufrin note how, at first sight, the Court of Justice went 
further than the US courts because it “seemed to weigh the anti-competitive effects 
of the agreement against benefits which were not economic benefits” under Art 
101(1).238 These views rightly point up the Court of Justice’s acceptance of non-
competition criteria to justify or excuse the restriction. The wider the range of 
excuses/justifications accepted under Art 101(1), the correspondingly greater the 
                                                 
235 Para 100 (emphasis added). 
236 See D.G Goyder, EC Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed. 2003) 95 
where the author identified a conflation of Art 101(1) and 101(3) which he regarded as a possible 
foretaste of the, then, future post-May 2004 scenario and  vehemently denied that it entailed a “rule 
of reason” approach. Also see G. Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” (2002) 39 CMLRev 
1057 who commented that this judgment entailed a European style” rule of reason.”  
237 R. Whish, Competition Law  (London: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th ed. 2003) 123. 
238 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed. 2011) 237.   
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threat that is posed to restrained persons. This occurs because the increases in the 
pool of excuses occur without any countervailing increase in the number of 
objections that can be taken to the restriction when Art 101(1) is applied. From the 
perspective of the person challenging the restriction, the assessment becomes 
imbalanced when a greater number and range (including non-competition type 
considerations) of excuses are deemed acceptable.  
 
For this chapter, the interesting point about the interpretation of Art 101(1) in 
Wouters is that it does not safeguard the interests of the restrained professional but 
allows Art 101(1) to give considerable protection to the interests of the restraining 
entity and to the general public (even if they are not consumers) even if their 
interests are not directly connected to competition criteria. Thus interpreted, Art 
101(1) does not prohibit a restriction whose objectives promote the non-
competition interests of others to the detriment of restrained professionals’ freedom 
to offer innovative competition. The final interesting point about this judgment for 
restrained persons is its allusion to the necessity of the restriction. Jones and Sufrin 
cast doubt as to whether the particular ban was really ancillary in the sense of being 
“directly related and necessary” on the grounds that equivalent Bar associations in 
other Member States do not have this restriction.239 It seems that a lax view was 
taken of the standard of “necessary” as it falls below the standard of being 
essential. This judgment means that restrained professionals cannot rely on Art 
101(1) to strike down measures that are admittedly restrictive of competition where 
they are believed by the restraining entity to be inherent and “necessary” ( but not 
essential).  
 
The next crucial question is whether Wouters can be safely treated as an aberration 
or is more widely applicable? Restrained persons would be better protected if the 
Wouters judgment was limited, for example, to regulatory type entities that 
consider the interest of the public and if the judgment did not extend to protect 
wholly private organisations such as some sports bodies.240 Whish offers the term 
                                                 
239  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed. 2011) 238 in footnote 214. 
240 Some sports associations adopt a “regulatory” role without any statutory basis, for example,  the 
World Professional Billiards & Snooker Association in Hendry v World Professional Billiards & 
Snooker Association Ltd [2002] UKCLR 5.Whether the Wouters judgment may extend to a “purely 
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“regulatory ancilliarity” to describe the Court of Justice’s approach in Wouters and 
suggests that this term could be  
“useful in first demonstrating a continuity with the earlier case law, through 
the common use of ‘ancilliarity’ while also capturing the difference 
between the first two situations by distinguishing commercial and 
regulatory cases.”241  
 
However, Whish notes that the Wouters judgment does not limit itself to 
deontological rules or to the liberal professions and suggests it could apply to some 
(proportionate) regulatory rules adopted to protect consumers and offers examples 
in the fields of banking, environment, safety and integrity of sporting events.242 The 
case of Meca Medina suggests that the Wouters approach to Art 101(1) may be 
quite widely deployed.243  
 
The dispute in Meca Medina involved the compatibility of the International 
Olympic Council’s (IOC) anti-doping rules with Art 101. One section of the 
Commission’s decision accepted that the contested rules may restrict the athletes’ 
freedom of action but noted that such a limitation is not necessarily a restriction of 
competition in the sense of Art 101(1) because it may be inherent in the 
organisation and proper conduct of sporting competition.244 In its view, the rules 
were intimately linked to the proper conduct of sport, necessary to combat doping 
and that the limitation of athletes’ freedom of action did not go beyond what is 
necessary to attain that objective and, thus, not prohibited by Art 101(1).245 This 
type of analysis appears to be faithful to the Wouters rubric.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
private regulatory system where there is no public law component at all” has been described as an 
“intriguing question” by R. Whish and D. Bailey Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press,7th ed. 2012).  
241 See R. Whish, Competition Law  (London: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th ed. 2003)  121-2 
where the author comments that “[W]hat  is of interest about Wouters, however, is that the 
restriction in that case was not necessary for the execution of a commercial transaction or the 
achievement of a commercial outcome in the market; instead it was ancillary to a regulatory 
function.”  
242 R. Whish, Competition Law  (London: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th ed. 2003)  122.  In 
support, Whish notes the Commission’s rejection of a complaint  about restrictions on ownership of 
teams designed to protect integrity of competitions (see Press Release IP/02/942 27 June 2002) and 
similar rejection of complaints against an IOC ban on swimmers (IP/02/1211 9 August 2002). 
243 C-519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991. 
244 Para 42. 
245 Para 55 (emphasis added).   
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The Court of Justice heard a twofold plea from the athletes that the Commission 
had misapplied the Wouters criteria. They argued that the anti-doping rules, firstly, 
are not inherent in the objectives of safeguarding the integrity of competitive sport 
and athletes’ health but, instead, protect the IOC’s own economic interest and, 
secondly, are excessive in nature and go beyond what is necessary to combat 
doping.246 The Court of Justice declined to assess the compatibility of contested 
rules with competition law in the abstract. It stated that not every decision:  
“which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them 
necessarily falls within the prohibition of Article [101](1). For the purposes 
of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all 
be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of 
undertakings was taken or produces its effects, and more specifically, of its 
objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects 
restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objective 
(Wouters para 97) and are proportionate to them.” 247  
 
This quotation endorses the Wouters approach as it cites criteria such as “overall 
context” and the “inherent” nature of restrictions when determining whether Art 
101(1) prohibits the contested measure. It is significant that the Wouters approach 
to Art 101(1) has been taken in an area outside the field of restrictive rules 
prohibiting specified market strategies within the liberal professions. Meca Medina 
confirms that the Wouters schema is not an exceptional or marginal approach that 
is confined to prohibitions of professional associations regarding specified business 
practices.  
 
In Meca Medina, the Court of Justice stated that penalties are in principle inherent 
in anti-doping rules because they are necessary to ensure enforcement and that 
anti-doping rules are “justified by a legitimate objective.”248 Such a limitation [on 
the athletes’ freedom of action] is inherent in the organisation and proper conduct 
of competitive sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry between 
athletes.”249  
                                                 
246 Para 40. 
247 C-519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, para 42  citing Case 
C-250/92 Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforening and Ors v. Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareseskab AmbA 
[1994] ECR I-5641. 
248 Para 44 (emphasis added). 
249 Para 45(emphasis added). 
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As regards the magnitude of the penalties, the Court of Justice specifically 
acknowledged their capacity to adversely affect:  
“competition because they could, if penalties were ultimately to prove 
unjustified, result in an athlete’s unwarranted exclusion from sporting 
events and, thus, in the impairment of the conditions under which the 
activity at issue is engaged in.”250  
It stated that penalties must be limited to what is necessary to ensure proper 
conduct of competitive sport and, in this case, there was insufficient scientific 
evidence that the threshold for the prohibited substance was set at too low a level. 
That Art 101(1) does not prohibit the imposition of penalties is significant. This is 
because a penal sanction, such as a lengthy ban on entering professional 
competitions, is a potentially far more restrictive and serious measure than the 
types of restrictions contained in the rules of the Dutch Bar in Wouters or by the 
cooperative in Gottrup Klim.   
 
As regards the justifications in Meca Medina, commentators have remarked on 
how it is “unclear by what criteria the condition of legitimate objective will be 
determined in borderline cases but it seems unlikely that the concept will be 
extended to purely commercial considerations.”251 On the other hand, the readiness 
of the Court of Justice in Gottrup to accept wholly commercial justifications for a 
ban on dual membership may encourage courts to accept commercial justifications. 
Imagine, for example, a rule where a sporting organiser imposes restrictions on 
players’ commercial activities (for example, a ban on sports persons wearing 
sponsors’ logos on clothing) being accepted as “necessary” to secure the 
commercial viability of the sporting event.252 Another possible example would be 
limitations imposed by organisers of one sporting tournament on players 
participating in tournaments organised by rival organisers.253 That these two 
                                                 
250 Para 47. 
251 D. Bellamy & Child (Ed. P. Roth and V. Rose), European Community Law of Competition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6th ed. 2008)  2.116. 
252 This example is inspired by the facts of the dispute in Adidas-Salomon v. Draper et al  [2006] 
EWHC 1318 (Ch). See para 36 where the High Court commented on how it is not essential for 
“playing a game of tennis that the player's shirt should not identify its maker but it may well be 
necessary to the maintenance of the economic value of the tournament as a whole.”  
253 This scenario happened in Hendry v World Professional Billiards & Snooker Association Ltd 
[2002] UKCLR 5. This case is discussed in Chapter Three. 
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possible examples of commercial justifications for restrictions were inspired by 
real world disputes makes them plausible. 
 
Art 101(1) applies to but does not prohibit certain restrictions on professionals that 
are contained in rules of an association or other regulatory type body. The reason 
why Art 101(1) does not prohibit the restrictions is due to the Court of Justice 
accepting a range of excuses from the restraining entity and these excuses are not 
limited to competition criteria. From the perspective of a restrained person, the 
increase in excuses or acceptable “legitimate objectives” under Art 101(1) is a 
negative development as it tilts the scales away from prohibiting the restriction.   
 
 
2.5. CONCLUSION ON ARTICLE 101(1) 
 
In order to show the low level of protection available to some restrained 
professionals under Art 101(1) the foregoing sections examined why and how Art 
101(1) does not prohibit certain restrictions. It was suggested that their interests 
may be poorly protected in comparison to other interests, such as those of the 
market, the restraining entity, the public and consumers. The reason for the 
relatively weak protection of restrained persons is due, it was argued, to the 
combined effect of i) a lax standard of  “necessary” and ii) an accepting attitude to 
wide-ranging justifications. 
 
Art 101(1) has been interpreted so as not to prohibit certain “necessary” restrictions 
in personal contracts or in rules without keen attention being paid to the impact of 
the restriction on the interests of restrained persons. When assessing the necessity 
of a restriction in a bilateral contract or in rule of association, the applied standard 
in practice falls short of being essential. Thus, Art 101(1) might not prohibit certain 
restrictions on the grounds that they make operations easier or cheaper for the 
restraining party or association even where the competition interests of a restrained 
person are injured. This approach to Art 101(1) does not safeguard vigorously the 
interests of restrained persons.   
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The second strand of the explanation as to why Art 101(1) is not protecting 
restrained persons is due, it is suggested, to the types of excuses that it accepts. It is 
significant that the excuses for restrictions in rules are grounded deliberately within 
criteria such as the “overall contexts” and “proper” functioning of the restraining 
entity. Restrictions in contracts and in rules have been accepted on the grounds of 
commercial considerations (Pronuptia, Remia, and Gottrup), some presumed 
benefit to the public (Pronuptia, Institute of Professional Representatives, Wouters, 
and Meca-Medina) and benefit to the operations of the restraining entity 
(Pronuptia, Institute of Professional Representatives, Gottrup, and Wouters,).  It 
may be argued that there is a too ready acceptance of restrictions that purport to 
ensure that individual professionals conduct themselves properly (Institute of 
Professional Representatives, Wouters and Meca-Medina). Even entities which are 
not “regulatory” type but are wholly commercial (Gottrup) may benefit from this 
indulgent approach to restrictions under Art 101(1). There is no dedicated space 
under the Art 101(1) analysis that takes specific account of the damage to the 
restrained person while space has been created for considering the interests of the 
restraining party or entity. 
 
The “necessary” test and the acceptance of justification based on broad grounds 
combine to create a very imbalanced assessment of restrictions if examined from 
the perspective of the restrained professional. These two strands (loose definition 
of “necessary” and wide ranging justifications) reduce the range of restrictions on 
professionals’ freedom to compete that are prohibited by Art 101(1). 
 
 2. 6 ARTICLE 101(3) 
 
A provision that infringes Art 101(1) may be permitted under Art 101(3) where it 
satisfies the four conditions specified in that paragraph.254 No type of arrangement 
is, a priori, precluded from benefitting from Art 101(3).255  
 
                                                 
254 See further Guidelines on the Application of Art [101](3) of the Treaty (“Art 101(3)  
Guidelines”) OJ [2004] C 101/97. 
255 T-17/93 Matra Hachette v. Commission [1994] ECR II -595, para 85. Also see T- 168/01 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Ltd v. Commission [2006] ECR II 2969, para 233. 
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Some restrictions benefit from an automatic exemption under a block exemption 
regulation. Of these, the most likely such regulation for the restrictions studied in 
this research is Regulation 339/2010 which covers vertical arrangements. Pursuant 
to this Regulation, a franchise may contain a one year post-termination non-
competition clause which is limited to the premises and land from which the buyer 
has operated during the contract and is indispensable to protect know-how 
transferred by the supplier to the buyer.256 
  
Since May 2004, Art 101(3) may be applied, in individual cases, as a directly 
applicable exception by national courts (and by some national competition 
authorities). Previous Decisions of the European Commission granting individual 
exemptions to notified restrictions provide useful non-binding guidance, subject to 
the following observations. Commission Decisions to refuse or grant exemptions 
for a finite period (either with or without conditions) were issued following 
detailed examination and, sometimes, significant amendments.  As such, Art 
101(3) operated, for decades, as the Commission’s unique and administratively 
convenient mechanism for balancing various interests, including the wider interests 
of the whole Community/Union.257 There is debate over whether Art 101(3) should 
be interpreted narrowly or more broadly so that non-competition criteria are taken 
into account.258 The General Court has stated that “in the context of an overall 
assessment, the Commission is entitled to base itself on considerations connected 
with the pursuit of the public interest.”259 For this research, the interesting issue is 
how the interests of restrained persons may fare under Art 101(3). 
 
The first two conditions of Art 101(3) specify the positive benefits that the 
arrangement must produce. Under the first condition, it must “contribute to 
improving production or distribution of goods or promoting technical or economic 
progress.”260 Although there is no mention of “services” in Art 101(3) it is likely 
                                                 
256 Article 5(3) EU Regulation 339/2010. 
257 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 34. 
258 R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,7th ed. 2012) 156-
7. Also see G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) chapter 
4.  
259 Case T-528/93 Métropole Television SA v. Commission [1996] ECR II-649 para 118. 
260 See Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig  Verkauf s GmbH 
[1966] ECR 405. Essentially, this condition requires the establishment of “appreciable objective 
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that such improvements would come under the heading of “technical or economic 
progress.” A broad attitude may be taken to interpreting this condition. In Remia, 
the Court of Justice accepted that “the provision of employment comes within the 
framework of the objectives to which reference may” be made pursuant to Art 
101(3) “because it improves the general conditions of production, especially when 
market conditions are unfavourable.”261 To satisfy the second condition, the 
arrangement must bestow a fair share of benefit on “consumers.” In practice, the 
term “consumer” is interpreted very broadly so as to include persons who are not 
direct purchasers and those who may not even acquire the product.262 That these 
two conditions are interpreted generously increases the likelihood of restrictions 
being permitted. 
 
The third and fourth conditions are framed in negative terms. According to the 
third condition, any restriction must be indispensable for the attainment of the 
efficiencies identified under the first condition. This condition entails a weighing 
exercise to assess whether the scope or extent of restriction in terms of geography, 
duration or subject matter is indispensable. Before May 2004, it was possible for 
notifying parties to offer amendments to make the arrangement more palatable to 
the European Commission. For example, a reduction in the duration of a ten year 
non-competition clause to a period of three years was accepted in Television par 
Satellite, notably on the grounds that it reduced the negative consequences for the 
market (rather than for concern for the restrained parties.)263 It is important to 
emphasise that the criterion of “indispensability” is conceptually different from the 
weighing exercise conducted under the “ancillary restraints” doctrine.264 The 
“indispensability” standard entails questioning the necessity of, firstly, the type of 
arrangement and, secondly, the particular restriction(s).265 The fourth condition 
provides that competition must not be substantially eliminated. Protecting rivalry is 
                                                                                                                                       
advantages of such a character as to compensate for the disadvantages which they cause in the field 
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261 Case 42/84 Remia BV and NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia v. Commission [1985] ECR 2545, 
para 42. 
262 Phillips Osram and KSB/Goulds/Iowara/Itt [1990] OJ L 19. 
263  Re Télevision par Satellite (TPS) [1995] 5 CMLR 168 346, paras 100-109. 
264 See Article 101(3) Guidelines para 30. 
265 See Article 101(3) Guidelines para 73 et seq. 
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the priority.266 It is significant that not one of the four conditions in Art 101(3) 
expressly adverts to the impact of a restriction on the restrained person. This 
silence means that Art 101(3) may be applied without squarely addressing the 
effect of the restriction on the restrained person’s interests. 
 
It is possible that structural or institutional factors encouraged the Commission 
(perhaps inadvertently) to apply Art 101(3) to an individual notification of rules in 
a way that caused the interests of the restrained person to be relatively sidelined. 
Restrictions contained in rules were usually notified by the restraining entity and, 
as such, the notifier readily got the opportunity to participate in any discussions 
with the Commission regarding the amendment of particular restrictions. Perhaps 
this interactive process affected the Commission’s attitude to the restriction. In 
particular, the question arises as to whether the process steered Commission 
officials towards achieving the most achievable “cure” to a competition problem? 
Did interactions with a restraining entity (such as a professional association) 
temper the Commission’s ambition to secure a perfect outcome in the short term 
because it took a pragmatic view that a second best outcome was more readily 
achievable by consent within the notification process? If so, then there was a risk 
that the interests of the restrained professionals were unduly marginalised.  
 
These questions are prompted by the Commission’s Decision in Institute of 
Professional Representatives European Patent Office.267 Following many 
amendments to the notified Code of Conduct, the Commission exempted, for a 
defined period, the EPO’s ban on comparative advertising and its ban on 
approaching former clients of other representatives by exchanging views on that 
case.268  The Commission stated that this profession’s long tradition of the 
“virtually total prohibition of individual advertising and supply of unsolicited 
services” was “unquestionably” anti-competitive, but, nonetheless, the Commission 
accepted the need for a transition period.269 It took the view that a sudden 
                                                 
266 Article 101(3) Guidelines para 105. See para 115 for a list of the factors that could be taken into 
account  including entry barriers and minimum efficient scale. 
267 Dec 1999/267, IV/36.147 EPI Code of Conduct  [1999] OJ  L 106/14. 
268 For example, the removal  of the ban on individual advertising, the ban on supply of  
unsolicited services and the deletion of the requirement to charge fees that were reasonable and 
sufficient to maintain independence. 
269 Para 46. 
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transformation to total freedom risked confusing the public and it accepted that the 
advantages could not be achieved by means other than having a short transition 
period.  Perhaps a similar managerial attitude existed in other cases towards rules 
that were amended following Commission “representations.”270 Consider the case 
of Piau where, the Commission rejected the complaint of a restrained players’ 
agent, on the grounds, inter alia, that the most important restrictions had been 
removed by amendments to FIFA’s original regulations.271 When the 
Commission’s Decision to reject the complaint was challenged by the agent (Piau) 
before the General Court, the Commission submitted to the General Court that the 
“most important restrictions had been removed in the amended regulations. Any 
persistent effects of the original regulations can be regarded as transitional 
measures.”272 The point is that, in these two cases, the Commission, by allowing 
“unquestionably” anti-competitive restrictions for a transition period, acted as a 
manager or sort of regulator seeking a viable and mediated outcome for the market. 
The problem, from the perspective of the restrained professional, is that this 
process risks marginalising the safe-guarding of his interests. The process also 
results in some restrictions being accepted rather than prohibited. 
 
The Decision in Piau is also interesting because it shows the Commission’s attitude 
to restrictive rules that are contested by a restrained person after the rules were 
amended following a Statement of Objections.273 The amended regulations 
maintained the requirement that players’ agents be licenced, take a written 
examination and hold either insurance policy or deposit a specified sum in a bank. 
It mandated that written contracts be concluded with players and be for a maximum 
period of two years (renewable). In its Decision rejecting the complaint from the 
agent, the Commission stated that the “licence requirement could be justified” and 
                                                 
270 See T- 193/02 Laurent Piau v. Commission [2005] ECR II -209, para 19 where the General 
Court noted a letter to Piau stated that its “representations to FIFA” had resulted in the removal of 
the “main restrictive aspects” of the Regulations. 
271 PIAU COMP /34 124 15 April 2002 para 29.  
272 T- 193/02 Laurent Piau v. Commission [2005] ECR II -209, para 59. 
273 The Commission initiated proceedings following a complaint from a Danish undertaking. In 
1996,  Multiplayers International Denmark complained under competition rules. Mr Piau’s 
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Piau v. Commission [2005] ECR II -209 involved the appeal against the Commission Decision to 
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the remaining restrictions could enjoy an exemption under Art 101(3).274 
Apparently, the Commission took the view that the licence requirement was not 
prohibited by Art 101(1).275 By contrast, the General Court, without analysing the 
provision’s “object or effect” under Art 101(1), crisply stated that the:  
“actual principle of the licence which is required by FIFA and is a condition 
for carrying on the occupation of players’ agent, constitutes a barrier to 
access to that economic activity, and therefore necessarily affects 
competition. It can therefore be accepted only insofar as the conditions set 
out in Art [101] (3) are satisfied.”276  
This quotation is important as it shows the General Court did not apply the 
“necessity” rubric but, instead, concluded that paragraph (1) of Art 101 was 
infringed and, consequently, that the provision could only be saved by Art 101(3). 
The General Court heard opposing submissions from Piau and the Commission 
regarding Art 101(3). Piau argued that the introduction of a compulsory licence for 
his profession eliminated any competition, because only FIFA is authorised to 
grant a licence. The Commission submitted that the amended regulations satisfied 
the conditions in Art 101(3). It stated that they are:  
“intended to raise professional and ethical standards and are proportionate. 
Competition is not eliminated. The very existence of regulation promotes 
better operation of the market and therefore contributes to economic 
progress.”277  
 
This quotation shows the Commission’s confidence in the advantages of the 
regulation of professionals by an association and its belief that this is a factor that is 
relevant to the analysis under Art 101(3). The General Court noted that the agents 
did not constitute a profession with its own internal regulation, that their past 
practices had the potential to harm clubs and players (financially and 
professionally) and FIFA’s submission that the licence’s dual objective was to raise 
professional and ethical standards for agents to protect players who have short 
careers.278 The General Court specifically rejected Piau’s argument that 
competition was eliminated because the Court viewed the new system as 
                                                 
274 T- 193/02 Laurent Piau v. Commission [2005] ECR II -209, para 22. 
275  See T- 193/02 Laurent Piau v. Commission [2005] ECR II -209, para 61 where the General 
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qualitative selection (“appropriate for the attainment of the objective of raising 
professional standards”) rather than a quantitative restriction on access to the 
occupation.279 It must be noted that a restrained professional faces an uphill task 
when trying to challenge a decision of the Commission given the limited nature of 
the judicial review process, in casu, a rejection of a complaint.280 The General 
Court decided that the Commission did not commit manifest error of assessment by 
“considering that the restrictions stemming from the compulsory nature of the 
licence might benefit from an exemption.”281  
 
Art 101(3) does not insist that the interests of restrained persons be considered.  
Some determinations convey some sense that the objective of Art 101(3) when 
applied to rules of professionals has regulatory-type dimension. The problem with 
any “regulatory” focus is that it can tilt the analyses in favour of permitting the 
restriction once it does not damage the market and/or the public unduly. In other 
words, the regulatory lens is not as deeply concerned with the possible injury to 
interests of the restrained person. 
 
2.7 ARTICLE 102 
  
Restrictions contained in the rules of an association may infringe Art 102 which 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by one or more undertakings. How Art 
102 deals with restrictions on professionals and, in particular, the account it takes 
of their impact on restrained persons is next explored.  
 
The classic definition of “abuse” is: 
“an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a 
dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of the market 
where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking...  the degree of 
competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different 
to those which condition normal competition in products or services... has 
                                                 
279 Para 103. 
280 The Court allows a sizeable margin of discretion to the decision-maker under Art 101(3) and 
takes a narrow view of its own role. See Joined cases 56/64 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SA & 
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the effect of hindering the maintenance of degree of competition still 
existing in the market or the growth of that competition.”282 
 
There is very little case law specifically dealing with restrictions on professional 
persons that constitute an “abuse” of dominance. Art 102(a) contains an illustration 
of an “abuse” which may be relevant to some restrained persons because it refers to 
the “imposition of unfair terms or conditions.” The verb and adjective may capture 
some situations involving restrictive rules of a professional entity or another party. 
In general, “abuses” have been classified into three (sometimes overlapping) 
groups.283 One group is of “exclusionary abuses” where existing rivals are 
marginalised or barriers to new entrants are raised.284 “Exploitative abuses” arise 
where a dominant undertaking acts unfairly towards undertakings that are not 
independent of the dominant undertaking. Thirdly, “reprisal abuses” entail an 
element of punishment.285  
 
If the conduct may be objectively justified, it is not an “abuse” in the sense 
proscribed by Art 102.  In Piau, the General Court considered whether Art 102 
prohibited FIFA’s requirement that players’ agents obtain a licence. It found that an 
“abuse” had not been established because FIFA’s requirements did not impose 
“quantitative restrictions on access to the occupation.... that could be detrimental to 
competition but qualitative restrictions that may be justified in the present 
circumstance.”286 The Court criticised the Commission’s finding that FIFA did not 
hold a dominant position. In its view, the Commission’s finding that “the most 
restrictive provisions of the regulations had been deleted, and that the licence 
system  could enjoy  an exemption decision under Art [101](3) would accordingly 
lead to the conclusion that there was no infringement under Article [102]’287 This 
quotation is interesting  as it shows how  the General Court linked Art 101(3) with 
Art 102 which is surprising since an exception under Art 101(3) does not provide 
an automatic protection vis-á-vis Art 102. It is clear that restrained persons are not 
                                                 
282 Case 85/76 Hoffmann La-Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461. 
283 A. Jones & B.Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed. 2011) 364. 
284 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102] of the EC 
Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2.  
285 J. Temple Lang, “Reprisals and Overreaction by Dominant Companies as an Anti-Competitive 
Abuse under Article 82(b)” (2008) ECLR 11. 
286 Para 117. 
287 Para 119. 
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protected if the possibility of satisfying Art 101(3) precludes the possibility of 
establishing an infringement of Art 102.  
 
  
2.8 CONCLUSION   
 
This chapter highlighted how competition law treats some restrictions on restrained 
professionals. It examined determinations that EU competition law did not prohibit 
certain restrictions that were contained in either personal agreements or in rules. It 
showed how EU competition law can be applied in ways that do not safeguard the 
economic interests of restrained professionals. This point was made by highlighting 
the interests that are protected and promoted by the selected cases. The examined 
decisions and judgments protected consumers and, sometimes, the public. 
 
This chapter does not argue that EU competition law takes the wrong approach 
with its concern for consumers. Consumers should benefit from competition. 
Protecting consumer welfare is a key goal, if not, the goal of EU competition 
policy.288 In 2001, Mario Monti stated that:  
“the goal of competition policy, in all its aspects, is to protect consumer 
welfare by maintaining a high degree of competition in the common 
market. Competition should lead to lower prices, a wider choice of goods, 
and technological innovation, all in the interest of the consumer.”289  
 
The beneficiaries of vibrant competition are depicted by economists in terms of the 
overall maximisation of society’s welfare due to productive and allocative 
efficiencies.290 Whish and Bailey point out, while the consumer welfare standard is 
currently to the fore, other policy objectives have been pursued as goals of 
competition law in the past and some were not founded in “notions of consumer 
                                                 
288 See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ [2010] C 130/1 para 7 which states that “[T]he 
protection of competition is the primary objective of EC competition policy, as this enhances 
consumer welfare and creates an efficient allocation of resources.” For a more recent statement see 
European Commission Report on Competition Policy 2011, COM (2012) 253 final {SWD (2012) 
141 final}, section 2.1 entitled “How Competition Enhances Consumer Welfare.” 
289 Speech by M. Monti, “The Future for Competition Policy in the European Union” London July 
9th 2001. Available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/01/340&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
290  L Peeperkorn and  K. Mehta “The Economics of Competition” in J. Faull & A. Nikpay, The 
EC Law of Competition  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2007). 
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welfare in the technical sense at all, and some were plainly inimical to the pursuit 
of allocative and productive efficiency.”291  
 
This chapter does not aim to elucidate the “correct” goals of EU competition law. 
Its aim is to demonstrate convincingly that EU competition law does not make a 
meaningful space for assessing the impact of restrictions on the restrained person 
while showing that it does take account of other interests including the market, 
some restraining parties (e.g. franchisors and some professional associations), 
consumers and the public. This point is important as it evidences the claim (made 
throughout Part I of this thesis) that the ROTD and competition law take 
significantly different approaches to some restrictions on professionals.  For clarity, 
this chapter focussed only on competition law and postponed making direct 
contrasts with ROTD. The next chapter draws closer contrasts between the ROTD 
and competition law by presenting analyses of judgments that applying both the 
ROTD and competition law to  the same restriction. 
 
                                                 











Building on Chapters One and Two, this chapter seeks to demonstrate concisely 
that a restriction may be treated differently by ROTD than by competition law in 
the UK. To this end, it examines some judgments that apply the ROTD and 
competition law (either EU and/or UK) to the same restriction. This examination 
shows that, even where the outcomes under the ROTD and competition law are not 
different, there are significant differences in the reasoning and processes under 
each legal regime. That they are different provides the foundation for the later 
argument that the delineation of their interface is a matter of importance for some 
professionals in the UK.  
 
This chapter argues that a restriction receives different treatment under the ROTD 
and competition law because the legal measures do not pursue the same approach. 
Their differences may make the ROTD a more attractive legal measure than 
competition law for some professionals. On this basis, it is argued that it is a 
problem if (as demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five) the ROTD is ousted by the 
applicability of competition law.  
 
In order to explain fully and illustrate how UK domestic competition law applies to 
restrictions on professionals, section 3.2 details why UK competition legislation is 
so tightly aligned with EU competition law.292 It also presents a detailed study of 
                                                 
292 Understanding the depth of influence exerted by EU competition law on domestic competition 
law in the UK is additionally important for Chapter Six which highlights the possible expansion of 
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one case to illustrate how intentionally closely UK competition law follows EU 
competition law determinations. Section 3.3 illustrates that the ROTD and 
competition law in the UK take different approaches to restrictions by presenting 
studies of two cases. 
 
 
3.2 UK COMPETITION LAW ALIGNMENT WITH EU COMPETITION 
LAW 
 
The influence exerted by Arts 101 and 102 on the substantive prohibitions of the 
Competition Act 1998 is deliberate and is ongoing.293 The EU provisions of Art 
101 and 102 were intentionally chosen as a template by the Act’s drafters of the 
prohibitions in Chapters I and II. In addition, the Act makes express provision to 
ensure that it is interpreted consistently with EU competition law developments.  
 
 3.2.1 EU Template for Competition Act 1998  
 
With the Competition Act 1998, Parliament chose to enact legislative prohibitions 
closely modelled on Arts 101 and 102.294 Chapter I, s.2 (subject to specific 
exclusions) prohibits agreements, concerted practices of undertakings and decisions 
of associations of undertakings which may affect trade within the UK and whose 
object or effect is the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the UK. 
S.9 allows individual exception in terms that are almost identical to Art 101(3). 295 
Chapter II, s.18 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in terms that are similar 
to Art 102.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
UK competition law, following expansive interpretations of “undertakings” in EU competition law, 
to include some professionals in employment.   
293 There are patent differences in the domestic institutional framework enacted by the Competition 
Act 1998 and, further, in the Enterprise Act 2002 compared to the EU institutional architecture. 
294 “Europeanisation” is a political science term that may describe the process. It has been used to 
describe an imitative attitude voluntarily taken by Parliament and the ongoing influences of EU 
measures on the interpretation and operation of domestic provisions and policy. See further Buller, 
Evans and  James, Editorial,  (2002) 17(2) Public Policy & Administration. 
295 See HL Committee 13 Nov1997 (col 279) and again 25 Nov 1997 (col 962) where Lord Simon 
expressed his expectation that the s. 9 criteria would be interpreted similarly to those in Art 101(3).  
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Nonetheless, there are two relevant divergences from the EU model which must be 
noted here because they explain why some restraints on professionals only recently 
came within the reach of the domestic competition legislation.296 The first such 
situation involves the exclusion of “designated professional rules”297 from the 
Chapter I prohibition which persisted until April 2003.298 The second divergence 
involves the “special treatment” provisions of s.50299 which provided the basis for 
an Order excluding vertical agreements.300 This exclusion ended in May 2005.301  
 
3.2.2 Interpreting UK Law Consistently with EU Competition Law 
 
This section examines the extent to which the UK organisations (comprising 
courts, tribunals and administrative authorities) applying national competition law 
must follow EU competition law interpretations. The Competition Act 1998 is 
highly susceptible to following interpretations made under EU competition law.302 
Its susceptibility to EU competition law is due both to its “open” style of drafting 
and to the express provision in s. 60 linking its interpretation to EU competition 
law.  
 
The drafting style and format of the 1998 Act departs dramatically from preceding 
restrictive practices and fair trading legislation. For example, the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1956 was so detailed that it specified not only the practices within 
and without the statutory requirement to register but, additionally, the grounds 
upon which the Restrictive Practices Court (RPC) could make decisions. Its 
intricate and comprehensive drafting stemmed from Parliament’s resolve to remove 
                                                 
296 Why these divergences occurred is discussed in Chapter Four which traces the evolution of the 
interface between the ROTD and domestic competition legislation.  
297 The “designated” professional rules were those that are listed in Schedule 4 Part II and which 
were notified to and designated by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. These include legal 
services, medical, dental, ophthalmic, veterinary, nursing, midwifery, physiotherapy, chiropody, 
architectural, accounting and auditing, insolvency, patent agency, Parliamentary agency, surveying, 
engineering, educational and religious professional services. 
298 Schedule 4 was repealed by s.207 of the Enterprise Act 2002 with effect from April 1 2003 
299 S.50 allowed the Secretary of State “to provide by order for a provision of the 1998 Act Part 1 
to apply with modification.”  
300 Vertical Exclusion Order SI 2000 No 310.  
301 The Vertical Exclusion Order was repealed with effect from May 1st 2005 by the Competition 
Act 1998 (Land Agreements Exclusion and Revocation) Order 2004 SI 2004 No. 1260. 
302 Understanding the extent of the influence of EU competition law is important also for Chapter 
Six which considers the implications of expansive interpretations of the concept of “undertaking” to 
include perhaps some professionals in employment. 
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any opportunity for the RPC to engage in policy-type decision making.303 The 1998 
Act, by copying the EU tests, is drafted in a style that is looser and more receptive 
to EU influences.  
 
Additionally, there is express provision in s.60 of the Act that tightly ties 
interpretations of the Act to EU competition law. S.60, as the “governing 
principles”304 provision, applies to all UK authorities involved with the 
administration and enforcement of the Act.305 According to Whish, s.60 enables the 
UK competition authorities when acting under the UK Act to apply EU 
competition law.306 The extent to which it obliges them to copy EU competition 
law is next considered.  
 
S.60 contains three subsections. The first subsection sets out its aim and the 
remaining two subsections impose duties of consistency.  
 
According to s.60(1), its purpose is:  
“to ensure that so far as possible (having regard to any relevant differences 
between the provisions concerned) questions arising under this Part, in 
relation to competition within the United Kingdom, are dealt with in a 
manner which is consistent with the treatment of corresponding questions 
arising in Community law in relation to competition within the 
Community.”307 
 
This provision describes its aim as the consistent treatment under UK and EU 
competition law of corresponding questions after having regard to any relevant 
differences. Coleman and Grenfell have noted that the duty of consistency extends 
to questions “in relation to competition” rather than in relation to competition law 
and  suggest that this could include questions of fact so that a finding by the 
European Commission that no collusion had occurred would preclude the national 
                                                 
303 R.A.O Wilberforce, A. Campbell, The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell 1966) 153. 
304 It was termed by some as the “El Dorado” clause because it was expected to provide a 
goldmine for lawyers for at least a decade according to Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, 23 Feb 1998,col. 
510. See P.R. Willis, “Procedural Nuggets from the Klondike Clause: The Application of s.60 of the 
Competition Act 1988 to the Procedures of the OFT” [1999] 20(6) ECLR 314, 314 for its 
description as the “Klondike” clause.   
305 OFT Guidelines 401, para 2.3.  
306 R. Whish, Competition Law (London:LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003, 5th ed.) 351 (emphasis 
added). 
307 S. 60(1). 
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competition authority from reaching a different conclusion.308 If their view is 
correct, it means that a finding by the Commission, for example, that a particular 
measure of a UK professional association does not have the object of restricting 
competition could prevent a national court from finding, under national 
competition law, that the same measure had the object of restricting competition.   
 
S. 60 (2) imposes specific positive obligations on the national courts. It provides 
that:  
“at any time when the court determines a question arising under this Part, it 
must act (as far as is compatible with the provisions of this Part and 
whether or not it would otherwise be required to do so) with a view to 
securing that there is no inconsistency between: 
(a) the principles applied, and decisions reached, by the court in 
determining that question; and  
(b) the principles laid down by the Treaty and the European Court, and any 
relevant decision of that Court, as applicable at that time in determining any 
corresponding question arising in Community law.”  
 
 
Middleton argues that this provision represents a significant change in approach to 
statutory interpretation as it obliges courts to follow the “practice of teleological 
interpretation.”309 The Court of Appeal has accepted that s.60(2) imposes a 
“particular responsibility” on courts and litigants “to identify clearly what in the 
jurisprudence of the European Union is truly a principle or decision.”310 This 
subsection actively orients parties towards drawing on EU competition law in their 
litigation under national competition law. There is a clear Parliamentary intention 
to keep domestic competition law abreast of EU competition law developments.  
                                                 
308 M. Coleman and M. Grenfell, The Competition Act 1998: Law and Practice (Oxford University 
Press 1999) 46. See Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Co CPC [2004] EWCA Civ 637, paras 83 and 92 
for expression by the Court of Appeal of the duty of deference that further supports this view. 
309 K. Middleton “Harmonisation with Community Law: The Euro Clause” in B. Rodger and A. 
MacCulloch (eds.), The UK Competition Act: A New Era for UK Competition Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2000) 31. 
310 Napp Pharmaceuticals Holdings Limited v  Director General of Fair Trading [2002] 4 All ER 
376 Court of Appeal para 14. 
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The phrase “as applicable at that time” clearly anticipates and addresses situations 
where EU competition law develops or evolves. This phrase intends to make:  
“clear that if there is a decision of the European Court which conflicts with 
the latest interpretation of the point by the UK courts, those applying the 
prohibition must follow the EU interpretation. It is also the case that if the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ changes over time it is the latest decision which 
prevails.”311 
  
The dynamic nature of this underpinning to s.60(2) is crucial to appreciating fully 
the on-going significance for UK competition law of  developments in EU 
competition law. This subsection makes the EU cases highly influential vis-a-vis 
the UK prohibitions. In particular, how Art 101 has been interpreted and applied in 
cases such as Remia, Pronuptia, Gottrup and Wouters comes within the duties in 
s.60(2).  
 
S.60(3) obliges the national bodies to “have regard to any relevant decision or 
statement” of the European Commission.312While the cogency of this obligation is 
less than that under subsection 2, its material scope is broader because it extends 
beyond legally binding measures. When the High Court was faced with opposing 
interpretations in a recent case, it expressly decided to adopt the approach set out in 
Commission Guidelines.313 Notably, although s.60 does not make any mention of 
Opinions of Advocates General, the Court of Appeal has paid some attention to 
                                                 
311 See Lord Simon of Highbury col 962 speaking against Amendment 255 that sought to delete 
the reference to the relevant EC principles and decisions applicable at the time the UK decision is 
being taken. 
312 See K. Middleton “Harmonisation with Community Law: The Euro Clause” in B. Rodger and 
A. MacCulloch (eds.), The UK Competition Act: A New Era for UK Competition Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2000) 41 for the suggestion that this provision was included following views expressed 
by the Competition Law Association. See further J. Scholes “The Draft Competition Bill: 
Comments by the Competition Law Association” [1998] ECLR 32.  
313 Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated Racing Ltd [2008] EWHC 1978 
(Ch), [2009] UKCLR 547, para 438. More surprisingly, some courts have even referred to non-
binding letters from the European Commission to notifying parties or complainants, see Qualifying 
Insurers subscribing to the ARP and Capita London Market Services Ltd v. Ross & Co and the Law 
Society [2004] EWHC 118 (Ch).   
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them.314 A receptive attitude of courts to Opinions is very significant because of 
their de facto potential to spur developments in EU law.315  
 
Coleman and Grenfell note that reading s. 60(3) alone suggests that UK 
organisations are relatively more at liberty to depart from Commission decisions 
(assuming that there is no Treaty or EU Court case law on the issue).316 However, 
they rightly further point out that if subsection (3) is considered in the light of 
subsection (1), the UK authorities’ discretion to depart from relevant Commission 
decisions and statements is more limited, because subsection (1) obliges them: 
“so far as possible to ensure consistency of treatment between questions 
arising under Part I of the Act and corresponding ones under EU law. It is 
clear that Commission Decisions are part of [EU] law and, thus, the 
consistency obligation is likely to apply in relation to such decisions.”317  
 
Parliamentary debates emphasise that subsection (2) was deliberately “very tight” 
and that “those applying and interpreting the prohibitions must always act with the 
purpose set out in subsection (1) in mind: that is consistency with the [EU] 
approach. Subsections (2) and (3) must therefore be read as a package together 
with the purpose in subsection (1).”318 This quotation starkly reveals Parliament’s 
determination to ensure the highest feasible degree of consistency between the EU 
and national competition law provisions. 
 
It is clear that s.60 trammels the interpretation of UK competition law tightly in 
line with EU competition law as the latter evolves. Some UK courts have expressly 
noted the obligations they face under s.60.319 Some UK judgments are very deeply 
influenced by Art 101 case law. To illustrate this point, one case is now analysed 
closely. 
 
                                                 
314 Napp Pharmaceuticals Holdings Limited v  Director General of Fair Trading [2002] EWCA 
Civ 796; [2002] 4All E.R. 376, para37 where it expressly reserved the issue as to whether Opinions 
come within s.60 but noted that they are “important and authoritative” and are “respectfully viewed 
by this court.” Intel Corporation v. VIA Technologies Inc [2003] ECC 16, [2002] EWCA Civ 1905 
para 43 
315 Chapter Six considers the jurisdictionally dynamic view of Advocate General Jacobs on the 
possible classification of  some employees as “undertakings.”  
316  M. Coleman and M. Grenfell, The Competition Act 1998: Law and Practice (Oxford 
University Press 1999) 52. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Lord Simon 25 Nov 1997 Col 961. 
319 Hendry v World Professional Billiards & Snooker Association Ltd [2002] UKCLR 5, para 25. 
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3.2.3 Study: Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services320 
  
While the case of Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services (BAGS) does not 
deal directly with restrictions on professionals, the High Court judgment is 
interesting in two respects. These are, firstly, its deferential treatment of a variety 
of EU sources and, secondly, its views on the “ancillary restraints” doctrine.  
 
In this case, licenced betting offices (LBOs) challenged new collective 
arrangements among thirty one racecourse operators to establish a joint venture 
(AMRAC) in order to sell their media rights collectively to the LBOs. The LBOs 
were unhappy that AMRAC sought higher overall prices than its predecessor.321 
They challenged the AMRAC arrangements by arguing that they amounted to price 
fixing and/or closed collective exclusive selling of LBO rights that foreclosed the 
market. A highly contentious issue was whether either the object or effect of the 
arrangements was anti-competitive? The High Court (Morgan J.) concluded that 
their object was not to fix prices but was to sponsor AMRAC’s entry into the pre-
existing monopsonistic market for LBO media rights of racecourses. Because the 
arrangement and alleged restriction are not ones that typically involve 
professionals, this chapter does not delve into the substantive arguments 
surrounding the particular arrangements. Instead, its focus is placed on the High 
Court’s attitude to EU competition law sources and, additionally, its understanding 
of the EU approach to “ancillary restraints.”   
 
This case shows the closeness of the relationship between the substantive 
prohibitions in the Act and Art 101. In the High Court Morgan J. stated that the 
domestic and EU provisions are “very similar” and expressly confined himself to 
“addressing the requirements” of Art 101 “without on every occasion repeating that 
the same requirement exists in the parallel provisions of sections 2 and 9 of the 
1998 Act.” 322 Later, in the same dispute, the Court of Appeal went so far as to say 
that “it is common ground that there is no difference between the article and the 
                                                 
320 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated Racing Ltd [2008] EWHC 1978 
(Ch), [2009] UKCLR 547; on app [2009] EWCA Civ 750, [2009] UKCLR 863 
321 Previously, one distributor (SIS) managed these rights of all sixty racecourse operators and only 
he dealt with the LBOs. 
322 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated Racing Ltd [2008] EWHC 1978 
(Ch),para 298. 
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national legislation, so reference need only be made to the article.”323 These 
comments from the High Court and the Court Of Appeal provide a striking 
illustration of how deeply the interpretation of the domestic competition legislation 
is affected by Art 101.  
 
The High Court judgment contains very lengthy overviews and summaries of EU 
competition law. Notably, Morgan J. drew heavily from non-binding sources such 
as Commission Guidelines (especially Guidelines on Article [101](3)) and from 
textbooks. In particular, he cited the views of Faull & Nikpay that whether an 
agreement involves a restriction by object is “predominantly a question of policy 
for the Community institutions.”324 Morgan J. remarked that this would leave:  
“little room for a national court to expand the scope of restrictions, which 
are regarded as restrictions by object, beyond those explicitly identified as 
such by the European Courts and case law and by the Commission in its 
notices and guidelines.”325  
 
This quotation gives an interesting insight into the national judge’s perception of 
the minimal scope under UK competition law for manoeuver outside the approach 
taken by EU institutions to Art 101.  
 
Morgan J. summarised the EU courts doctrine of “ancillary restraints” as providing 
that clauses which restrict “rivalry between the parties and/or third parties fall 
outside Article [101](1) if they are directly related and necessary to the 
implementation of a legitimate purpose.” 326 Notably, he continued to remark that 
the “legitimate purpose” may be commercial (and cited Gottrup Klim) or it “may 
relate to a public interest such as the case involving the Bar of the Netherlands” 
(and cited Wouters).327 In addition, the judge quoted, at length, the description of  
the “ancillary restraints” doctrine contained in the Commission Guidelines on Art 
                                                 
323 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated Racing Ltd [2008] EWHC 1978 
(Ch), para 23. 
324 Para 31. 
325 Para 324. 
326 Para 332. 
327 Para 332. 
 95
[101](3) and expressly adopted its approach.328 These Guidelines state, inter alia, 
that: 
“[I]f on the basis of objective factors it can be concluded that without the 
restriction the main non-restrictive transaction would be difficult or 
impossible to implement, the restriction may be regarded as objectively 
necessary for its implementation and proportionate to it.”329  
 
It is significant that Morgan J. stated that the concept of “necessity” may be:  
“satisfied by something which is not strictly essential. The concept of 
necessity has some flexibility and in an appropriate case can be satisfied by 
facts which show that it would be difficult to achieve the commercial 
objective without the presence of the restriction.”330  
 
The High Court clearly intended to copy the EU approach of the standard of 
“necessity” and understood it to provide a relaxed rather than a strict standard like 
that of being essential. The other point of note is the readiness of the High Court to 
cite and accept non-binding EU sources, such as Commission Guidelines.  
 
Morgan J. stated that not every restriction on conduct amounts to a restriction on 
competition and decided to apply the EU case-law on “ancillary restraints” and 
commercial necessity. The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that the 
object of the arrangement was to establish a rival new operator which needed to get 
exclusive rights from a minimum number of courses.331 A crucial issue was 
whether it was necessary to sell the media rights of racecourses on an exclusive 
basis. The Court of Appeal specifically stated that it was “obviously necessary that 
the new entrant would have to be promoted by  .. a number of racecourses and that 
it would need to be protected, at the stage of its establishment, from competition 
from the incumbent.”332 This statement confirms that the test of “necessary” is not 
a strict one in the sense of being “essential.” In this author’s view, as all the parties 
were based in the UK they did not face significant legal or linguistic impediments 
and, therefore, collective selling was not strictly “necessary” but was, rather, more 
                                                 
328 Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [now Art 101(3)] 
[2004 OJ C 101/97. 
329 Para 21-2(emphasis added). 
330 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated Racing Ltd [2008] EWHC 1978 
(Ch), para 452(emphasis added). 
331 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated Racing Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 
750.  
332 Para 85. 
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convenient. However, the Court decided, in effect, that a measure may be 
“necessary” because it makes the business easier to manage in practice.  
 
The judgments in BAGS illustrate two relevant points. Firstly, the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal judgments exhibit a high level of fidelity to EU competition 
law when applying national competition law. They treat UK competition law as 
being a domestic equivalent of EU competition law. Moreover, the High Court 
drew heavily from textbooks and non-binding Commission Guidelines. This may 
indicate the judge found the primary EU Court sources more difficult or it may just 
indicate the increasing influence of European Commission materials on national 
courts. In any event, the judgment takes account of sources of EU law such as 
Commission Guidelines to a degree that far exceeds the stipulations of s.60.  The 
second key point is that the High Court and Court of Appeal did not insist on a 
strict standard when deciding what was “necessary.” The High Court expressly 
accepted that a measure is “necessary” if it solves a business difficulty.  It 
determined that the EU approach to the “necessity” standard is less rigorous than 
the standard of “essential” and faithfully interpreted UK competition law in that 
light rather than looking to other areas of UK law for inspiration. This makes the 
test a rather easy one for a restraining party to satisfy. Consequently, restrictions 
that are merely convenient (from an operational standpoint) may not be prohibited.  
 
The foregoing shows the inclination of UK competition law to take EU aligned 
approaches. It showed how, in practice, both systems may be viewed as applying 
equivalent tests (apart, of course, from the inter-state trade effect requirement under 
EU competition law.)   
 
Having shown the closeness between UK and EU competition law, the next step is 
to contrast their approach with the approach taken by the ROTD. The next section 
demonstrates how some restrictions on professionals may be treated differently by 




3.3 ROTD AND COMPETITION LAW ARE NOT THE SAME 
 
Chapters One and Two explored how the ROTD and EU competition law have 
been applied to some restrictions on professionals. This chapter draws together 
strands from these foundational chapters in order to demonstrate concisely that the 
ROTD and competition law in the UK (comprising UK competition law and EU 
competition law) do not take the same approach to some restrictions. In order to 
highlight the differences in the approaches of the ROTD and competition law in the 
UK, this section examines judgments where the High Court considered and applied 
both the ROTD and competition law (EU and/or UK) to a provision. It discusses, 
firstly, some differences that stem from their different substantive tests and, 
secondly, some differences surrounding their processes.  
  
 3.3.1 Different Substantive Tests  
 
The differences in the tests of the ROTD and competition law cause courts to take 
different approaches when applying each legal regime to the same provision. This 
will be illustrated by discussing two judgments. The first judgment (Days Medical 
Aids) shows that different outcomes may be produced under competition law and 
the ROTD. The second judgment (Hendry) shows that the ROTD and competition 
law, even where they do not produce a different outcome, take different 
considerations into account when assessing the same restriction. The aim of this 
section is to explain why a restrained party might prefer to have the ROTD applied 
instead of competition law.  
 
The High Court judgment in Days Medical Aids Ltd. v. Pihsiang demonstrates how 
a restriction that is not prohibited by Art 101(1) may fall foul of the ROTD. Days 
Medical Aids (DMA) sought damages from Pihsiang for the allegedly wrongful 
repudiation of a distribution contract.333 DMA had been appointed as the exclusive 
wholesale distributor for Pihsiang’s products. Pihsiang undertook to supply the 
products only to DMA and not to supply customers or other distributors. Pihsiang 
                                                 
333 Damages may be awarded by an English court to a party to an illegal contract, see Case C-
453/99 Courage Ltd v. Crehan [2001] ECR 1-6297; [2001] 5 CMLR 28; [2002] QB 507. 
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also contracted not to allow its distributors located outside the contract territory to 
sell into the territory. DMA undertook to distribute only Pihsiang’s products. The 
contract did not contain any restrictions on prices or any post-termination 
restrictions. The distribution contract was concluded for an initial period of five 
years. Clause 10 gave DMA a right to renew which extended to all subsequent five 
year periods on the same basis “for as long as permitted by law.”334 Pihsiang 
argued that the provision for renewals was void under both the ROTD and Art 101. 
 
The applicability of the ROTD depended on the how the renewal clause was 
construed. Langley J. decided that if the clause provided for only one renewal, the 
ROTD would not apply.335 However, he further expressed the view that:  
“if the Agreement is to be construed as one entitling DMA to renew it every 
five years for the rest of time... I think the conclusion that it not only 
contained a restraint of Pihsiang’s freedom to trade in the UK (as well as 
continental Europe) but did so in a manner which was unusual or 
exceptional is almost unavoidable. The Agreement would then be subject to 
the doctrine and so require to be justified as reasonable between the 
parties.”336   
 
Only DMA enjoyed the right to renew and when exercised, this right imposed a 
positive duty on Pihsiang to supply the goods to DMA, at all times, and at the 
lowest price payable by any distributor.337 Langley J. expressly declined to follow 
case law (Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd) which 
allows a dispensation from justification if a clause has passed “into the accepted 
and normal currency of commercial or contractual …..relations…”338 This meant 
that DMA would have to justify the restraint as being reasonable in the parties’ 
interests.  
                                                 
334 Clause 10 provided: “On expiry of the first five year term of this agreement provided that DMA 
has discharged its obligations under the agreement and is maintaining a sales level of not less than 
5000 units per annum, DMA shall have the right to renew the agreement for another five years on 
the same basis as herein, except that the amount payable each year under Clause 2 shall be $20,000. 
This right of renewal shall extend to all subsequent five year periods on the same basis for as long 
as permitted by law.” 
335 Paras 223 and 267. 
336 Para 224. 
337 Para 224. 
338 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd. [1968] AC 269, 331. This case is 
examined in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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Langley J. accepted that DMA was entitled to protect its investment and to reap the 
rewards of success. However, he stated that:  
“if the agreement is to be construed as entitling DMA to renew every five 
years for the rest of time, that goes much further than any legitimate 
interest DMA could have or was entitled to protect. It would be tantamount 
to imposing a lifetime restriction and potentially a way of avoiding the 
consequences of the greater legal distaste for restraints which apply after an 
agreement has ended.”339  
 
The High Court weighed the interests of the parties when assessing the 
reasonableness of the provision. This approach allowed the Court to consider and 
to protect the interests of the restrained party as it led to the conclusion that the 
provision for unlimited renewals fell foul of the ROTD. 
 
The focus of the analysis under competition law was different as it assessed 
economic criteria and market conditions. It was agreed that Art 101(1) prohibited a 
vertical agreement if the exclusivity created substantial market foreclosure.340 One 
expert witness framed the question as follows: “[D]oes the fact that Pihsiang is 
obliged to supply its products only to DMA remove opportunities to other 
competing top-tier distributors to such an extent that they are unable to compete 
effectively in the marketplace?”341 The undisputed expert economic evidence was 
that competition in the wholesale market was strong, effective and increasing, that 
entry was neither foreclosed nor difficult and that prices were decreasing. In this 
light, as Langley J. put it, there was “no evidence, at all, that any potential market 
entrant was deterred by the existence of the agreement.”342 He concluded that the 
renewals clause did not have an anti-competitive object or effect and, thus, was not 
prohibited by Art 101(1).343 At the relevant time, vertical agreements were 
excluded from the equivalent prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 but it may 
be assumed that a similar conclusion would have been reached under UK 
competition law.344 
 
                                                 
339 Para 225 (emphasis added). 
340 Para 238.  
341 Para 239. 
342 Para 240. 
343 Para 243.  
344 Vertical Exclusion Order SI 2000 No 310. 
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The contractual clause was not prohibited by competition law but was one that 
could be resisted by the restrained party under the ROTD (assuming that the 
interface rules allowed the ROTD to be applied). It is important to highlight the 
different focus that was taken when applying each legal regime. When applying 
ROTD, the Court followed the traditional analysis of assessing whether the 
provision was justified as being reasonable in the parties’ interests. This entailed 
paying specific attention to the effect of the measure on the restrained party. Under 
the competition law analysis, the focus was on the market and, in particular, on 
whether the clause could adversely affect new entry by rivals. Each legal regime 
pursued a different focus and the ROTD took greater account of the restrained 
party. Thus, the restrained person would prefer the ROTD to be applied in the place 
of competition law. 
 
The High Court judgment of Hendry v. World Professional Billiards & Snooker 
Association Ltd was selected for discussion because it illustrates that while a 
measure may fall foul of both the ROTD and competition law, this similar outcome 
is reached by means of different analytical approaches.345 In this case, professional 
snooker players challenged some restrictive rules of the World Professional 
Billiards and Snooker Association Ltd (WPBSA). In particular, they challenged 
Rule A5346 (and other policies347) that limited the tournaments which WPBSA 
                                                 
345 [2002] UKCLR 5. 
346  It provides “5.1 Members shall not enter or play in any snooker tournament, event or match 
without the prior written consent of the Board other than: 5.1.1 Any snooker tournament event or 
match (both qualifying and final rounds) owned and staged by World Snooker; and/or 5.1.2 Any 
snooker tournament, event or match (both qualifying and final rounds) sanctioned by the Board in 
accordance with the principles set out in the sanctioning policy document of 12 March 2001.5.2 
Members shall not require the consent of the Board to enter and play in any  exhibition, 
promotional, testimonial event or match provided that such event or match will not be arranged: 
5.2.1 until the dates for tournaments events or matches owned and staged or sanctioned by World 
Snooker have been fixed for the relevant season; 5.2.2 so that it adversely affects any tournament 
event or match owned and staged or sanctioned by World Snooker.” 
347 For example, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the policy document. These are as follows: “4. To ensure 
the proper working, organisation and administration of the sport of snooker as a whole and to ensure 
that Members give a degree of priority to World Snooker organised tournaments (which are part of 
the ranking system or which are significant representative tournaments such as the Champions Cup 
and the Nations Cup) as is necessary to organise and run the sport, World Snooker will not normally 
sanction a tournament on dates and at times which conflict with the dates and times for such World 
Snooker tournaments involving players who are participating in such World Snooker tournaments. 
5. Notwithstanding the principle set out in paragraph 4, for the benefit of the sport of snooker as a 
whole World Snooker needs to maximise revenue from the audio-visual exploitation of its organised 
tournaments. Accordingly World Snooker will not normally sanction a tournament, the audio-visual 
rights to which will be transmitted at the same time and within the same territory (either live or on a 
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would recognise (or sanction). The players wished to play in tournaments 
organised by TSN that were not sanctioned by WPBSA. The High Court (Lloyd J.) 
decided that the sanctioning policy was void under both EU and UK competition 
law and, also, opined that it was void under the ROTD. How the Court conducted 
different analyses under each legal regime is next highlighted. 
 
Lloyd J. recited the defence argument that a restriction may fall outside the 
prohibition in Art 101 only on either one of two bases. The first basis is that the 
restriction does not have a significant anti-competitive effect. The second basis is 
where “if on balance, the economic advantages of the agreement are seen as pro-
competitive overall, any restrictions which are necessary to the performance of the 
agreement are not affected by the provisions.”348 However, the claimants 
(restrained sportspersons) argued that this second approach may be used only in 
relation to “ancillary restrictions, subordinate to the main object of the agreement, 
and then only to those which are really necessary for the purposes of the main 
agreement” and referred, in particular, to Gottrup-Klim.349 Lloyd J. decided that the 
object of the rule was not anti-competitive but that its effect was anti-
competitive.350 He defined the affected market in economic terms for the purposes 
of ascertaining whether there was an infringement of Art 101 (or s.2 of the 
Competition Act 1998) and/or Art 102 (or s.18 of the Competition Act 1998). He 
defined the relevant market as being between snooker players and the promoters of 
snooker tournaments.351 He evaluated the market power of WPBSA by considering 
factors such as its market share and barriers to entry and drew heavily on expert 
economic evidence on markets. Lloyd J. characterised the parties in terms of 
buyers and sellers of services by applying tests of demand substitutability.352 While 
                                                                                                                                       
delayed basis within as limited a window as World Snooker can secure by agreement with its 
broadcasters) as rights to any World Snooker  organised tournament are being transmitted live.” 
348 Para 27. 
349 Ibid. Case C-250/92 Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforening and Ors v. Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareseskab AmbA [1994] ECR I-5641, in particular, paras 35-40. 
350 Para 112. 
351 Para 89. 
352 See further para 88 where the judge found there was no substitute “as far as the players are 
concerned, for the services of promoters. As between broadcasters and promoters, on the other 
hand, I am satisfied by the evidence that broadcasters do have close substitutes for snooker 
tournaments, namely   other sporting events, even if I disregard, as not being a really close 
substitute, other entertainment material. It seems to me that the same is true of sponsors as well.” 
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conceding that analogies between goods and services could be misleading, he 
highlighted two particular aspects of the market. These were namely:  
“the acquisition of the ingredients or raw materials, and the sale of the 
product: as ‘buyer’ the tournament organiser is in a market in relation to 
players; as ‘seller’ it is in a market in relation to broadcasters, sponsors and 
other advertisers, and the paying public who attends events.”353  
The language employed in the competition law analysis is rooted in economic 
terminology, centres on the market and is somewhat impersonal when discussing 
the restrained persons.   
 
After Lloyd J. decided that the restriction was prohibited by competition law, he 
said it was not necessary to consider the ROTD. This conclusion raises a highly 
important point about the interface between the ROTD and competition law (which 
will be addressed in Chapters Four and Five). For this chapter, the relevant point is 
how Lloyd J. viewed the sanctioning policy when he applied the prism of the 
ROTD. Lloyd J. applied the classic ROTD test by asking whether the policy was 
justified as reasonable in the parties’ interests? He queried specifically whether the 
sanctioning policy was no more than reasonably required to protect a “legitimate 
interest” of WPBSA? Lloyd J. accepted that WPBSA had a “legitimate interest” in 
spreading the prize money more widely than its rival TSN (which, he noted was 
motivated solely by profit). Lloyd J. expressed some sympathy for WPBSA in the 
face of TSN’s attempts to “cream off” some star players while TSN “incurred no 
expense on training and preparing for stardom, with a view to exploiting their 
talents for commercial profit.”354  Lloyd J. was not convinced that WPBSA’s 
interest could “only sensibly be protected by a rule” such as Rule 5 and opined that 
it could not be upheld by the ROTD.355 The timbre of the judges’s observations 
under the ROTD contrasts with his more impersonal economic evidence based 
comments in the competition law analysis. 
 
The High Court judgment in Hendry shows that a measure may fall foul of the tests 
under the ROTD and under competition law but that the two legal provisions do 
not approach the same measure in the same way. The competition law focus is on 
the market and the analysis is more scientific as it is based on economic evidence. 
                                                 
353 Para 87. 
354 Para 115. 
355 Para 114. 
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By contrast, the ROTD takes closer account of the reality of the relationship as 
between the restrained professionals and the association. Most importantly, the 
impact of the restriction on the parties’ interests is specifically taken into account 
under the ROTD.  
 
The analyses of the two judgments above show that courts take different 
considerations into account when applying ROTD and competition law. The impact 
on the restrained party of a contested measure is a more significant factor under the 
ROTD analyses than under competition law judgments. 
 
 
3.3.2 Different Processes under ROTD and Competition Law  
 
It is next suggested that, in some cases, a restrained professional may find it easier 
to litigate a restriction under the ROTD than under competition law on account of 
differences in their processes or proceedings.  
 
An injunction may be more easily obtained under the ROTD than under 
competition law on account of the nature of the evidence required to establish an 
infringement of competition law. Kamerling and Osmann expressed the view that:  
“ … in interlocutory proceedings  it will be considerably easier to show that 
a clause on its construction is unreasonable, rather than to try and argue that 
the object or effect of an agreement on competition means that it is void 
under Article [101](1) and should not benefit from an exemption under Art 
[101](3) - an economic assessment which national judges post-May 2004 
will increasingly be called upon to do, but are unlikely to relish.”356  
Using similar reasoning, the ROTD may be a more effective legal instrument when 
defending an application by a restrainor to dismiss an action on the grounds that 
there is no serious issue to be tried. For example, in Meridian VAT Reclaim UK Ltd 
v. Lowendahl Group, Gross J. was reluctant, in the absence of detailed economic 
evidence on the definition of markets, to conclude that there was a serious issue to 
                                                 
356 See A. Kamerling and C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2004) preface xvi. 
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be tried under competition law, but easily reached that conclusion under the ROTD 
by simply examining the express terms of the restriction.357  
 
In proceedings under competition law, the restrained party as plaintiff must 
discharge the evidential burden to establish that the restriction has an anti-
competitive object or effect.  Complex and detailed economic evidence is often 
required in competition law litigation that may be expensive and/or difficult to 
present. In any event, before a court will find an infringement of competition law 
the evidence adduced must be “commensurately cogent and convincing.”358  
 
When a case is argued under the ROTD, the restrained person may face a relatively 
easier task than under competition law. The restrained person enjoys a fundamental 
advantage due to the ROTD’s presumption that all “restraints of trade” are void and 
must be justified by the restrainor before he may enforce the restriction.359 This 
presumption not only makes for a hostile starting point for the analysis but, also, 
places a greater evidential burden on the side seeking to enforce the restriction. The 
party seeking to rely on the restriction first has to establish, to the court’s 
satisfaction, that the restriction is reasonable inter partes.360 Moreover, if the 
restriction is contained in a standard contract, the restrained party gets the benefit 
of the contra proferentem rule against those who draft a measure.361 If the 
restriction is justified as reasonable inter partes, the restrained party may argue that 
the restriction is not reasonable in the “public interest.”362 This argument may be 
substantiated, in some cases, relatively easily. It has been suggested that any 
economic analysis conducted by courts under the ROTD’s “public interest” limb is 
                                                 
357 [2002] EWHC 1066. Lowendahl had entered into a confidentiality agreement which included a 
non-solicitation clause as part of a pre-sale due diligence exercise. 
358 Attheraces  v. BHRB, Etherton J. [2005] EWHC 3015 (Ch) para 126 citing re H [1996] AC 563, 
586-7 (Lord Nicholls), Aberdeen Journals Limited v. OFT [2002] CAT 11 citing Napp 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. DGFT [2002] CAT 1, at para 109.  
359 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd [1894] AC 535, 565.  
360 Herbert Morris Ltd v. Saxelby [1916] 1 AC HL 688, 700, 707, 715 per Lords Atkinson, Parker 
of Waddington, and Shaw of Dunfermline. Also see Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harpers Garage 
(Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 319 (Lord Hodson).        
361 Arbuthnot v. Rawlings [2003] EWCA Civ 518. 
362 Herbert Morris Ltd v. Saxelby [1916] 1 AC HL 688, 700, 707, 715 per Lords Atkinson, Parker 
of Waddington, and Shaw of Dunfermline. Also see Texaco Ltd v. Mulberry Filling Station [1972] 
1WLR 814, 822 where Ungoed Thomas J. stated that “ the onus of proving reasonableness in the 
interests of the parties lies on the covenantee, and the reasonableness of the public on the 
covenantor.” See further Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 
269, 319 Lord Hodson .       
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less sophisticated than that conducted under competition legislation because it 
tends to focus on the concentrated nature of the market and, without more, 
conclude that the clause is against the “public interest.”363 Another difference 
concerns the time frame of the analysis. The ROTD examines the restriction’s 
reasonableness at the time the restriction was agreed.364 This focus confers an 
advantage to senior professionals who seek to challenge restrictions that were 
concluded years earlier when they were at comparatively junior level. Competition 
law examines the actual and potential anti-competitiveness of the clause at the time 
of the litigation.365 Thus, because of these differences in the processes, some 
restrained persons may prefer to litigate under the ROTD than under competition 





This chapter showed that competition law in England and Wales (comprising EU 
competition law and UK competition law) does not approach the interests of 
restrained persons in the same way as the ROTD does. It discharged this task by 
taking a two stage approach.  
 
Firstly, this chapter detailed the close alignment between UK competition law and 
EU competition law.  It showed how national competition law is applied in line 
with EU competition law. It highlighted the readiness of the High Court to accept 
EU sources, far in excess of the obligations imposed by s.60 and, thus, take account 
of non-binding Opinions of Advocates General, White Papers and European 
Commission Guidelines. The aim was to show the ongoing influence of 
developments and practices in EU competition law for the interpretation of UK 
competition law. This is important because it explains why domestic courts will 
follow EU approaches such as “ancillary restraints” doctrine and accept 
                                                 
363 See Glick, Bush and Hafen, “The Law and Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A 
Unified Framework [2002] 11 Geo Mason L. Rev 357, 373 where the authors state that “.the courts 
have typically not undertaken any sophisticated antitrust analysis to make this determination, 
instead relying on the number of practitioners as a rule of thumb.” 
364 William Stuart Young v. Evan Jones & Saunders [2001] EWCA Civ 732. 
365 Proactive Sports Management Ltd v. Wayne Rooney, Colleen Rooney et al [2010] EWHC 1807 
(QB) Judge Hegarty QC 651, para 715. 
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justifications based on commercial convenience when applying UK competition 
law.  
 
Taking this EU inspired approach to restrictions on professionals could 
disadvantage some individual professionals in the UK. Consider, for example, 
where a professional association with de facto mandatory membership restricts 
members’ capacity to deal individually with a third party (such as an insurance 
company) in order that the association concludes an exclusive agreement with the 
insurance company based on a ban on its individual members concluding insurance 
agreements with other insurance companies. It is possible for the professional 
association to argue that the collective deal was commercially necessary to achieve 
a critical mass in order to obtain lower cost of professional insurance cover from 
insurance companies and, on that basis, obtain a decision that the restrictions did 
not infringe competition law. The point is that accepting commercial reasons as 
justification for a collective action can damage the freedom of individual 
professionals to choose a preferred insurance company. UK competition law 
follows Art 101(1) closely and does not scrutinize the implications of restrictions 
for the restrained party.  
 
Secondly, this chapter directly juxtaposed the approaches taken by the ROTD and 
competition law when dealing with the same restriction by presenting some 
analyses of cases. The analyses showed that the competition law analysis is 
grounded in the language and concepts of economics, is market focused and 
relatively impersonal.  The ROTD’s focus on the parties’ interests renders it 
generally more hostile to restrictions on persons and ensures attention is always 
paid to implications of restrictions for restrained persons. Unlike the ROTD, Art 
101(1) (or s.2 Competition Act 1998) does not fillet out, for particular scrutiny, 
restrictions on the grounds that the restrictions were either not truly negotiated or 
are capable of being enforced oppressively. There are also differences as between 
the processes under the ROTD and under competition law.   
 
It is clear, from the foregoing, that the ROTD and competition law are different. 
Their different tests and foci mean that different considerations are taken into 
account when appraising the legality of a particular restriction. The main 
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difference, stemming from their different tests, is that the interests of restrained 
persons are not central to the competition law analyses.  
 
Some restrained professionals prefer to rely on the ROTD rather than on UK 
competition law. In such circumstances, the interface question as to whether 
competition law prevails over the applicability of the ROTD is a most important 
one. As the ROTD and competition law are different, an acute problem arises in 
situations where they concurrently apply to the same restriction on a professional. 
The interfaces between the ROTD and competition law are examined in the next 

























Part I (Chapters One to Three) showed that the ROTD and competition law are 
different legal regimes and that, for this reason, their interface is a matter of 
importance for some restrained persons. Part I laid the foundation for Part II 
(Chapters Four, Five and Six) which identifies and discusses how the interfaces 
between the ROTD and competition law in England and Wales may be delineated 
in ways that are problematic for some restrained persons.  
 
Chapter Four examines the interfaces between the ROTD and domestic 
competition law.366 It pinpoints the difficulties that may arise where both the 
ROTD and UK competition law are prima facie applicable to the same restriction. 
There is an interface problem if a restrained person is precluded from relying on 
the ROTD to void an unreasonable (but not anti-competitive) restriction. 
 
In order to understand the extent of this interface problem, this chapter portrays 
fully the context and the nature of, firstly, historical and, secondly, current 
interfaces between the ROTD and competition legislation. Section 4.2 examines 
some legislation enacted in the period preceding the Competition Act 1998. This 
examination shows that the legislations’ interfaces with the ROTD were 
unproblematic because a restriction could be resisted under the ROTD even where 
it was not prohibited by the legislation. The historical analysis also identifies some 
operational shortcomings of the legislation in order to highlight the particularity of 
                                                 
366 Chapter Five examines the interface between the ROTD and EU competition law. Chapter Six 
explores future problematic interfaces. 
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the problems that Parliament intended to remedy with the enactment of domestic 
competition law modelled on EU competition law. Section 4.3 examines the 
applicability of current UK competition law to restrictions on professionals. It 
argues that the general rules on the interface between legislation and the common 
law are unsatisfactory for restrained persons because they apparently permit the 
ROTD to apply only in a residual manner (i.e. where competition law does not 
apply). It queries whether the 1998 Act was truly intended to muzzle the ROTD’s 
applicability to restrictions which also come with the reach of the competition 
legislation. It suggests that the current interfaces between the legislation and the 
ROTD occurred incidentally following the enactment of an EU-style model that 
intended to cure particular operational problems under the previous legislation 
which were not related to its interfaces with the ROTD.  
 
4.2 LEGISLATION FROM 1948 TO 1990s  
 
In order to appreciate the context of the current interface problem, some of the 
legislation enacted between 1948 and the 1990s needs to be examined. This 
analysis is important for three reasons. Firstly, it shows that there was no interface 
problem with the ROTD before the 1998 legislation came into effect. Secondly, the 
analysis reveals the operational shortcomings of the legislation which, it will be 
argued, explains why it was repealed and replaced with a domestic version of the 
EU model. Thirdly, the historical account may explain why certain restrictions on 
professional services were excluded initially from the key prohibition of anti-
competitive arrangements in the 1998 Act.   
 
In the period 1948-1997, the most relevant enactments comprised the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948, Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1956, Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act 1968, Fair Trading Act 1973, Restrictive Trade Practices Acts 1976 and 1977 
and the Competition Act 1980.  These Acts constructed, in an ad hoc fashion, two 
discrete models to deal with market practices.367 One model, established by the 
1948 Act, was an investigative one. The other model, instituted by the 1956 Act, 
                                                 
367 Agreements within the 1956 Act were excluded from the application of the 1948 Act . 
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was a compulsory registration model. The key features of each model are next 
sketched in order to show how they treated some restrictions on professionals. 
 
4.2.1 Investigation Model 
 
The investigation model began under the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
(Inquiry and Control) Act 1948.  From today’s perspective, the model appears tame 
and has been described as “cautious and pragmatic.”368 It allowed references to be 
made by the Board of Trade requiring the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Commission (MRPC) to investigate and report.369 The MRPC had no competence 
to act unless and until the Board of Trade made a reference to it. It could receive 
either limited or general references. In a limited reference, it could investigate and 
report whether particular conditions prevailed. A general reference concerned 
specified classes of restrictive practices in an industry. A MRPC report had to state 
whether the conditions operated or might be expected to operate against the “public 
interest.”370 Only the “competent authority” (Board of Trade or a Minister) could 
make an Order.371 An Order could declare particular practices unlawful but it could 
not alter the structure of the industry. The 1948 Act was limited to goods but the 
Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965 allowed for the investigation model to be 
extended to some services and some mergers.372 Also, the 1965 Act renamed the 
MRPC as the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). It gave the Board of 
Trade, with the consent of Parliament, power to order divestiture following an 
MMC Report that an agreement was against the “public interest.” The Fair Trading 
Act 1973 created the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the independent Director 
General for Fair Trade (DGFT). It gave the DGFT power to publish advice and 
                                                 
368 R. Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 1993) 60. See further S. Wilks, In 
the Public Interest: Competition Policy and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Manchester:  
Manchester University Press, 1999)13. 
369 The Board of Trade is the predecessor of the Department of Trade and Industry. 
370 The concept of “public interest” was not statutorily defined.  
371 Not every reference culminated with an Order. 
372 See further  D.M. Rabould and A. Firth, Law of Monopolies, Competition Law and Practice in 
the USA, EEC, Germany and the UK (London: Graham & Trotman 1991) 435 where the authors 
cite the third annual report  in 1963 of the Registrar of Restrictive Trade. For discussion of the 
report and the data see J.P. Cunningham, The Fair Trading Act 1973: Consumer Protection and 
Competition Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1974)  121. Also see T. Frazer, Monopoly, 
Competition and the Law: The Regulation of Business Activity in Britain, European and America 
(Brighton: Wheatsheaf 1988) 136-7. 
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guidance and to refer “monopoly situations”373 to the Commission for investigation 
which could recommend “structural” remedies. The DGFT got responsibility for 
negotiating “undertakings” with businesses as well as the duty to encourage trades 
associations to prepare codes of conduct.374 The Competition Act 1980 allowed the 
DGFT to investigate practices of particular firms instead of industries and to assess 
practices rather than products.375 The Secretary of State could request the 
negotiation of “undertakings” to be given to the DGFT.376 The DGFT could refer 
the firm and the practice to the MMC which could decide whether the firm had 
engaged in anti-competitive practice against the “public interest.” The Secretary of 
State had power to make an Order prohibiting the practice.  
 
In 1976, a statutory instrument moved many services to the registration model. 
However, many professional services were not so moved and, thus, remained 
within the investigation model. Over many years, the statutory institutions issued 
reports on professional services. For example, the MMC issued a general report on 
Professional Services in 1970. Reports criticising specific restrictions on 
professionals included one on scale fees377 and one on the two counsel 
requirement.378 Although the MMC upheld restrictions on advertising by barristers, 
it expressed criticism of them in respect of other professions.379 Some Reports 
                                                 
373 The power to initiate merger references was retained by the Secretary of State and the DGFT 
could only make recommendations to the Secretary about referring mergers to the Commission. See 
J.P. Cunningham,  The Fair Trading Act 1973: Consumer Protection and Competition Law 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1974) 4 where the author expresses surprise that the DGFT was not 
given this power.  
374 S.124(3) Fair Trading Act 1973. 
375 This Act was preceded by many reports, the most influential of which was the second Liesner 
report Cmnd 7512 (1979). See further R. Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 
1993) chapter 4 and see 119 for analysis of the relationship between the  Fair Trading Act 1973 and 
the Competition Act 1980.  
376 See R. Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 1993) 108  for discussion of  
“undertakings” given to DGFT following preliminary investigation under 1980 Act. 
377 Estate Agents HCP (1968-69); Architects’ Services HCP (1977-78); Surveyor’s Services HCP 
(1977-98). 
378 Barristers’ Services HCP (1975-76); Advocates Services HCP (1975-76). 
379 Stockbrokers Cmnd 6571 (1976); Veterinary Surgeons Cmnd 6572 (1976); Accountancy 
Services Cmnd 6573 (1976); Services of Solicitors in England and Wales HCP (1975-76); Services 
of Solicitors in Scotland HCP (1975-76); The Law and Economics of Professional Advertising: An 
Overview (1985); Civil Engineering Consultancy Services  Cm 564 (1989); Services of Medical 
Practitioners CM 582 (1989); Services of Professionally Regulated Osteopaths Cm 583 (1989). 
MMC received reference on private medical fees in 1992. 
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brought about change to professional practices.380 In 1986, the DGFT published 
four Reports on professions.381 The MMC published a report in 1994 on NHS 
Consultants382 and, in 1997, on Solicitors Estate Agency Services in Scotland.383  
 
The types of activity that were undertaken in relation to restrictions on 
professionals were sketched above in order to show how the legislation operated in 
practice. This is important because of their implications for the legislative 
interfaces with the ROTD. The investigative and reporting functions did not create 
unclear or problematic interfaces with the ROTD. If an Order was made, it could, 
inter alia, end agreements to fix and control prices, or prohibit refusals to supply 
and prevent take-overs.  In such a case, the reach and effect of any Order made was 
clear because it was prohibitory and specific. For example, an Order prohibiting 
scale fees followed from the Report on Estates Agents.384 Reports from institutions 
such as the MMC and OFT did not affect the operation of the ROTD. The interface 
between the common law and the investigation model was not problematic because 
the legislation did not interfere with the applicability of the ROTD. In particular, 
the ROTD could be called on to resist unreasonable “restraints of trade” which also 
came within the reach of the legislative investigation model. 
 
4.2.2 Registration Model 
 
The compulsory registration model was established by the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1956. If the Board of Trade made an Order specifying classes of 
agreements, such agreements containing restrictions on trade in goods had to be 
registered with the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements before the restriction 
                                                 
380 Reports criticising advertising restrictions on professionals caused professional bodies to amend 
their codes/regulations e.g. Services of Solicitors in England and Wales in Relation to Restrictions 
on Advertising (1975-76) HCP 557. 
381 The Advertising and Charging Rules of the Professions Serving the Construction Industry ( 
March 1986);Restrictions on the Kind of Organization through which Members of the Professions 
may Offer their Services (August 1986);  Review of Restrictions on the Patent Agent’s Profession 
(September 1986) and Advertising by the Professions: A Review of the Remaining Significant 
Restrictions (October 1986).  
382 Private Medical Services: Report of Agreements and Practices Relating to Charges for the 
supply of Private Medical Services by NHS Consultants- CM 2452 1994. 
383 Cm 3699. 
384  HCP (1968-69) Restriction on Agreements (Estate Agents) Order 1970 SI 1970/1696. Also 
Specialised Advertising Services CM 280 (1988) was followed by Restriction on Conduct 
(Specialized Advertising Services) Order 1988  SI 1989/2390. 
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took effect. The Registrar referred agreements to the Restrictive Practices Court 
(RPC). The Act expressly presumed that a registered restriction was against the 
“public interest.”385 An agreement was not allowed unless it came within one of the 
seven (or later eight) “gateways” and the “tailpiece.” The Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1968 rendered unregistered agreements void and unenforceable. It 
introduced more severe fines where a registrable agreement was not registered. It 
also gave a person harmed by the operation of restrictions in an unregistered 
agreement a cause of action as a breach of statutory duty. After the Fair Trading 
Act 1973 the DGFT took over the functions of Registrar.386 Later legislation 
consolidated many aspects of this model.387  
  
Many restraints on professionals did not come within the registration requirement. 
It is important to understand the limited scope of the legislation’s applicability vis-
a-vis common restrictions of professionals for two reasons. Firstly, it means that 
the interface between the registration legislation and the ROTD was not extensive. 
Secondly, it may explain why many professional services were placed (initially) by 
Parliament outside the Chapter I, s.2 prohibition of the 1998 Act.  
  
The 1956 Act was limited to goods, but the 1973 Act allowed for some services to 
be brought by means of statutory instrument into the registration model. 388 This 
occurred, to some extent, with the Restrictive Trade Practices (Services) Order 
1976.389 However, in practice, many restrictions on professionals’ services were 
not required to be registered. This is significant because it meant that there was 
only a limited interface with the ROTD. Moreover, in practice, many restrictions 
did not have to be registered due to either i) express curtailments or exclusions 
specified in the legislation and/or ii) their failure to satisfy the highly precise 
                                                 
385 S. 21.  
386 See S. Wilks, In the Public Interest: Competition Policy and the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (Manchester:  Manchester University Press,1999) 40 for a discussion of the redesign of 
the implementation machinery. 
387 The Restrictive Trade Practices Court Act 1976 consolidated earlier provisions and, itself, was 
later amended by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1977. 
388 S. 107 (1) in Part X. entitled “Extension of Act of 1956 to agreements relating to services.” 
Specifically, the Act allowed for agreements between “two or more persons carrying on business” 
within the UK “in the supply of services brought under control” by the Order. 
389 SI 1976/98 came into operation  on March 22nd, 1976. 
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specifications for compulsory registration. How professional services were treated 
by the registration model is next considered. 
 
Professional services came within the scope of carrying on business.390 The Act 
expressly provided that “services” included “engagements (whether professional or 
other) which for gain or reward are undertaken or performed.”391 It did not include 
services rendered to an employer under an employment contract.392 That 
employment contracts did not come within the reach of the legislation precluded a 
significant interface arising with the ROTD.  
 
As noted earlier, many professional services were, in effect, excluded from the 
requirement to register by the Restrictive Trade Practices (Services) Order 1976. 
This Order covered agreements between two or more persons carrying on business 
in the supply of any services under which restrictions in respect of the matters 
specified in Art 3(2) of the Order were accepted in relation to “designated 
services.”393 Art 3(2) specified matters such as charges, terms or condition of 
supply, forms in which and persons to whom or from whom “designated services” 
are to be supplied. However, “designated services” were defined as all services 
except those described in Sch. 4 of the 1973 Act.394 This list of exceptions 
enumerated fifteen paragraphs of categories of liberal professionals.395 Some 
services were defined simply (e.g. “medical services” and “ophthalmic services”) 
and others by statutory definition (e.g. “any services falling within the practice of 
dentistry within the meaning of the Dentists Act 1957”).396 Some services were 
defined more cumbersomely by referring to professionals “acting in their capacity 
as such.” Legal services were defined as “the services of barristers, advocates and 
solicitors in their capacity as such.” The study in section 4.3.3 will show that the 
                                                 
390 S.117(2) “In this Part of the Act and in the modifications made by it ‘business’ includes a 
professional practice.” 
391 S. 117(1). 
392 Contract of employment was defined by  S.137(1) as “ a contract of service or of 
apprenticeship, whether it is express or implied, and (if it is express) whether it is oral or in 
writing.” 
393 S.107(3) 1973 [later S 11of 1976]. 
394 Later Sch. 1 of the 1976 Act. 
395 Later, the Insolvency Act 1985 in S. 217(4) added insolvency services to the list that could not 
be designated. 
396. See para 50 of  The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors v. DGFT [1981] ECC 587 RPC.  
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phrase (“capacity as such”) caused difficulty in determining whether chartered 
surveyors came within the exception to the registration requirement.  
 
The legislation made express provision for exclusions from compulsory 
registration. Of these, the most relevant ones for this research were vertical 
agreements397and agreements for certain licences, patents and certain know-how 
exchange agreements. Additionally, it specified that certain restrictions must be 
“disregarded” which meant that a “blue pencil” approach was taken to them. Such 
listed restrictions included exclusive dealing agreements approved by the Board of 
Trade398 and some restrictions affecting workmen.399 Wilberforce suggested that 
the wide definition of “workmen”400 could exempt agreements, for example, to 
supply only chemists who employ qualified staff.401 
 
Some restrictions on professionals fell outside the registration model not because of 
express exclusions/exemptions (detailed above) but because they did not come 
within the precisely stipulated terms of the requirements to register. The next 
paragraphs examine two examples of strict definitions that, in practice, put many 
restrictions on professionals outside the requirement to register.  
 
The first example stems from the stipulation that a restriction be accepted by at 
least two parties. Agreements between two professionals in partnership were not 
registrable because two partners were treated as one person.402 Moreover, only 
restrictions accepted by both parties had to be registered. This stipulation is highly 
relevant because it meant that restrictive rules of a professional association 
inhibiting its members’ freedom to compete with each other were not inevitably 
registrable.403 In Fisher, the distinction was drawn between a multilateral 
agreement (one between considerable numbers of persons) and a series of bilateral 
agreements in which each of a number of persons makes an agreement with a 
                                                 
397 S.8(3) and  later Sch. 3, para 2 of  1976 Act.  
398 S.7(1). 
399 S.7(4) later s.9(6).  
400  Any person who has entered into or works under a contract with an employer. 
401 R. O Wilberforce, A. Campbell, The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell 1966), 301. 
402 S.43(2) of the 1976 Act.   
403 Also see  Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors Application  [1985] ICR 330 discussed later 
in this chapter. 
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single party but not amongst each other.404 Fisher unsuccessfully sought a 
declaration that the agreements between persons licensed by the National 
Greyhound Racing Club405 were registrable.406 While it was agreed before the RPC 
that the rule contained a restriction on services, the crucial issue was “whether by 
becoming a licensee of the NGRC and subjecting himself to the Rules of Racing of 
the club, the licensee merely made a bilateral agreement with the club or also made 
an agreement with others licensed by the NGRC on the same terms so that 
multilateral agreements were thereby created giving rise to mutual obligations inter 
se.” 407 The Court of Appeal was not prepared to imply mutual obligation and 
upheld the RPC’s decision that there was no registrable agreement.  
 
The second example of a highly precise requirement (that excluded many restraints 
on professionals in practice) was the strict segregation of agreements relating to 
goods from those relating to services. If a particular restriction did not fall 
definitively within either the goods or the services stream it was not registrable.  
For example, because the RPC decided that granting a lease was neither the supply 
of a service nor a good, a lease was not registrable unless there was a trading nexus 
between the landlord and tenant.408 Whish suggests that an agreement between 
landlords to price-fix would not come within the registration model.409 In addition, 
mixed or “crossover” situations fell outside the model and Whish offers two such 
examples.410 These are, firstly, an agreement between a person in goods business 
and a person in services business, and, secondly, an agreement made by two 
persons carrying on business in goods who accepted restriction as to services. 
 
On account of the express exclusions and the particularity of the requirements for 
registration, many restrictions relevant to this research fell outside the registration 
                                                 
404 Fisher v. DGFT [1982] ICR 71 83G.  
405 A limited company which, inter alia, acts as the judicial body for discipline and conduct of 
greyhound racing in Great Britain and licences greyhound racecourses, trainers and officials. 
406 Moccato J. March 27 1980.  
407 The “mere existence of a structure of rules, which bind persons who voluntarily engage in 
activities covered by the rules” would not in itself allow the inference that all the persons bound by 
the rules have also made an arrangement between themselves.  
408 Ravenseft  Properties Ltd’s Application [1978] QB 52, [1977] 1 All ER 47. 
409 R. Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 1993) 152. 
410 ibid. 
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model. Thus, in such cases, there was no interface with the ROTD and, 
consequently, no problem.   
 
Even in cases where the legislation applied to a “restraint of trade” the interface 
was not inevitably problematic. Registering a “restraint of trade” did not, in itself, 
have any effect on the applicability of the ROTD. A restrictive measure became 
unlawful only when the RPC declared that it was contrary to the “public 
interest.”411 The ROTD remained applicable unless and until the RPC declared that 
the restriction was against the “public interest” and, consequently, void.412 If the 
RPC declared that a particular “restraint of trade” was not against the “public 
interest,” the ROTD was applicable.  A restriction that did not fall foul of the 
“public interest” test in the Act could be void under the ROTD as the tests 
differed.413 In practice, this may be a moot point. Whish notes that of the almost 
10,000 agreements registered between 1956 and the end of 1991, only 11 
succeeded in penetrating one of the “public interest” gateways.414  
 
The foregoing discussion of the pre-1998 legislation showed that restrictions on 
professionals were not comprehensively subjected to scrutiny under the 
investigation or registration models. The significance of the legislations’ limited 
coverage is that the applicability or availability of ROTD was not affected by the 
legislation. Even where the legislation applied, the ROTD could be applied by a 
court to void a “restraint of trade” even if the particular restriction was not 
prohibited by the legislation. Thus, the interface between the ROTD and restrictive 
                                                 
411 S. 20. The RPC could order the parties not to give effect to the restrictions or prohibit them 
making an agreement to like effect. S.2(2)1976. S3 of the 1976 Act allowed the DGFT  to seek an 
interim injunction. In Re Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers [1991] ICR 822, RPC, the 
DGFT obtained an interim injunction following the Institute’s recommendation that its members  
boycott General Accident which implemented a free insurance scheme to purchasers of certain cars. 
The injunctions were obtained before the Institute’s recommendation was due to come into effect.  
412 S 2(2) 1976. 
413 See R. O Wilberforce, A. Campbell,  The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell 1966)  14 for the suggestion  that an agreement initially declared not 
to be against the “public interest” could be declared contrary to the public policy based ROTD on 
the basis that the declaration  under the Act “deals only with certain specific interests of  certain 
classes of the wider public (e.g. consumers, persons employed in the trade, persons seeking to enter 
the trade), and there are issues of public policy which it does not cover, and in particular the 
freedom to contract and, to some extent, freedom to trade.” 
414 R. Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 1993) 161. See  J.P. Cunningham,  
The Fair Trading Act 1973: Consumer Protection and Competition Law (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1974) 120 for a discussion of some early cases. 
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practices and fair trading legislation before 1998 was not a problem from the 
perspective of a restrained person seeking to rely on the ROTD. 
 
4.2.3 Operational Shortcomings: A Study 
 
It is important to appreciate that the interface between the ROTD and the 
legislative models was not regarded as a problem which needed to be remedied by 
enacting the Competition Act 1998. That begs the question as to what prompted its 
enactment?  It is suggested that various operational and enforcement shortcomings 
of the investigation/registration models provide the explanations for their 
replacement with the EU style model contained in the 1998 Act. In order to convey 
graphically some of the shortcomings of the registration model in practice, one case 
is next analysed in detail. The case concerns the measures of a professional 
association (Institution of Chartered Surveyors) and it emphatically demonstrates 
the complexity and undue formalism of the registration model. 
    
The protracted period required to resolve the dispute involving the Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors is remarkable The Institution registered its Charter, byelaws 
and regulations in 1976 on a “fail safe basis.”415 It applied in December 1978 to the 
RPC for an Order to rectify the register by removing the registered documents. In 
November 1980, the DGFT applied to strike out or stay this application to rectify. 
At the hearing in February 1981, the Institution got leave to amend its notice. The 
RPC judgment in March 1981 dismissed the DGFT application on the basis that the 
Institution’s case was, at least, arguable.416 The RPC made observations on certain 
unargued points and points which did not fall directly for decision. On this basis 
and following a Court of Appeal judgment in another case,417 the Institution 
reformulated the grounds for its application.  In December 1983, when granting 
leave to re-amend, Mc Neill J. ordered that three preliminary questions arising out 
of the re-amended application be determined before the final hearing of the 
application.418 His findings on these three questions were appealed by the 
Institution to the Court of Appeal which heard the appeal in January and February 
                                                 
415 Without making any admission but in order to avoid any penalty if registration was required. 
416 [1981] ECC587 Slade, Pearson and Waller JJ. 
417 Fisher v. DFGT [1982] ICR 71 . 
418 [1985] ICR 330, 1984 WL 562915 (ChD) (RPC) Mc Neill J. 
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1986.419 Both the longevity and convoluted nature of the above proceedings 
evidence the complexity of the registration model.  Some of the most relevant 
contentious issues are next detailed. 
 
The first contentious point concerned the scope of the exemption from registration 
as regards services provided by chartered surveyors acting in their “capacity as 
such.”420 The Institution argued that all services provided by its members came 
within this exemption while the DGFT argued that services provided by members 
in valuation, management of property, auctioneering and estate agency did not 
come within the exemption. When seeking to strike out the Institution’s application 
to rectify the register, the DGFT argued that the definition did not include services 
relating to the sale and/or valuation of personal property/chattels. In the RPC, Slade 
J. noted that no authority was cited to assist the interpretation of the phrase 
“capacity as such.”421 The RPC accepted that the legislation could not simply refer 
to “surveyor” because that would include surveyors of, for example, weights and 
that the legislator had to include qualifying words. Nonetheless, it did not 
“necessarily follow that a broad interpretation cannot properly be attributed to the 
additional, definitive words, or that they should be narrowly construed as applying 
to persons whose sole concern is with land or buildings.”422 Slade J. suggested that 
the phrase (“capacity as such”) intended “to exclude those surveyors who do not 
fall within this broad description than to draw a rigid distinction between those 
surveyors whose primary concern is with land and those whose concern, by way of 
specialisation, is more with personal property of one kind or another.”423 The 
divergence of views as to the construction of this fundamental phrase (“capacity as 
such”) neatly evidences the difficulty in understanding whether particular 
professionals’ services were required to be registered.  
 
                                                 
419 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors v. DGFT [1986] ICR  550, CA. 
420 The Schedule to the Act provided: “The services of surveyors (that is to say, of surveyors of 
land, of quantity surveyors, of surveyors of buildings or other structures and of surveyors of ships) 
in their capacity as such surveyors.” 
421 Para 53. 
422 Para 54. 
423 Para 55. 
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In this case, there were also divergent views on whether restrictions on members’ 
conduct contained in the Byelaw 24 had to be registered.424 The DGFT argued that 
Bye-law 24(2),(8)(b) and (12) contained restrictions on members which concerned 
services which had nothing to do with the capacity of surveyors of land of quantity 
surveyors or surveyors of buildings or other structures.425 The RPC conceded that 
the construction of Byelaw 24(8)(b) or 24 (12) was not clear but felt that it was 
arguable that the restrictions were intended to apply only in relation to the activities 
of surveyors carried out in that capacity.426  
 
The above analysis of this case demonstrates some of the fundamental difficulties 
in applying the registration model to professional services. This case is just one 
example of the difficulties surrounding the application of the registration model.427  
 
4.2.4 Reasons for Reform 
   
There was much criticism of the registration model. Some criticism pointed to its 
compression of “economic diversity into a system of legal forms - abstract, 
analytical, forms devised to deal with legal issues, not with economic issues.”428 
The formal nature of the criteria in the registration system attracted acute criticism 
for, inter alia, imposing unnecessary burdens on companies to register some 
agreements even though their effect was not clearly anti-competitive.429 Moreover, 
                                                 
424 Byelaw 24 (1) provided that  “No member shall be connected in any way with any occupation 
or business which is incompatible with membership of the Institution.” 
425 Byelaw 24(8) provided “ ..no member shall  with the object of securing instructions or 
supplanting another member of the surveying profession knowingly attempt to compete on the basis 
of fees and commissions. 24(12) provided “…. Every member shall ensure that the form, content 
and method of publication  and distribution of any advertisement…. or other publicity material of 
any kind whatsoever published… by him are neither misleading to the public nor such as to 
prejudice his professional status or the reputation of the Institution.” 
426 Para 59. 
427 See R. Whish, Competition Law  (London:Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th ed.  2003) 306 for  a 
more general comment that the restrictive trade practices legislation was “enormously complicated 
and often caught innocuous agreements while failing to apply to seriously anti-competitive ones.”  
428 J.P. Cunningham, The Fair Trading Act 1973: Consumer  Protection and Competition Law 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1974)  423 and see also 122 for his view  that  adherence to “legal, 
rather than economic, forms is a feature of the United Kingdom law:.. a feature which.. has caused 
...unnecessary complication.” 
429 See further M. Coleman and M. Grenfell, The Competition Act 1998: Law and Practice 
(Oxford University Press 1999) 4 for discussion on the need for reform.  
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the enforcement dimension was undoubtedly ineffective.430 The investigation 
model, too, had its shortcomings as an effective tool to deal with market strategies. 
The operational short-comings of these models included their complexity, 
uncertain scope, undue formalism, poor remedies and their general 
ineffectiveness.431  
 
It is interesting to ask why Parliament chose to enact an EU inspired model. It 
seems that some academics, legal practitioners, civil servants, bureaucrats, 
administrators of the old models and business favoured the enactment of EU style 
legislation. It is clear that the pre-1998 models had a very poor fit with EU 
competition law and this imposed an additional compliance burden on business.432 
Eyre and Lodge suggest that the driving forces for reform in the UK were national 
business associations and the DTI433 and that alignment was facilitated by factors 
such as close relationships evolving between UK, EU and other Member States’ 
officials.434 This opinion sits well with the political science based explanation 
offered by Van Waarden and Drahos for the convergence of domestic competition 
                                                 
430 For example, there was no penalty if particulars were not furnished to the Registrar. See R. 
Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 1993) 122 for the view that the only risk, 
in reality, was the possible punishment of disobedience of a court order as contempt. See  M. 
Coleman and M. Grenfell, The Competition Act 1998: Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 
1999) 5 where the authors state “[I]t was only if the RPC then struck down a restriction (or if the 
parties failed to notify the agreement in the first place) that the restrictions were rendered void and 
unenforceable. Moreover although voidness exposed the parties to civil liability, no fines could be 
imposed on the parties, unless and until they committed a ‘second offence’ of purporting to enforce 
a registrable agreement in breach of an order already made against that agreement by the Restrictive 
Practices Court; in those cases there could be contempt of court proceedings resulting in fines on the 
company concerned  and on its directors, as well as possible imprisonment of directors.” 
431 J.P. Cunningham,  The Fair Trading Act 1973: Consumer Protection and Competition Law 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1974)  423.  
432 See R. Eccles, “Transposing EEC Competition Law into UK Restrictive Trading Agreements 
Legislation; the Governments Green Paper” (1988) ECLR 277. For views expressed in House of 
Lords see comments of  Lord Haskel, Hansard ( November 17th 1997 col 417 ) and of  Lord Simon 
of Highbury  Hansard (HL), (October 30th 1997 Col 1145) and (November 25th 1997 col. 960).  
433 See S. Eyre and M. Lodge, “National Tunes and a European Melody? Competition Law Reform 
in the UK and Germany” (2000) 7(1) Journal European Public Policy, 63, 76 where the authors state  
“ it was the case of an old DTI agenda, often using the CBI to test its proposals, which met the neo-
liberal economic policy agenda of the Conservatives and Labour’s desire not only to fulfill demands 
expressed by business associations but also to make “New Labour” more credible by reducing 
ministerial discretion in competition issues.”  
434 See S. Eyre and M. Lodge “ National Tunes and a European Melody? Competition Law Reform 
in the UK and Germany” (2000) 7(1) Journal European Public Policy, 63, where they state  that 
contacts occurred through the secondment of UK officials to the Commission, UK membership of 
the advisory committee and increasing communication among competition authorities. 
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policies in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria with the EU model.435 They 
conclude that convergence resulted from the combined effect of institutionalism 
and the epistemic community.436 They point to the gradual and largely implicit 
pressure and the possibilities for mutual modelling arising from the development of 
a multi-level split legal system, mostly in the form of case law, which, however, 
was channelled between the levels through the lines of communication and 
exchange created by the development of a multi-level epistemic community of 
legally trained officials.437 This community, they argue, allows for “European ideas 
to infiltrate the national level, but it also facilitates actors at the EU level to draw 
lessons from application by national actors. As contacts increased, it became 
natural to look for solutions to problems in EU law or borrow solutions from EU 
case law or other Member States.”438 The Competition Act 1998 enacted a close 
copy of the EU prohibitions. From the point of view of this research, the key point 
is that the Act was intended to solve domestic problems (of ineffective restrictive 
practices/registration models and poor fit with EU competition law) that were 
wholly unconnected to the operation of the ROTD.  
 
4.3 COMPETITION ACT 1998 
 
This section, first, sketches the key provisions introduced by the 1998 Act and, 
then, identifies the new interfaces created with the ROTD. Then, it argues that 
these interfaces are not satisfactorily resolved by the general rules on the 
relationship between legislation and common law. To this end, it takes the 
perspective of a restrained person who wishes to call on the ROTD in a situation 
where an unreasonable “restraint of trade” also comes within the reach of the 
competition legislation. 
                                                 
435 F. Van Waarden and M. Drahos, “Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of 
Competition Policies” (2002) Journal of European Public Policy  913. 
436 See Haas “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination” (1992) 
46/1 International Organization 1, 3 where the author defines the epistemic community as “a 
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular  policy domain 
and the authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain.”  
437 F. Van Waarden and M. Drahos, “Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of 
Competition Policies” (2002) Journal of European Public Policy  913, 928.  
438 F. Van Waarden and M. Drahos, “Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of 
Competition Policies” (2002) Journal of European Public Policy  913, 931. 
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4.3.1 Overview of the 1998 Act  
 
The Competition Act 1998 marked a sharp discontinuity with the approaches taken 
by preceding legislation to restrictions.439 This is due, largely, to its innovative 
substantive prohibitions.  
 
It introduced a prohibition and exemption model (like Art 101) to apply generally 
apart from some specific instances. Chapter I, s.2, prohibits agreements and 
decisions and concerted practices between or by undertakings or associations of 
undertakings which are implemented in the UK and the object or effect of which is 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the UK. The DGFT got 
competence to require conduct to be modified or terminated and to impose 
administrative fines on undertakings.  Exemptions could be granted (either 
individually by the DGFT or on a category basis by the Secretary of State). Later, 
the individual notification system was abolished.440 Notwithstanding the 
similarities to the EU model, the 1998 Act (initially) contained two provisions 
curbing the applicability of s.2 to some provisions that are relevant to this research 
because they affect the overlap between the ROTD and the legislation. The first 
situation concerns professional associations and the second situation involves 
vertical agreements.  
 
The Act provided that s.2 did not apply to the extent to which an agreement 
constituted a designated professional rule, imposed obligations arising from such 
designated professional rules, or constituted an agreement to act in accordance with 
such rules.441 This exclusion from the prohibition was intentional and appears to be 
based on the view that “.. it would be unwarranted to apply prohibitions designed 
primarily for the private sector business to quasi-public law processes of drawing 
up and enforcing professional rules.”442 This attitude may be due to lobbying by 
                                                 
439 The fact that the old rules had been cleared by the Director General of Fair Trading was held to 
be  “no assistance” as to whether the new rules of the Association infringed the 1998 Act in Hendry 
v. WPBSA [2002] UKCLR 5 para 107.  
440 The Competition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004 No 
1261). 
441 Schedule 4 paragraph 1(1) Professional rules are those which regulate a professional service or 
the persons providing or wishing to provide that service.  
442 See debates in House of  Lords Cttee (13 Nov 1997 cols 285-94) and  HL Report Stage (9 Feb 
1998, cols 896-898). 
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professions443 and, also perhaps, to some institutional continuity with the preceding 
legislation. The 1998 Act excluded professional services listed in Schedule 4 part II 
of which were notified to and designated by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry444 and this list closely matched the professional services that had been 
exempted from the registration model.445 The view that professional services 
should be outside the legislative prohibition did not prevail for long. The 1989 
White Paper stated that they should come within the reach of the prohibition and, 
on an individual basis, be considered and assessed.446 In March 2001, the OFT 
Report “Competition in the Professions” expressed the view of the Director 
General (John Vickers) that there was a “strong case for removing Schedule 4.”447 
This view accorded with the one expressed by the Law and Economics Consulting 
Group (LECG) Report of December 2000. In November 2002, the OFT reiterated 
its view that professionals should be “fully subject to competition law.”448 S.207 of 
the Enterprise Act 2002 repealed Schedule 4 with effect from April 1 2003. 
 
The second relevant exclusion in the 1998 Act was for vertical agreements 
following “special treatment” which allowed the Secretary of State to make an 
Order to exclude them.449 It is true that vertical agreements were also excluded 
                                                 
443 See speech to 2006 Annual Fall Conference on Competition Law “Promoting Competition in 
Professions- Developments in the UK”, at 8.2 for comments of OFT Chairman (Phillip Collins) that 
the professional associations  “have traditionally been eloquent, powerful and well connected 
lobbyists who have traditionally sought protection from competition and exemption from 
competition laws through reliance on restrictive regulation by their professional bodies on the basis 
that, as professionals, they are in the best position to ensure that standards are maintained and 
consumers’ interests are protected.” It is available at http://oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/speeches/2006/0906 
444 The list included legal services, medical, dental, ophthalmic, veterinary, nursing, midwifery, 
physiotherapy, chiropody, architectural, accounting and auditing, insolvency, patent agency, 
Parliamentary agency, surveying, engineering, educational and religious professional services. 
445 The scope of the exclusion under the 1998 Act was narrower than the RPTA because it covered 
only the designated rules and not any and every restrictive agreement concerning the supply of the 
professional service. See OFT Guidelines The Competition Act 1998: Trade Associations, 
Professions and Self-Regulating Bodies (OFT 408) March, para 6.8 for the suggestion that “an 
agreement of fees made between a local group of practitioners” is one which may be caught by the 
Chapter 1 prohibition .  
446 Opening Markets: New Policy on Restrictive Trade Practices, Cm 727, July 1989, Annex E. 
447 OFT Report 328  Competition in Professions March 2001 para 44. The OFT Report and the 
LECG Report are available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-
categories/reports/professional_bodies/oft328. For a discussion of the OFT Report and the longer 
LECG Report see G. Murphy “Level Playing Field in Britain’s Professions High on OFT and 
Government Agenda” (2002) ECLR 7. 
448 November 2002  Response to Lord Chancellor Department “In the Public Interest” of July 
2002 available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2002/lord-chancellors-paper  
449 Vertical Exclusion Order SI 2000 No 310 made pursuant to s.50.  
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from the registration model but this may not be the reason for their exclusion from 
the 1998 Act. It seems that the Order was made because of technical difficulties in 
drafting a legislative exclusion.450 At that time, the applicability of EU competition 
law to vertical agreements was being revised to address criticism of overbroad 
interpretations of Art 101(1) unwarrantedly prohibiting vertical agreements.451 The 
Vertical Exclusion Order was repealed with effect from May 1st 2005 by the 
Competition Act 1998 (Land Agreements Exclusion and Revocation) Order.452 This 
repeal meant that competition legislation became applicable to vertical agreements 
for the first time. How the reversal to 1998 Act’s initial attitude to vertical 
agreements was executed is interesting. The legal position was changed, not in an 
Act, but by Statutory Instrument. This may be noteworthy because a statutory 
instrument does not attract full blown debate in Parliament, thus, possibly 
explaining the scant attention paid to the implications of these changes for the 
legislation’s interface with the ROTD.  
 
The overlap between the ROTD and the competition legislation increased sizeably 
with the repeal of two exclusionary measures. For example, rules of professional 
associations and vertical agreements (including franchises) came within the overlap 
area. The staggered timeline according to which the Competition Act 1998 became 
applicable to more restrictions on professionals means that new interfaces with the 
ROTD only emerged on an incremental basis. This pattern may explain why little 
comment was made regarding the possibility of negative implications for the 
continued and full application of the ROTD. The interfaces with the ROTD 
increased in their number and complexity as an incidental consequence of closely 
reproducing the EU model of competition law in domestic legislation. 
                                                 
450 See further HL Consideration of Commons’ Amendments 20 October 1998 col 1397. 
451 Especially following T-374, 375, 384 & 388,  European Night Services v. Commission [1988] 5 
CMLR 718. See P. Freeman  & R. Whish, A Guide to the Competition Act 1998 (London: 
Butterworth, 1999) 28 where the authors argue that Parliament could have duplicated the EU 
position (including the reforms proposed in the 1996 European Commission Green Paper).  
452 SI 2004 No. 1260. 
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4.3.2 Problematic Interfaces Created by the 1998 Act    
 
The Competition Act 1998 applies to a far greater number of “restraints of trade” 
than the preceding legislation. Its more extensive coverage and, more importantly, 
its greater range of possible determinations increase and complicate its interfaces 
with the ROTD. This section explores these interfaces from the perspective of a 
restrained person who would prefer to rely on the ROTD when faced with an 
unreasonable “restraint of trade” that also comes within the reach of the 
competition legislation. From this perspective, the key question is whether the 
competition legislation legitimately prevents a court from applying the ROTD and 
deciding that a “restraint of trade” is unreasonable and, thus, unenforceable?  
 
The Competition Act 1998 does not contain any express provisions vis-a-vis the 
ROTD. Unlike competition legislation in some other jurisdictions, the Act does not 
contain any provision that expressly either abolishes or curtails the applicability of 
the ROTD.453 As the competition legislation makes no specific provision to 
organise its interface with the ROTD, the general rules on the relationship between 
legislation and common law apply. The interface between legislation and the 
common law is governed by doctrines, assumptions and canons of statutory 
interpretation. Some of these approaches are next outlined before considering how 
they may delineate the interface between competition legislation and the ROTD. 
 
According to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, an Act can lay down any 
proposition of law.454 The doctrine of the overriding effect of an Act provides that a 
statute, as the expression of the legislature, overrides inconsistent provisions of pre-
existing law (be it statutory or otherwise) and is overridden by any later 
inconsistent statute.455 It is assumed that the courts will give effect to any law 
passed by Parliament so long as it is expressed clearly.456 Even if an Act does not 
spell out its specific effect on existing law, it will, as the expression of Parliament, 
                                                 
453 Legislation in  Australia expressly delineates its relationship with the  ROTD, see s. 4M Trade 
Practices Act 1974. 
454 F.A.R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (London: Butterworths 1992)  111. 
455 F.A.R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (London: Butterworths 1992)  112. 
456 R. Cross, Statutory Interpretation (London: Butterworths 1976)  142. 
 128
become part of the corpus juris.457 A statute may abolish the common law, amend 
it or take it over by enacting it, either with or without modification. Bennion 
depicts this relationship with the image of a floor (representing the common law or 
lex non scripta) concealed, to some degree, by rugs (representing Acts) which may 
be removed or overlain.458  
 
Under the “rug” metaphor, competition legislation is viewed as the rug that 
conceals the floor as constituted by the ROTD. The applicability of the ROTD is, 
thus, relegated to those areas that are left uncovered by competition law. This 
means that ROTD occupies only a limited and residual position.459 This view of the 
interface seems to be accepted by Kamerling and Osman who state:“[O]nly if 
competition law does not apply will the restraint of trade doctrine apply….”460 A 
similar view has been expressed by Furse when he described the common law as 
occupying only “a residual role in relation to competition law generally.”461 It is 
next argued that this residual applicability approach, when viewed from the 
perspective of the restrained person, produces problematic interfaces between 
ROTD and competition legislation  
 
There are four interesting interfaces between the ROTD and the competition 
legislation in cases of an unreasonable “restraint of trade” (i.e. unenforceable under 
the ROTD). The first interface is where the “restraint of trade” is prohibited by the 
legislation. The second interface arises where the “restraint of trade” comes within 
an exempting statutory instrument. The third interface is where the “restraint of 
trade” is found to satisfy individually the exception criteria. The fourth interface is 
where there is a determination that there is no infringement of the legislation on the 
grounds that neither its object nor effect is anti-competitive. How the residual 
applicability approach to statutory interpretation could determine the applicability 
of the ROTD in each of these four scenarios is next explored.   
                                                 
457 F.A.R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (London: Butterworths 1992) 112. 
458 ibid 
459 I. Maher, Competition Law: Alignment and Reform (Dublin: RoundHall Press, 1999)  464 and 
V. Power,  Competition Law and Practice in Ireland and the EU (Dublin:Butterworths, 2001) 90 
and  189.  
460 A. Kamerling and C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell , 4th ed. 2004)  preface xvi. 




The first scenario is where a “restraint of trade” infringes the prohibition in the 
competition legislation and is rendered void.  In such a case, under the rug 
metaphor, the restriction is covered clearly and completely by the legislation and, 
apparently, leaves no space for any residual application of the ROTD. This view 
seems to be supported by dicta in Hendry, when the High Court, having found the 
restraint was void under competition law, stated it was unnecessary to consider 
whether the restraint was void under ROTD.462 In the second scenario, the 
“restraint of trade” comes within an express exempting measure (for example a SI) 
and is thereby permitted by competition law. Under the rug metaphor, this 
application of the legislation apparently leaves no residual space for the ROTD to 
apply. The third scenario is where there is an individual decision that the “restraint 
of trade” comes within the exception specified by competition legislation. This 
positive act of permission occurs following an individual assessment and could 
amount to rug coverage and eliminate any residual space for applications of the 
ROTD. Finally, the fourth scenario entails a determination that the “restraint of 
trade” does not have an anti-competitive object or effect as proscribed by the 
legislation. This determination is made following an individual analysis and, in that 
way, entails an application of the legislation which consequently eliminates any 
residual space for the application of the ROTD.  
 
The residual applicability (or rug) approach is an exclusionary one that may 
preclude the ROTD from applying in any situation where the legislation is 
applicable. This approach disadvantages persons who would prefer to rely on the 
ROTD. The starkest disadvantage arises where the competition legislation applies 
but does not prohibit the unreasonable “restraint of trade” clause. In such cases, a 
restrained person can no longer resist an unreasonable “restraint of trade” by 
calling on the ROTD but gets no protection under the competition law. Even in 
cases where competition legislation prohibits a particular “restraint of trade” there 
may be some inconvenience or disadvantage in a procedural sense to the restrained 
person if the ROTD is not available. It is clear that the interface between the ROTD 
                                                 
462 Hendry v. WPBSA [2002] UKCLR 5 para 119 and  para 144 and similarly in Jones v. Ricoh UK 
Ltd [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch). 
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and competition law may be delineated in ways that serve to displace the ROTD 




This chapter examined the evolution of the interfaces between the ROTD and 
competition legislation. It traced the changing scope and determinations reached 
under, firstly, pre-1998 legislation and, then, under the EU style Competition Act 
1998. The historical perspective threw light on the motivations for legislative 
amendments. It also explained how the changes created, in an incidental fashion,463 
different and complex interfaces between the ROTD and competition legislation.   
 
This chapter argued that the traditional approach to statutory interpretation as 
represented by the rug metaphor does not satisfactorily resolve the interface 
between the ROTD and competition legislation from the perspective of a restrained 
person. It argued that the rug metaphor risks overexcluding the ROTD, especially 
in relation to “restraints of trade” that come within the reach of but are not 
prohibited by competition legislation.  
 
EU competition law may also contribute to domestic interface problems. This is 
because the ROTD’s interface with domestic competition law may be affected by 
EU rules on the relationship between EU competition law and domestic law 
because it makes sense (in practice and as a matter of logic) that the ROTD’s 
interface does not differ depending on whether EU competition law or UK 
competition law is applied.464  It is clear that EU competition law must be applied 
where there is a sufficient potential impact on the pattern of interstate trade and, in 
practice, this jurisdictional threshold is quite easily reached.465 The next chapter 
examines the interfaces between the ROTD and EU competition law. 
 
                                                 
463 This point is an important one which will be discussed in Chapter Seven.  
464 A. Scott, “The Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in the United Kingdom” LSE 
Working Papers 9/2009, 5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344807 
465 The obligation to apply EU competition law where there is a sufficient potential effect on 










This chapter examines the interfaces between EU competition law and the ROTD. 
These interfaces are obviously important in cases where both EU competition law 
and the ROTD apply to a measure. Moreover, the interfaces between the ROTD 
and EU competition law may also be relevant to the delineation of the interfaces 
between national competition law in the UK and the ROTD. As Scott argues it 
makes good sense for the ROTD to have the same interface with UK competition 
law as it does with EU competition law because otherwise the ROTD’s 
applicability to a particular measure could differ according to whether EU or UK 
competition law is being applied. 466 
 
Since May 01st 2004, the interface between EU competition law and national law 
(comprising competition law and other law) is delineated by Art 3 of Regulation 
1/2003. It is important to ascertain precisely the scope of Art 3. Art 3 is best 
understood after examining both why and how it evolved.   
 
In order to explain why Art 3 came into existence, section 5.2 first details the 
uncertainties that surrounded the interface between EU competition law and 
national law in the period before May 2004. Then it examines how the interface 
between Art 101 and the ROTD was articulated by the High Court in Days Medical 
Aids in January 2004.467 Section 5.3 examines Art 3 and its implications for the 
interface between Art 101 and the ROTD.  It starts by considering the European 
                                                 
466 A. Scott, “The Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in the United Kingdom”  LSE 
Working Papers 9/2009 p5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344807 
467 Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 44 
(Comm), [2004] UKCLR 384. 
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Commission’s initial proposal for Art 3 and traces the changes it underwent before 
the final version of Art 3 was eventually agreed by the Member States. Next it 
examines how Art 3 has been interpreted by the High Court when determining the 
interface between EU competition law and the ROTD. The High Court (in Days 
Medical Aids468 and in Jones v Ricoh469) interpreted Art 3 and declined to strike a 
restriction down under the ROTD because:   
“once EU competition law applies and either strikes down or permits the 
restriction involved, the court is not permitted to reach a different result as 
regards the application of a restriction to trade between EU Member States 
under the domestic law of restraint of trade.”470  
 
Thus, an unreasonable “restraint of trade” to which Art 101 has been applied but 
does not prohibit cannot be resisted under the ROTD. That this interpretation of Art 
3 ousts the protection otherwise available under the ROTD creates a serious 
problem for those persons who wish to rely on the ROTD. It will be argued in this 
chapter that the High Court failed properly to understand and apply Art 3.  
 
 
5.2 INTERFACES BEFORE MAY 2004 
 
To understand fully why Art 3 was drafted, it is necessary to understand the 
uncertainty that surrounded the delineation of the interface between EU 
competition law and national competition law at that time. The then prevailing 
situation is examined from two angles: firstly, through the judgments of the EU 
Courts and Opinions of Advocates General (section 5.2.1) and, secondly, through a 
judgment of the High Court (section 5.2.2). The examination will reveal the 
uncertainties and difficulties surrounding attempts to articulate, definitively and 
comprehensively, the interface between EU competition law and national law 
(including but not limited to national competition law).  
 
                                                 
468 ibid. 
469 [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch) Roth  J.  
470 Para 49.  
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5.2.1 EU view of Interface with National Law 
 
The EEC Treaty 1957 did not determine the relationship between national law and 
EU competition law but, rather, provided for the Council to determine it in a 
directive or regulation.471 Art 3 of Reg. 1/2003 is the first such measure which 
means that, for decades, the interface was addressed in an ad hoc fashion by case 
law.472 Case law did not clearly and completely determine the interface between 
EU competition law and national law (including national competition law and other 
types of national law).473 
 
Walt Wilhelm is the first judgment that addressed the interface between EU 
competition law and national competition law.474 The Court of Justice stated that: 
“parallel application of the national system can only be allowed in so far as 
it does not prejudice the uniform application throughout the Common 
Market of Community rules on cartels and of the full effect of the measures 
adopted in implementation of those rules.”475  
 
Walz described this judgment as offering a “procedural” rather than a “normative” 
rule.476 His view, according to Wesseling, suggests that there is no “principle of 
pre-eminence” of EU competition law as long as the application of national 
competition law does not prejudice the uniform application of EU competition 
law.477 Wesseling further notes that the procedural supremacy perspective is 
narrowly focussed because EU competition law takes precedence only after a 
                                                 
471 Art 103 (ex Art 83(2)(e)). 
472 As a practical solution, the Commission issued Notice on Cooperation between National 
Competition Authorities and Commission [1997] OJ C313/3  and  Notices on Cooperation between 
National Courts and the Commission in applying Arts [101] and [102], [1993] OJ C 39/05. 
473  R. Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: 
Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options” (1999) ECLR  426, 427 
where the author states that  “[T]he question on the interrelationship between EC and Member State 
antitrust laws has never been answered in full. The Court has provided important guidelines but 
these guidelines did not settle the matter.”  
474 Case 14/64 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] CMLR 100. See also R. Wesseling, “The 
Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: Unspoken Consequences and 
Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options” (1999) ECLR  426;  C.S.  Kerse, Antitrust Procedure 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed.1998) para 10.33 and  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law, Text 
Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 2001) 1013. 
475 Case 14/64 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] CMLR 100, para 4. 
476 R. Walz, “Rethinking Walt Wilhelm, or the Supremacy of Community Competition Law over 
National Law [1996] 21(6) ELR 449, 451 argues in favour of a normative rule to replace it. 
477 R. Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: 
Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options” (1999) ECLR  426.  
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formal decision and, thus, did not eliminate what he describes as “frictions between 
concurrently applicable” rules.478 The Walt Wilhelm judgment can be seen as a 
narrow one which only resolved the interface where there was a decision that EU 
competition law prohibited a particular clause. This research takes the view that the 
judgment does not provide a universally comprehensive solution for all cases 
involving stricter national law (whether it is competition law or other law). In order 
to show how uncertain the interface was left by the Walt Wilhelm judgment, the 
next paragraphs discuss three situations involving stricter national law. 
 
The first uncertain interface arose where a restriction satisfied the exemption terms 
set out in Art 101(3). In such a case, there was divided opinion among scholars as 
to whether any stricter national law could be applied. The Walt Wilhelm judgment 
(para 5) stated that national law must not thwart EU authorities carrying out certain 
“positive though indirect, action with a view to promoting a harmonious 
development of activities within the whole Community.”479 Although the Court of 
Justice did not stipulate that “positive though indirect action” included exemptions 
under Art 101(3), it is, as Wesseling observes, difficult to find an alternative 
reasonable interpretation.480 The phrase, according to Kerse, referred to measures 
addressed to Member States to harmonise national laws and he suggested that “a 
national prohibition could not override the effect of a Community exemption 
because the application of national laws must not interfere with the uniform 
application throughout the Community of the competition rules.”481  
                                                 
478  ibid. 
479 Para 5 (emphasis added). 
480 R. Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: 
Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options” (1999) ECLR  426, 
428. 
481 C.S. Kerse, EU Antitrust Procedure (Sweet and Maxwell 1998 4th ed.) para 10.33. 
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Other commentators argued that the permissive nature of Art 101(3) should not 
preclude a national authority from applying more stringent national rules.482 For 
example, in Walt Wilhelm, Advocate General Roemer opined that where national 
authorities: 
“thwart the Community exemption through the application of a national 
rule of prohibition, they no more threaten the objectives of the Treaty than 
do the parties to an agreement when they refrain from applying it, which 
can occur at anytime. ….Indeed, in the absence of a Community provision 
which requires performance of an exempted agreement, it may, at least, at 
first sight, be surprising that a Member State could be considered to be 
under an obligation to relax its national law to permit such 
performance.”483  
 
Exemptions, as pointed out by Jones and Sufrin, formed part of the European 
Commission’s “coherent competition policy and were designed to encourage 
certain types of agreements.”484 Whish argued that exemptions are not “just a 
grudging concession” by the Commission but “rather have a positive role” in the 
Community’s economic policy.485 The absence of any individual assessment by the 
European Commission where block exemption regulations arose strengthened the 
argument that exemptions were “merely permissive.”486 However, Advocate 
General Tesauro, in Bundeskartellamt v. Volkswagen and VAG Leasing (and 
similarly in BMW487) opined that the primacy of Community law required that an 
agreement protected by an exempting regulation not be prohibited by national 
authorities using stricter national law because the Commission moulded 
competition policy with block exemptions.488 Maher argues that, because some 
block exemption regulations expressly permitted Member States to apply stricter 
national laws, Member States could not ordinarily apply stricter law.489 From this 
brief survey of views, it is clear that there was no certainty as to whether national 
                                                 
482 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed.  2001)  1008-15 and  the authors referred to UK MMC Report The Supply 
in the UK for Retail Sale of Fine Fragrances (1993) HMSO Cm 2380. 
483 Cited in C.S. Kerse, EU Antitrust Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed.) 1998  at para 10.33 
(emphasis added). 
484 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law:Text Cases and Materials  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed, 2001) 1013. 
485 R. Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 1993), 41. 
486 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law,:Text Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed, 2001)  1013. 
487 Case C- 70/93 BMW v ALD [1995] ECR 1 3439. 
488 Case C- 266/93 [1995] ECR I-3477, [1996] 4 CMLR 505. 
489 I. Maher, Competition Law: Alignment and Reform (Dublin:RoundHall Sweet & Maxwell 
1999),99. 
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law (competition law or other law) could strike down a restriction that satisfied the 
exempting criteria of Art 101(3).    
 
The second difficult interface arose where national competition law sought to 
prohibit a measure whose object or effect was not proscribed by Art 101(1).490 
Wesseling expressed the view that, in general, stricter national competition law 
could be applied to measures which did not restrict competition in the sense 
covered by Art 101(1).491 In support, he drew on the statement in Walt Wilhelm 
(para 3) that EU and national competition laws consider cartels from different 
vantage points and that this formed the basis for the continued concurrent 
application of national and EU competition laws.492 Nonetheless, Wesseling 
acknowledged the opposing argument that stricter national law would create 
divergent market conditions and thereby undermine the Common Market.493 The 
Court of Justice in Walt Wilhelm stated that: 
 “  … national competition authorities may take action against an agreement 
in accordance with their national law, even when an examination from the 
point of view of its compatibility with Community law is pending before 
the Commission, subject however to the condition that the application of 
national law may not prejudice the full and uniform application of 
Community law or the effects of measures taken or to be taken to 
supplement it.”494  
 
Under the procedural supremacy rubric (advanced by Walz), a formal decision that 
Art 101(1) was not infringed (for example, a “negative clearance”) could amount to 
the stipulated “positive though indirect, action with a view to promoting a 
harmonious development of activities within the whole Community.”495 In 
Guerlain the question was whether a “comfort letter” (stating that there was “no 
                                                 
490 This is distinct from cases where the agreement fell outside Art 101(1) due to the inadequate 
effect on interstate trade.  
491 R. Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: 
Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options” (1999) ECLR 426, 427. 
492 ibid and also noted Case C-67/91 Direccion General de Defensa de las Competencia v. 
Associacion Espana de Banca Privada [1992] ECR. I-4785. 
493 R. Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: 
Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options” (1999) ECLR  426, 427 
and referred to the Advocate General Opinion in Case C- 266/93 Bundeskartellamt v. Volkswagen 
and VAG Leasing [1995] ECR I-3477, [1996] 4 CMLR 505. 
494 Case 14/64 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] CMLR 100 para 9. 
495 Para 5. 
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longer any need” for the Commission to take action and the file would be closed) 
prevented prosecution under national law?496 Here, the Court of Justice stated that:  
“the fact that a practice has been held by the European Commission not to 
fall within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Articles [101](1) and 
(2), the scope of which is limited to agreements capable of affecting trade 
between Member States, in no way affects that practice from being 
considered by the national authorities from the point of view of the 
restrictive effects which it may produce nationally.”497  
Walz points out that, while Guerlain is often cited as authority for the rule that 
comfort letters giving negative clearance may not prevent the application of 
national law, this conclusion is not entirely clear from the judgment.498 He notes 
that, according to the Commission, the comfort letters were issued because there 
was no interstate trade effect but he remarks that it is “not absolutely clear” 
whether this interpretation was also adopted by the Court of Justice.499  
 
The third uncertain interface involved the implications of Art 101(3) for the 
applicability of stricter national law other than national competition law. This type 
of interface may be described as a “diagonal” one.500  It is hard to see how Art 
101(3) can immunise a clause from being prohibited by such national law. Art 
101(3), on a literal interpretation, offers exemptions only from the prohibition in 
Art 101(1). It does not offer any protection from the prohibition in Art 102. 
Whether Gesetz Gegen den Unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG)501which is domestic 
unfair practices legislation (and not the national competition law) in Germany 
could be applied to a clause that came within a Block Exemption Regulation arose 
for consideration.502 The answer according to the Court of Justice, in a preliminary 
reference proceeding, was that the national law could be applied to the clause 
because the block exemption regulation did not lay down mandatory conditions for 
                                                 
496 Case 253/78 and 1-3, 37 &99/79 Procureur de la Republique v Giry and Guerlain [1980] ECR  
2327, [1981] 2 CMLR 99. 
497 Para 18 (emphasis added). 
498  R. Walz, “Rethinking Walt Wilhelm, or the Supremacy of Community Competition Law over 
National Law [1996] 21(6) ELR 449, 451. 
499 ibid.  
500 See G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 408 where 
the author defines a “diagonal” conflict as a conflict between EU competition law and a “national 
rule of law that is not based on national competition law.”    
501 The first Gesetz Gegen den Unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) was adopted  in 1896 and replaced 
in 1909 and in 2004.  
502 Case C- 41/96 VAG Haendlerbeirate v. SYD Consult [1997] ECR I- 3123. 
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contracts.503 Wesseling interprets this judgment to mean that the Court of Justice 
did not regard the UWG as national competition law on the grounds that stricter 
national competition law cannot prohibit what is exempted by EU competition 
law.504 
 
The foregoing shows that the interface between EU competition law and stricter 
national law (including but not limited to national competition law) was not clearly 
and unequivocally delineated. This led to uncertainty in, at least, the three 
situations discussed above.  
 
The most interesting interface for this research is the interface between the ROTD 
and Art 101. How the High Court interpreted EU law on this interface is next 
analysed and criticised.   
 
5.2.2 High Court’s View of Interface Between Art 101 and ROTD 
 
In Days Medical Aids Ltd. v. Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing and Ors, Langley 
J. considered the interface between ROTD and Art 101.505 Specifically, he had to 
decide whether an unreasonable “restraint of trade” could be found void under the 
ROTD if it did not infringe Art 101(1) on the grounds that neither its object nor 
effect is anti-competitive? DMA, the plaintiff, argued that this type of agreement 
falls within Art 101 and that only EU law could provide for its validity or 
invalidity.506 Pihsiang, the defendant, submitted that the “mere non-application” of 
Art 101(1) would not oust the common law.507 Langley J. decided that applying EU 
competition law precludes the court reaching a different finding under the ROTD. 
In his view, once Art 101 is applied the ROTD cannot be relied on to produce a 
different finding. This means that an unreasonable “restraint of trade” may not be 
resisted under the ROTD if Art 101 is applied even if Art 101 does not prohibit the 
                                                 
503 Case C- 41/96 VAG Haendlerbeirate v. SYD Consult [1997] ECR I- 3123 para 16. 
504 R. Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: 
Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options” (1999) ECLR  426, 
430. 
505 [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm).  
506 [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm) para 256. 
507 See [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm) para 257 where the defendant also argued that if the agreement 
was entitled to an exemption , the common law would only be incompatible with European 
Community law to the extent that it prevented the exemption from having full force and effect. 
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restriction on the grounds that the restriction either does not have the requisite anti-
competitive object or effect to infringe Art 101(1) or, alternatively, because it 
satisfies the terms of Art 101(3).  
 
This author suggests that this High Court judgment gives EU competition law 
unduly wide scope and, thereby, causes unwarranted detriment to restrained 
persons seeking to rely on the ROTD. The main criticism is that Langley J. failed 
to take proper account of important factual differences between Days Medical Aids 
and the situations that occurred in the EU cases. It will be argued that Langley J. 
relied too heavily on judgments and Opinions without identifying and fully 
considering the significance of key differences as between the situations and 
circumstances. Moreover, it will be suggested that Langley J.’s treatment of the EU 
materials was truncated and that this obscured significant differences which should 
diminish their cogency vis-a-vis the UK case. Criticism is next directed at how 
Langley J. approached, firstly, Court of Justice judgments (in Walt Wilhelm508 and 
in Giry and Guerlain509) and, secondly, Opinions of Advocate General Tessauro (in 
BMW510 and in Bundeskartellamt v. Volkswagen and VAG Leasing).511 Later, this 
chapter criticises Langley J.’s interpretation of Art 3 of Reg. 1/2003.  
 
The first criticism is that Langley J. quoted a few paragraphs from Walt Wilhelm 
without any accompanying explanation of their factual context or background.512 
Langley J.’s brief treatment of Walt Wilhelm failed to highlight the parameters that 
limited the general relevance of the specific issues decided in the EU judgment. 
Langley J. did not tease out important differences between the factual situations in 
Walt Wilhelm and in Days Medical Aids.  
 
The dispute in Walt Wilhelm arose from contemporaneous separate investigations 
by the European Commission and the German cartel authority (Bundeskartellamt) 
into collusion in the aniline dyestuffs market. The Bundeskartellamt’s decision to 
fine the undertaking for price-fixing in breach of German competition law was 
                                                 
508Case 14/64 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] CMLR 100.  
509 Case 253/78 and 1-3, 37 &99/79 Procureur de la Republique v Giry and Guerlain [1980] ECR  
2327, [1981] 2 CMLR 99. 
510 Case C- 70/93 BMW v ALD [1995] ECR 1 3439. 
511 Case C- 266/93 [1995] ECR I-3477, [1996] 4 CMLR 505. 
512 Case 14/64 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] CMLR 100. 
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challenged by one undertaking in the national court on the grounds, inter alia, that 
the investigation by the national authority should cease because of the 
Commission’s investigation. The national court made a preliminary reference to the 
Court of Justice. It is important to  highlight the narrow question it asked of the 
Court of Justice which was whether the Treaty allowed national authorities to 
apply national competition law to the same facts? The specificity of this question 
sets fundamental parameters that limit the Court of Justice’s reply and, 
consequently, limit the universality of the Court of Justice’s reply. Langley J.’s 
cryptic treatment of Walt Wilhelm risks giving the Court of Justice judgment 
unwarrantedly extended applicability. 
 
Langley J. quoted paragraphs 4-7 from the Court of Justice judgment. Paragraph 4 
states, inter alia that  “parallel application of the national system can only be 
allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform application  throughout the 
Common Market of the Community rules on cartels and the full  effect of the 
measures adopted in implementation of those rules.” Paragraph 6 states, inter alia: 
“[T]he binding force of the Treaty and of measures taken in application of it 
must not differ from one State to another as a result of internal measures, 
lest the functioning of the community system should be impeded and the 
achievement of the aims of the Treaty placed in peril. Consequently, 
conflicts between the rules of the Community and national rules in the 
matter of the law on cartels must be resolved by applying the   principle that 
Community law takes precedence.” 
In paragraph 7, the Court of Justice stated that “... should it prove that a decision 
from a national authority regarding an agreement  would be incompatible with a 
decision adopted by the Commission …the national authority is required to take 
proper account of the effects of the latter decision.” Langley J. did not cite 
paragraph 9, which states that national competition law could be applied where 
there is a Commission investigation provided that application of national law does 
“not prejudice the full and uniform application of Community law.”513 Paragraph 9 
is too important to be omitted as it sets out the particular factual matrix which was 
at play in Walt Wilhelm. 
 
The omission in the High Court’s judgment of the national tribunal’s referring 
question, and, of the Court of Justice’s reply in paragraph 9 combines to mask an 
                                                 
513 Para 9. 
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important institutional difference between the two cases. In Walt Wilhelm, EU 
institutions were seeking to apply EU competition law in opposition to the 
preferred action of national competition authorities. In Days Medical Aids there 
was no action by any competition enforcement agency (national or EU) and so, the 
prospect of any clash between EU institutions and national institutions was remote 
or nonexistent. In Days Medical Aids, the question of priority as between national 
and supranational norms was decided within a national court in an inter partes 
dispute. This is an important contextual difference that makes the Court of Justice’s 
judgment less pertinent.  
 
The next criticism is that Langley J. failed to recognise properly that the conflict in 
Days Medical Aids, unlike that in Walt Wilhelm, is “diagonal” because the relevant 
national law is not competition law. Langley J. apparently equated the ROTD with 
competition law when he remarked that the ROTD is “no more than earlier 
language for the restraint on competition at which Article [101] is aimed.”514 
Chapters One, Two and Three of this research argued that the ROTD is not the 
same as EU competition law and that they are different legal regimes in terms of 
their substantive provisions, their concerns and some processes.515 Another and 
related criticism is the High Court’s failure to explain how an application of 
national law (which is not competition law) creates the requisite conflict with EU 
competition law in the sense of upsetting the full and uniform application of EU 
competition law. 
 
Langley J.’s treatment of the judgments in Giry Guerlain appears to be 
incomplete.516 He briefly noted that the European Commission’s administrative 
letter closing a file did not prevent the application of national law which might be 
more rigorous than Community law.  Langley J. did not point out that, in Guerlain, 
the agreement fell below the requisite interstate trade effect which means that it 
could not be subject to Art 101. This is a key difference with the case at hand 
which needed to be, at least, noted. 
                                                 
514 Para 254. 
515 In particular, the ROTD is never enforced by a public authority and no sanction (such as a fine 
or order) can be levied on the parties. 
516 Case 253/78 and 1-3, 37 &99/79 Procureur de la Republique v Giry and Guerlain [1980] ECR  
2327, [1981] 2 CMLR 99. 
 142
 
The judgments in Walt Wilhelm and Giry Guerlain do not deal with the situation 
that arose in Days Medical Aids. Therefore, these EU judgments cannot be 
uncritically and automatically extended to the situation in Days Medical Aids. 
Unlike the EU cases, Days Medical Aids was an inter partes private dispute before 
a national court over a contractual provision that i) was not anti-competitive in the 
sense proscribed by Art 101(1), ii) was not investigated by a Community institution 
and iii) was unreasonable under the ROTD which is distinct from the domestic 
competition legislation. 
 
Secondly, Langley J.’s treatment of the Opinions of Advocate General Tesauro in 
BMW517 and in Bundeskartellamt v. Volkswagen and VAG Leasing518is open to 
criticism. Langley J. quoted from the Opinion in BMW that “a national court is 
bound not to take decisions that are incompatible with a block exemption.”519 The 
relevance of this statement to the situation in Days Medical Aids is not clear 
because Langley J. had decided that the particular clause did not satisfy any block 
exemption regulation. From the Opinion in Bundeskartellamt v. Volkswagen and 
VAG Leasing,520 Langley J. cited that “... a binding finding of the Commission, or a 
fortiori, a judgment of the court, to the effect that the agreement does not adversely 
affect competition, precludes it being penalised at national level.”521 Langley J. 
stated that this Opinion addresses the issue with which he was “confronted.”522  
 
This research takes a different view because, in Days Medical Aids, there was no 
decision of any EU institution that Art 101(1) did not proscribe the measure. 
Nonetheless, Langley J. found there was an “inescapable logic” in “applying the 
same principles in a case to which an exemption applies to a case in which Article 
[101](1) is held not to apply at all because the relevant agreement is found not to 
                                                 
517 Case C- 70/93 [1995] ECR 1 3439. 
518 Case C- 266/93 [1995] ECR I-3477, [1996] 4 CMLR 505. 
519 [2004] EWHC 44, para 261 where he cited para 38-39 of Advocate General  Opinion in Case 
C- 70/93 BMW [1995] ECR 1 3439. 
520 Ibid. 
521 See [2004] EWHC 44, para 262 where Langley J. cited para 59 of Advocate General Opinion in 
Case C- 70/93 BMW [1995] ECR 1 3439. 
522 Days Medical Aids Ltd. v. Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing and Ors [2004] EWHC 44 
(Comm) para 263. 
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have an anti-competitive effect and so not to ‘need’ exemption.”523 This author 
suggests that Langley J’s remark obscures differences between an exemption under 
Art 101(3) and negative clearance type decision under Art 101(1) that there is no 
anti-competitive object or effect. Decisions under paragraphs (1) and (3) of Art 101 
are reached by applying different criteria and evidential onus is borne by different 
parties.  
 
There are significant differences between the Days Medical Aids situation and the 
situations addressed by the cited Court of Justice judgments and Opinions of 
Advocates General which Langley J. did not tease out fully. The institutional 
distinction is that in Days Medical Aids there was no prospect of disobedience by a 
national body to any (formal or informal) determination in related proceedings 
under Art 101(1) or (3) by any EU organisation. The other key difference is the 
diagonal nature of the interface that arose in the context of private litigation in a 
national court.  The High Court is open to criticism for giving undue force to 
inexact EU dicta that the Court of Justice and Advocate General had directed 
towards ensuring the priority of EU competition law decisions over conflicting 
ones by national authorities under national competition law. Arguably, the EU 
materials cited by Langley J. do not necessarily preclude the application of the 
ROTD to allow the restraint to be resisted. 
 
While the foregoing elements of Langley J.’s judgment have been superseded, in 
substantive terms, by Art. 3, their analysis is still useful for the light it shines on the 
High Court’s view of EU sources and of the ROTD. The judgment appears to be 
unduly deferential to EU materials when delineating the interface between EU 
competition law and the ROTD. It seems that the High Court regarded the ROTD 
as a national competition law rather than as a unique national doctrine capable of 
protecting different interests other than those protected by competition law. This 
chapter argues that such a view of the ROTD is misconceived. The High Court’s 
apparent equation of the ROTD with national competition law, in effect, resulted in 
the common law doctrine being overwhelmed by EU competition law. The High 
Court failed to defend the potency of the ROTD as a valued and distinct legal 
                                                 
523 Ibid. 
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instrument available to restrained persons to resist unreasonable restrictions that 
happen to come within the reach of but do not infringe competition law.  
 
 
5. 3 INTERFACE SINCE MAY 2004: ART 3 of REGULATION 1/2003 
 
Since May 2004, Art 3 of Reg. 1/2003 provides the rule of jurisdictional 
delimitation between EU competition law and national competition law.524 Art 3’s 
convoluted provisions and their impact on the ROTD can be appreciated fully only 
with some knowledge of its contentious evolution which is sketched next (and 
detailed more fully later in this chapter). Art. 3, when initially proposed by the 
European Commission, was a succinct one paragraph provision. It evolved into a 
three paragraph provision following amendments advanced by Member States 
during a process that lasted from September 2000 until December 2002.525  
 
 
5.3.1 European Commission’s Proposal of September 2000 
 
The European Commission’s proposed text provided: 
“[W]here an agreement… within the meaning of Article [101] of the 
Treaty, or the abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 
[102] may affect trade between Member States, Community competition 
law shall apply to the exclusion of national competition laws.” 526 
                                                 
524 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament on the Functioning of 
Regulation 1/2003 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0206:EN:NOT. Also see 
Commission Staff Working paper Accompanying  Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003  COM (2009) 206 final para 139-
181 which is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009SC0574:EN:NOT   
525 See, in particular, the following European Council documents in Interinstitutional File 
2000/0243(CNS) 5158/01 p10 (January 11th 2001)  at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st05/st05158.en01.pdf ;  
9999/01 p11 (27th June 2001) at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st09/st09999.en01.pdf;  
13563/01 p 20 (November 20th 2001) at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st13/st13563.en01.pdf;  
8383/02 pp21-22 (May 21st, 2002)at  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st08/st08383.en02.pdf;  and 13451/02  p18 (October 
28th 2002) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st13/st13451.en02.pdf. 
526 Proposal for Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82 and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No  2988/74, (EEC) No 
4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87.COM (2000) 582 final. OJ C 365 19.12.2000 
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The Explanatory Memorandum for the proposed Regulation advanced various 
theoretical and practical arguments from the Commission in support of the 
proposed article.527 It accepted that the judgment in Walt Wilhelm provided a rule 
of conflict resolution but did not provide a rule of jurisdictional delimitation. It 
noted that some undertakings felt forced to argue that their agreement breached Art 
101(1) and satisfied Art 101(3) in order to “substantiate a conflict between outcome 
under EU and national competition law” in order to bring the case within the Walt 
Wilhelm solution.528 It argued that the proposed article would ensure coherence 
between Arts 101(1) and 101(3). Also, the Commission expressed its worry about 
increases in instances of stricter national competition law seeking to prohibit 
agreements which would not have the anti-competitive object or effect proscribed 
by Art 101(1).529 It further stated that the new article would ensure a “level playing 
field” throughout the Union so that agreements capable of affecting interstate trade 
are subject to a common standard.530 Additionally, it pointed up the inconsistency 
with a single market if “an agreement which would be considered innocuous or 
beneficial under Community law can be prohibited under national competition 
law.”531 It asserted that the new article would remove the costs caused by the 
parallel application of national competition law and EU competition law.532 It also 
asserted that the proposed article would assist the efficient allocation of cases to the 
best placed national competition authority and avoid problems where national 
competition law obliged a national competition authority to deal with a case, for 
example, to adopt a formal decision on receipt of a complaint.533 The breadth and 
scope of the above reasons reveal the shortcomings of the Walt Wilhelm judgment 
as a solution.  
 
However, these arguments did not persuade all Member States to support the 
proposed article. This is unsurprising as the proposed text would have completely 
                                                 
527 Proposal for Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82. COM (2000) 582 final, 14. 
528 One example of  where a firm sought exemption instead of negative clearance is provided by  
Phillips Osram and KSB/Goulds/Iowara/Itt [1990] OJ  L 19 p 25.   






ousted the applicability of national competition laws to arrangements and conduct 
falling within the reach of EU competition law. The proposal was amended at 
various intervals which are next sketched and examined later in detail.   
 
5.3.2 Overview of Art 3  
 
The European Commission’s proposed text had to evolve into a complicated three 
paragraph article before it was finally accepted by Member States.  Art 3(1) 
provides: 
“[W]here the competition authorities of the Member States or national 
courts apply national competition law to agreements, decisions of 
associations of undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of 
Article [101](1) which may affect trade between the Member States within 
the meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Article [101] to such 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices.”   
 
This paragraph ensures that a national court or competition authority cannot ignore 
Art 101 by applying only national competition law to provisions falling within the 
reach of EU competition law.  
 
Art 3(2) provides: 
 “[T]he application of national competition law may not lead to the 
prohibition of agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings or 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States but 
which do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article [101](1) of 
the Treaty, or which fulfil the conditions of Article [101](3) of the Treaty or 
which are covered by a Regulation for the application of Article [101](3) of 
the Treaty. Member States shall not under this Regulation be precluded 
from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which 
prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.”  
 
Essentially, the first sentence of Art 3(2) means that that “national competition 
law” cannot prohibit an arrangement which is not prohibited by Art 101 on the 
grounds that it either does not have anti-competitive object or effect, or else, comes 
within the exceptions specified in Art 101(3). This has been described as the 
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“convergence rule.”534 The second sentence contains an exception that allows the 
application of stricter national law to prohibit unilateral conduct.535 
 
Art 3(3) provides:  
“Without prejudice to general principles and other provisions of 
Community law, paragraphs 1 and 2 do not apply when the competition 
authorities and the courts of the Member States apply national merger 
control laws nor do they preclude the application of provisions of national 
law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by 
Article [101] and [102] of the Treaty.”  
This final paragraph of Art.3 contains a saver that dis-applies Art 3(1) and 3(2) vis-
à-vis certain national laws. For this research, the relevant part of Art 3(3) is the part 
that covers national laws which “predominantly pursue an objective different from 
that pursued by Article [101] and [102].” Art 3(3) allows national institutions to 
apply some national laws without activating either Art 3(1) or (2). Thus, the 
national law may be applied solely (i.e. not also applying EU competition law) and 
the national law may prohibit measures that are not proscribed by Art 101, on the 
grounds that either their object/effect is not proscribed by Art 101(1) or because 
they satisfy the exception of Art 101(3). 
 
For this research, the kernel of the problem is that if the ROTD comes within the 
“convergence rule” of Art 3(2) (first sentence), it cannot void what Art 101 does 
not prohibit unless the ROTD comes either within the second sentence of 
paragraph 2 (unilateral conduct exception) or within paragraph 3 (as law that 
predominantly pursue other objectives). It is clear that the interpretation of Art 3 is 
of crucial importance to the capacity of the ROTD to challenge restrictions within 
the overlap area that are not prohibited by EU competition law. 
                                                 
534 The Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and Council- Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 
{COM(2009) 206 final} para 158. The Paper  is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009SC0574:EN:NOT 
535 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and Council- Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 
{COM(2009) 206 final} para 141 states:”[I]n its current wording, the obligation of convergence 
covers only the application of national  competition law to agreements, concerted practices and 
decisions of associations of undertakings. Member States remain free to enact and maintain stricter 




The next section examines how Art 3 has been interpreted by the High Court in the 
context of the interface between Art 101 and the ROTD. 
 
5.3.3 High Court Interpretation of Art 3 
 
The High Court’s interpretation of Art 3 and its implications for the interface 
between Art 101 and ROTD is next examined. The High Court first expressed its 
view on Art 3 in Days Medical Aids 536 and this view was repeated in Jones v Ricoh 
UK Ltd.537 According to the High Court, Art 3 prevents the application of ROTD to 
resist a measure to which Art 101 is applied but does not prohibit where the 
restriction either i) does not have an anti-competitive object/effect or ii) comes 
within the criteria of Art 101(3).  
 
The High Court judgment in Days Medical Aids addressed Art 3 which had been 
adopted but had yet to come into effect.538 For this reason, the Court’s view of Art. 
3 might be relegated as being merely obiter. In 2004, Furse remarked that it was by 
“no means certain” that this judgment will be followed.539 However, in 2010, in 
Jones v Ricoh UK Ltd, Roth J., having decided that Art 101(1) prohibited a 
particular clause in a Confidentiality agreement, stated:  
“ …. it is not necessary to consider separately the domestic law of restraint 
of trade. In any event, once EU competition law applies and either strikes 
down or permits the restriction involved, the court is not permitted to reach 
a different result as regards the application of a restriction to trade between 
EU Member States under the domestic law of restraint of trade: Article 3(2) 
of Regulation 1/2003, and see Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery 
Manufacturing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm), [2004] UKCLR 384 , at 
[265]-[266].” 540  
 
This conclusion has the effect of ousting or muzzling the ROTD once Art 101 is 
applied. It means the ROTD is not available to persons to resist the enforcement of 
                                                 
536 [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm) Langley J. For analysis of this lengthy judgment and its 
interpretation of  Art 3 see Lucey, M.C., “EC Competition Policy: Emasculating the Common Law 
Doctrine of Restraint of Trade?”  (2007) ERPL 419. 
537 [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch) Roth J.  
538 The judgment was delivered in January 2004 and predated the coming into effect of Art 3 on 
May 01st, 2004.  
539 M. Furse, Competition Law of the EC and UK (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 4th ed) 
369. 
540 [2010] EWHC 1743, para 49. Roth J. found that the clause was prohibited by Art 101(1) and 
did not come within Block Exemption Regulation 2790/99. 
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an unreasonable “restraint of trade” that comes within the jurisdiction of but is not 
prohibited by Art 101. This creates a serious problem for some restrained 
professionals. 
  
The approach of the High Court to Art 3 is next criticised on three grounds. These 
are, firstly, its ready acceptance that Art 3 is activated, secondly, its treatment of 
High Court judgments on trade mark delimitation disputes and, thirdly, the 
inadequacy of its attempts to ascertain the intended scope of Art 3(3).  
   
5.3.3.1 Why is Art 3 Activated? 
 
The first criticism is that the High Court too readily accepted that Art 3 was 
relevant. Art 3(1) and Art 3(2) are activated only in a case where national 
competition law is applied.541 The trigger is expressly stipulated as “national 
competition law” and this phrase is narrower than the broader concept of “national 
law.”  Thus literally interpreted, Art 3 is not activated in cases where national 
courts apply only national law that is not “national competition law.”  
  
The High Court did not explain why it regarded the ROTD as “national 
competition law” for the purposes of Art. 3, in these cases, where the Competition 
Act 1998 was expressly excluded from applying.542 It would have been more 
convincing if the Court had explained why the ROTD may be seen as “national 
competition law.” In this regard, the Court could have pointed out that Art 3 does 
not limit the term “national competition law” to only national legislative versions 
of EU competition law. Moreover, it could have drawn on a teleological approach 
to interpret “national competition law” to capture any stricter national laws that 
may undermine the uniform EU wide standards set by Art 101. It could have 
highlighted how the Commission’s “Staff Working Paper on Article 3” asserts that 
the concept of “national competition law” must be interpreted in light of Art 3’s 
objective which is to avoid parallel application of EU competition law and national 
competition law and what “matters is the substantive content of the national rule 
                                                 
541 See further M.C. Lucey “ Unforeseen Consequences of Article 3 of EU Regulation 1/2003” 
(2006)  27 ECLR 557. 
542 Vertical Exclusion Order SI 2000 No 310. 
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rather than the legal instrument of which it forms part.”543 Furthermore, the High 
Court could have stated that an “effects” rather than “form” based approach would 
capture the ROTD because it may void certain consensual restrictions agreed by 
economic operators. However, that none of these arguments were debated shows 
how readily the High Court equated the ROTD with “national competition law.”  
 
5.3.3.2 Reliance on Apple and WWF to Interpret Art 3  
 
The second criticism concerns the High Court’s undue reliance on two judgments 
on trade mark delimitation agreements to support its conclusion that the ROTD 
does not come within the saving provision of Art 3(3). The High Court in the 2010 
judgment of Jones v. Ricoh UK Ltd and the 2004 judgment in Days Medical Aids 
placed considerable reliance on a few paragraphs from judgments in WWF and 
Apple.  
Roth J. in Jones v. Ricoh UK Ltd refers to paragraphs 264 and 265 of the judgment 
in Days Medical Aids. Paragraph 264 merely recites the text of Art 3. Paragraph 
265 from Days Medical Aids, inter alia, states: 
“[W]hatever characterisation may be given to the common law restraint of 
trade doctrine ... I do not think it can be said predominantly to pursue an 
objective different from Articles [101] and [102]. A reflection of the close 
relationship can be found in WWF v World Wrestling Foundation [2002] 
EWCA CIU 196 in the judgment of Carnwarth LJ at paragraphs 64 and 66, 
and in Apple  Corps Limited  v Apple Computer Inc in the judgment of 
Nicholls LJ at paragraphs  109-113.”544 
 
It is an obvious but appropriate criticism to point out that the WWF and Apple 
judgments considerably predate Art 3 and, as such, cannot intend to determine 
whether the ROTD predominantly pursues the same objective as EU competition 
law for the purposes of Art 3. It is argued next that the WWF and Apple judgments 
contain merely incidental observations on the ROTD and competition law which 
were made within their own particular factual contexts and that they have been 
given undue weight and currency by Langley J. 
 
                                                 
543 SEC (2001) 871,  para 62. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009SC0574:EN:NOT   
544 Para 265. 
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The next paragraphs critically examine the paragraphs cited from WWF and Apple 
in order to argue that they offer insufficient support for the High Court’s (Langley 
J.) later conclusion in Days Medical Aids that the ROTD is not saved by Art 3(3).  
The cited judgment in Apple arose following a dispute between a music company 
and a computer company over the use of an apple trade mark. In 1981, the 
companies reached a settlement in the form of a trademark delimitation agreement. 
Later, one company alleged breaches of the agreement’s “no challenge” clause. At 
the trial, the defence wanted to argue that the trade marks registration was invalid. 
On November 15 1990, Ferris J. ruled that the invalidity point could not be argued 
on the pleadings. On December 21st, Ferris J. refused leave to the defendant to 
serve a “late Rejoinder” which the defendant had drafted on the registration 
invalidity point. These November and December rulings were appealed to the 
Court of Appeal which issued the judgment that contains the cited paragraphs 109-
113. This context must be borne in mind when appraising the paragraphs of 
Nicholls L.J. that were cited and relied on by the High Court in Days Medical Aids.   
 
In Apple, Nicholls L.J., in para 109, stated: “[F]or present purposes” the “essence” 
of Art 101 is “not substantially different” from principles of the ROTD.545 These 
opening words of the quotation (“[F]or present purposes”) are crucial because the 
purposes and context of this dispute in Apple were highly particular. In his 
judgment Nicholls L.J. had to decide whether one party was allowed to serve a 
“late Rejoinder” to a registration invalidity point made by the other side. He 
decided that the validity or invalidity of the trade mark registration was an 
irrelevant issue to the case under Art 101 and under ROTD.546 It is important to 
appreciate that Nicholls L.J. was not deciding whether a clause infringed either the 
ROTD and/or Art 101. In this light, it is unsafe to take his remarks as being a 
widely applicable declaration that the ROTD and competition law are always the 
same.   
 
Nicholls L.J. commented that the Court of Justice in Remia “adopted an approach 
which is not so different from that of the common law.”547 However, the analysis 
                                                 
545 Para 109. 
546 Para 112. 
547 Para 110. 
 152
of Remia, in Chapter Two, shows how the Court of Justice decided that a 
restriction in a transfer of business agreement is not prohibited by Art 101(1) if it is 
necessary to ensure that the transaction has the effect intended and would have a 
beneficial effect on competition.548 The Remia test is not the same as the ROTD’s 
approach which is to refuse to enforce a restriction unless it has been justified as 
reasonable both inter partes and in the “public interest.” Furthermore, even if the 
ROTD and EU competition law take a somewhat similar approach to agreements 
for the sale of businesses, this coincidence cannot support the far more general 
conclusion that the ROTD and EU competition law are essentially the same and 
pursue the same objective in the sense intended by Art 3. Suffice it to recall here 
that Chapter One showed the ROTD intentionally adopts a more robust scrutiny of 
restrictions in employment (and analogous personal contracts) than it does when 
assessing restrictions in sale of business agreements. In paragraph 113 of Apple, 
Nicholls L.J. noted one difference between EU competition law and the ROTD and 
this concerned the time at which an assessment is made. The pertinent point of time 
under the ROTD is when the agreement is made (in this case 1981) but under EU 
competition law  matters can be considered “not only at the outset of the agreement 
but also from time to time during the life of the agreement.”549 This is a difference 
but it is not the only difference between the ROTD and EU competition law. The 
paragraphs from Nicholls L.J. that were cited by Langley J. provide too slim a basis 
for any conclusion that the objectives of the ROTD are the same as those of EU 
competition law. This research suggests that the remarks made in Apple were 
delivered in a particular and limited context and were never intended to be a 
reliable comparison of the objectives of the ROTD and EU competition law.  
 
Also, Langley J. cited two paragraphs 64 and 65 from a judgment in WWF in a 
dispute over the alleged breach of a trademark delimitation settlement agreement 
between the World Wildlife Fund (“Fund”) and the World Wrestling Federation 
(“Federation”) on the use of the initials “WWF.”550 Carnwarth L.J.’s judgment is 
                                                 
548 See Case 42/84 Remia BV and NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia v. Commission [1985] ECR 
2545, para 20 where the Court of Justice  stated that non-competition clauses in an agreement for 
the transfer of material assets and goodwill of two subsidiaries may not be prohibited by Art 
[101](1) if  they have a “ beneficial effect on competition”  and  they are “necessary to the transfer 
concerned and their duration and scope must be strictly limited to that purpose.”   
549 Para 113. 
550 WWF v World Wrestling Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 196, para 66. 
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an appeal against the Order of Jacob J. made in favour of “Fund” for an injunction 
and damages to enforce a settlement agreement of 1994. The Court of Appeal 
considered the appeal under 6 headings.551 Langley J. cited paragraphs 64 and 66 
from Carnwarth L.J. judgment which are found under headings 5 and 6 which are 
titled “Other Issues” and “Conclusions and Remedy.” The location of these two 
paragraphs suggests that they do not form a core element of the judgment. Each of 
these paragraphs is next examined in turn.   
 
In paragraph 64, Carnwarth L.J. notes that the Court of Appeal (like Jacob J. 
earlier) had difficulty in seeing the basis of the Art 101 case. Paragraph 65 deals 
with an argument based on ECHR and is irrelevant to this chapter. Paragraph 66 
states the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that “the Federation gains no assistance in 
this case from the doctrine of restraint of trade, whether in its common law or 
European form.” These few italicised words cannot seriously be taken as a 
considered adjudication that EU competition law is a European version of 
ROTD.552 It is important to note that the case under Art 101 had not been made 
clearly. Jacobs J. had described the case made under Art 101 as “muddled and 
confused” and concluded that there was nothing in the Art 101 point. In particular, 
Jacobs J. criticised the lack of evidence on market definition and lack of 
explanation as to why interstate trade was affected. That the case under Art 101 
was poorly made may well explain why Carnwarth L.J. apparently did not draw 
distinctions between EU competition law and the ROTD.  
 
For these reasons, the cited paragraphs in WWF and Apple provide far too slight a 
basis to support a conclusion that ROTD pursues the same objective predominantly 
as EU competition law. They cannot fairly be treated as conclusive comparisons of 
the objectives of the ROTD and Art 101 for the purposes of Art 3. 
                                                 
551 These are a) Principles for Summary Judgment, b) Breach of Contract, c) Public Policy, d) 
Injurious Association, e) Other Issues f) Conclusion. 
552 On the origins of  EU competition law D. Gerber, Law and  Competition in Twentieth Century 
Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Clarendon Press 1998). 
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5.3.3.3 Inadequate Attempts to Understand Art 3(3) 
 
The third criticism of the High Court is directed at its poor efforts to tease out 
whether Art 3(3) could save the ROTD from the “convergence rule” of Art 3(2). In 
Days Medical Aids, Langley J. was not persuaded by submissions that the ROTD 
has, even in part, different objectives to Arts 101 and 102. The defence had sought 
to contrast the ROTD’s concern with the “perceived public policy in ensuring 
personal freedom to trade and thence its distaste for long term agreements” with 
competition law’s recognition that agreements “while restrictive on personal 
freedoms may nonetheless promote competition and so benefit consumers.”553 
However, Langley J. took the view that Art 3(3) is aimed at “consumer protection 
laws...”554 In Langley J.’s view, the ROTD does not “predominantly pursue an 
objective different from that pursued” by EU competition law and, consequently, 
does not come within the saving provision of Art 3(3).555 This conclusion on the 
interface between the ROTD and EU competition law is not only flawed (for the 
reasons stated above) but, it is next argued, creates a serious problem. 
 
 
5.3.4 Interface Problem 
 
According to the High Court’s interpretation of Art 3, when a court has applied EU 
competition law to a particular measure it cannot reach a different conclusion by 
applying the ROTD. This conclusion causes an acute problem for persons who 
would want to rely on the ROTD in a case where the ROTD would produce a more 
favourable outcome. The best such example is where an unreasonable “restraint of 
trade” that would be void under the ROTD is not prohibited by Art 101 on the 
grounds that its object/effect is not anti-competitive. 
 
                                                 
553 Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 44 para 
255.  
554 Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 44 para 
266. 
555 Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 44 para 
265. 
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It is notable that, in 2010, Roth J. in Jones v. Ricoh repeated the conclusion from 
Days Medical Aids when he stated that:  
“once EU competition law applies and either strikes down or permits the 
restriction involved, the court is not permitted to reach a different result as 
regards the application of a restriction to trade between EU Member States 
under the domestic law of restraint of trade.”556  
In Jones v. Ricoh, the particular clause was prohibited by both Art 101 and the 
ROTD which is unlike the situation in Days Medical Aids where the unreasonable 
“restraint of trade” was not prohibited by Art 101(1). Thus, it may be argued that 
Roth J.’s comments could be limited to cases where the EU competition law 
prohibits the clause. However, that is not a safe view for two reasons. Firstly, the 
broader interpretation is possible under a literal approach and, secondly, because 
the conclusion originated in Days Medical Aids where the particular clause was not 
prohibited by Art 101.  
 
The scale of this problem is potentially wide. Art 101 is applicable to measures 
which may affect, even indirectly, the pattern of trade between Member States.557 
Thus, it is likely that a profession-wide restrictive rule of a national professional 
association would satisfy the interstate trade effect test.558 Also, a restriction 
contained in a bilateral contract might have sufficient potential effect on the pattern 
of trade. For example, a network of post-termination non-competition clauses in 
professional partnerships (such as dentistry or veterinary) in geographical areas in 
Northern Ireland located near the border with Ireland may affect the pattern of 
trade in those professional services.  
 
Moreover, the delineation of the interface between EU competition law and the 
ROTD may even be relevant in cases where EU competition law is not applicable 
due to inadequate effect on trade.  It may affect cases where UK competition law 
and the ROTD are applicable on the grounds that it is logical for the ROTD to have 
a consistent interface with both UK and EU competition law.559 Otherwise, a 
serious inconsistency may be created. Consider, for example, the situation of a 
                                                 
556 [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch) Roth J. para. 49.  
557 Case 56/65 Sociéte La Technique Miniere v. Maschinebau Ulm GhbH [1966] ECR 234. 
558 Belgian Architects OJ [2005] L 0004/10 and Case C-309/99 Wouters v. NOVA [2002] ECR-I 
1577. 
559 See A. Scott, “The Evolution of Competition law and Policy in the United Kingdom”  LSE 
Working Papers 9/2009 p5.  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344807 
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dentist in Northern Ireland who seeks to resist the enforcement of an unreasonable 
post-termination non-competition clause in a large partnership or franchise located 
close to the border with Ireland. If the contractual restriction falls within the 
jurisdiction of Art 101 due to its potential to affect cross border trade, then, 
following the Days Medical Aids judgment, he cannot rely on the ROTD if Art 
101(1) is applied and does not prohibit the clause. It would be highly inconsistent if 
the same restriction on a different dentist who was physically located remotely 
from cross border trade could call on the ROTD because his restriction does not 
attract EU competition law.  Thus, although, Art 3 speaks only to the relationship 
between EU competition law and some national law, in practice, Art 3 may have 






This chapter detailed the background context that prompted the European 
Commission to propose a provision, in Art 3, to delineate the interface between EU 
competition law and national law. It intended to remedy the shortcomings of the 
Walt Wilhelm approach which only provided certainty where there was a conflict 
between national and EU competition law. The Walt Wilhelm judgment did not 
provide comprehensive and certain rules on delineating the interface between EU 
competition law and national law (comprising competition and other national law).  
 
Art 3 seeks to eliminate uncertainty. In Art 3(1) it insists that EU competition law 
be applied where there is adequate effect on interstate trade. It clearly ensures the 
priority of Art 101 over stricter national competition law. The “convergence rule” 
in Art 3(2) confers a priority on Art 101 that goes further than the previous conflict 
resolution rule because it prevails even if Art 101(1) does not prohibit the clause.  
The new uncertainty, created by Art 3, concerns the type of national laws that are 
saved by Art 3(3). Art 3(3) allows stricter national law that “predominantly pursues 
an objective different from that pursued” by EU competition law. The High Court 
apparently takes the view that the ROTD is not saved by Art 3(3). It has asserted 
that a contrary conclusion cannot be reached under the ROTD once EU 
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competition law has been applied to a particular restriction. This approach creates a 
most significant problem for persons wishing to call on the ROTD to void a 
restriction that is not prohibited by Art 101. The keenest problem is that it ousts 
protection that has otherwise long been available to persons under the ROTD. 
  
The range of professionals in the UK injured by this conclusion is even greater if 
(for reasons of consistency) the interface between the ROTD and national 
competition law is delineated in the same way. It is possible that the range of 
persons affected by this conclusion may be more extensive, in the future, if the 
jurisdictional scope of competition law increases by interpreting “undertaking” to 
include some professionals in employment. The next chapter suggests that the 
overlap between the ROTD and competition law would be significantly extended if 
competition law becomes applicable to some employment contracts. An increase in 
overlap would extend the interface between the ROTD and competition law. It 
would correspondingly increase the number of persons who may lose the 
traditional protection available under the ROTD on the grounds that competition 










 The concept of “undertaking” is a key jurisdictional term for competition law in 
England and Wales. Competition law applies only to arrangements agreed between 
“undertakings”, decisions of “associations of undertakings” and abuses of a 
dominant position by “undertakings.” The scope of “undertaking” is important for 
this research because it determines the extent to which competition law overlaps 
with the space traditionally occupied by the ROTD. This chapter explores the range 
of professionals who may be regarded as “undertakings” for the purposes of 
competition law in England and Wales. It assesses the current situation and predicts 
how it may increase in the future. 
 
Section 6.2 examines the provenance of the concept of “undertaking” in the 
Competition Act 1998. Section 6.3 considers the range of persons that have been 
regarded as “undertakings” under EU competition law. Section 6.4 pays attention 
to the margins of the concept of “undertaking” by exploring whether some 
employees may be “undertakings.” It challenges the view that employees cannot be 
“undertakings” by advancing legal and economic arguments and, also, by drawing 
on Opinions of two Advocates General. It concludes that it is not safe to assume 
that no professional in employment could ever be classified as an “undertaking” for 
the purposes of UK competition law.  
 
The possibility of any employee being classified as an “undertaking” is significant 
because it raises the possibility of UK competition law applying more widely than 
initially envisaged by Parliament. This development could cause UK competition 
law to become applicable to some contracts of employment and to measures of 
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associations whose members are all or mostly employees. In such an eventuality, 
the interface problem regarding the concurrent applicability of ROTD and 
competition law becomes acute. For employees and ex-employees accustomed to 
relying on the ROTD’s traditional protection (detailed in Chapter One) the worry is 
that the ROTD’s capacity to void unreasonable “restraints of trade” would be 
quenched on the grounds that courts cannot reach a different outcome under the 
ROTD once they have applied competition law.  
 
 
6.2 “UNDERTAKING” in COMPETITION ACT 1998  
 
It is important to explore the actual and potential scope of “undertaking” in UK 
competition law. The concept of “undertaking” is not a traditional one in UK law 
or in the competition legislation of other common law jurisdictions such as, for 
example, Australia. When enacting the Competition Act 1998, Parliament (unlike 
legislatures in some other Member States) chose not to include a statutory 
definition of “undertaking.”560 Parliament decided against accepting the following 
definition that was proposed: 
“[U]ndertaking includes a person who, or body which, requires, causes or 
connives in an infringement of the Chapter I prohibition or Chapter II 
prohibition. Except where the context otherwise requires words and 
expressions in this Act shall have the same meaning as in the Treaty.” 561  
 
“Undertaking” is not a commonplace phrase in general English legal terminology, 
unlike the terms used in the original EU languages, which have been described as 
“ordinary, everyday words for “firm or business,” namely: ‘Unternehmen’ 
(German), ‘enterprise (French), ‘onderneming’ (Dutch) and ‘impresa’ (Italian).”562 
That Parliament preferred to use the concept of “undertaking” over the more 
                                                 
560 For example, Article 1(f) of the Mededingingswet 1998 (Dutch Competition Act) defines an 
undertaking as follows: “an undertaking within the meaning of Article [101]1, first paragraph of the 
EC Treaty.” In Ireland the Competition Act 1991 defined an “undertaking” to include persons 
“engaged for gain.” The definition was repeated in the current competition legislation.  
561 Amendment No. 187B, see Feb 23 1998 Lord Fraser of Carmyllie col 512.   
562 L. Ritter, F. Rawlinson and D.W. Braun, EEC Competition Law- A Practitioner’s Guide (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law, 2001) 31in fn 158. In Irish the term is “gnóthas” which means a business 
 160
business centred term of “enterprise” 563 shows, in this author’s view, an 
unequivocal desire to align the national provisions with EU law. The government’s 
view was that “…the prohibitions are modeled on Articles [101] and [102] which 
apply to undertakings and, as a result of clause 58, (later s.60) words in the Bill 
such as “undertaking” are to be interpreted by reference to [EU] law.”564 It is 
clear that the provenance of the concept is EU competition law and that the concept 
of “undertaking” must be construed in that light, especially, in light of the 
consistency obligations of s.60 of the Competition Act 1998. 
 
 In order to gain a fuller appreciation of the range of persons who may possibly be 
classified as “undertakings” under UK competition law, it is necessary to consider 
the approach adopted under EU competition law. The concept of “undertaking” in 
the Act is particularly susceptible to EU developments because of its peculiar EU 
provenance and, additionally, the receptive attitude of courts under s.60 of the 
Competition Act 1998 to various EU competition law sources. Thus, in order to 
gain the fullest picture of the range of persons who may be “undertakings” under 
UK competition law, the next section ascertains the types of persons who are 
“undertakings” under EU competition law. 
 
 
6.3 PERSONS WHO ARE “UNDERTAKINGS” IN EU COMPETITION 
LAW 
 
Although “undertaking” is an important jurisdictional concept,565 no definition of 
“undertaking” was provided in the Treaty of Rome or its successors. This position 
contrasts with the approach taken in other Treaties such as the ECSC566 and 
                                                 
563 See A. Campbell, Restrictive Trading Agreements in the Common Market (London: Stevens 
and Sons 1964)7 and 14 where “enterprise” is the term used in some English language European 
Community law books published before the accession of the UK to the EEC in 1972. 
564 Lord Simon of Highbury Feb 23 1998 col 511 (emphasis added). 
565 A. Kamerling and C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2004)  283. See also L. Louri, “Undertaking as a 
Jurisdictional Element in EC Competition Rules” (2002) 29 LIEI 143, 149. 
566 Article 80 of the now expired ECSC Treaty provided “ ... ‘undertaking’ means any undertaking 
engaged in production in the coal or the steel industry......and...., any undertaking or agency 
regularly engaged in distribution other than sale to domestic consumers or small craft industries.” 
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Euratom567 and with the Merger Regulation.568 A definition is contained in a 
Protocol attached to the Agreement on the European Economic Area which 
provides that “ …an ‘undertaking’ shall be any entity carrying out activities of a 
commercial or economic nature.”569 This definition echoes the EU Courts’ 
approach which examines the nature of the activities carried on by the entity and is 
a function based test. Under this “functional” view, an “undertaking” comprises 
any entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of its legal status,570 the way in 
which it is financed,571 and that any activity consisting in offering goods and/or 
services on a given market is economic activity.572 The concept of “undertaking” is 
construed broadly and inclusively.573 It is not limited to corporate entities and 
includes persons engaged in undoubtedly economic or commercial activity, for 
example those in de facto control of a business,574self-employed persons, sole 
traders,575 future proprietors of businesses,576 distributors, suppliers,577 
franchisees578 and licensors of patent rights.579  
 
                                                 
567 Article 196 of Euratom Treaty provides “(a) ‘person’ means any natural person who pursues all 
or any of his activities in the territories of Member States within the field specified in the relevant 
chapter of this Treaty; (b) ‘undertaking’ means any undertaking or institution which pursues all or 
any of its activities in the territories of  Member States within the field specified in the relevant 
Chapter of this Treaty, whatever its public or private legal status.”   
568 Regulation 139/2004, [2004] OJ C24/1. See W. Wils, “The Undertaking as a Subject of EC 
Competition Law and the Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons”(2000) 25 
ELRev 99, 106 where the author argues that consistency between the Treaty and ECMR provisions 
“requires a common notion of undertaking.”  
569 Art 1 of Protocol 22. 
570 P&I Club [1985] OJ C 376/2, [1989] 4 CMLR 178.  
571 Case C-55/96 Job Centre [1997] ECRI-7119 para 21. 
572 Case C-118/ 85 Commission v. Italy [1987] ECR  2599 para 7; Polypropylene [1986] OJ L 
230/1, [1988] 4 CMLR 347 para 99; Case C-41/90 Hofner and Elsner v. Macroton [1991] ECR I- 
1979 
573 Advocate General Cosmas in Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851, 
para 49. 
574 Dec76/743 Reuter/ BASF [1976] OJ l254/40 [1976] 2 CMLR D44. a research chemist with a 
controlling shareholding in a company challenged a non-competition clause in an agreement for the 
company’s transfer.  
575 For example a shopkeeper in Case C- 210/81 Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission [1983] ECR 
3045, [1984] 1 CMLR 6 and a plant breeder in Case 258/78 Nungesser v. Commission [1982] ECR 
2015.  
576 Advocate General Lenz in Case 42/84 Remia BV and NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia v. 
Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para 50 noted that Mr de Rooij’s role was not confined to merely 
being the future proprietor of the business but that he received additionally certain powers and 
dispositive rights which justified regarding him as an independent commercial entity. The Court of 
Justice noted that he was both a contracting party and recipient of rights peculiar to himself.  
577 Case 35/83 BAT v. Commission [1985] ECR 365, [1985] 2 CMLR 470. 
578 For example Case 161/86 Pronuptia de Paris  GmbH v Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] E.C.R. 353 
579 AOIP v. Beyrard [1976]OJ  L6/8, [1976] 1 CMLR D14; Vaessen/ Morris [1979] OJ L19/32, 
[1979] 1 CMLR 511; Theal/Watts  [1977] 1 CMLR D44 , on appeal, Case 28/77 Tepea v. 
Commission [1978] ECR 139. 
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Some professionals have been regarded as “undertakings” for the purposes of EU 
competition law. Italian customs agents or officials were classified as 
“undertakings” in two sets of legal proceedings. One case involved infringement 
proceedings by the European Commission against the professional association 
(CNSD) under Art 101.580 The Commission decided that the customs agents were 
“undertakings” as they are engaged in economic activity and that classification of 
an occupation in domestic law as a liberal profession is “not inconsistent with the 
fact” that they are engaged in economic activity.581  
 
The other legal action concerning customs agents was Commission v. Italy (CNSD) 
which was an action against Italy for failure to fulfil an obligation.582 The Italian 
government unsuccessfully argued, inter alia, that customs agents, like lawyers, 
surveyors or interpreters could not be “undertakings” because their services are 
intellectual and cannot be offered unless relevant permission is granted and 
particular conditions satisfied. It specifically argued there was “no unitary 
organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements which pursues a specific 
economic aim on a long-term basis” and that all self-employed persons could not 
be treated as “undertakings.”583 Advocate General Cosmas emphasised that the key 
issue is not the status of the entity but whether the activity is “economic” in the 
broad sense. In his view, there was no doubt that the activity of customs agents was 
economic because they offered “ ... in return for payment, services concerning the 
completion of customs formalities...”584 Additionally, he observed that their 
activities “clearly require a minimum organisational framework of personal, 
tangible and intangible elements (for example the existence of a fully equipped 
office, communications and so forth) which have been set up for a certain purpose, 
which is the offer of services to the operators concerned with a view to profit.”585  
                                                 
580 Commission Decision 93/438 CNSD [1993] OJ L 203/27: [1995] 5 CMLR 495, upheld by T-
513 CNSD v. Commission [2000] ECR II- 1807. 
581 Commission Decision 93/438 CNSD [1993] OJ L 203/27, Recital 40.  
582 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851 
583 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851,  para 46 
584 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851,  para 53. 
585 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851,  para 54. 
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Advocate General Cosmas concluded by noting how customs agents:  
“fully assume all the economic risks involved therein, risks inherent, 
moreover, in the exercise of any economic activity which seeks to make a 
profit. That is the risk that the costs of the various factors intervening in the 
process of supplying the services will not be covered by payment for the 
services supplied to carry out the customs operations.....if there is an 
imbalance between expenses and receipts, it is the customs agent himself 
who is required to make up the administrative deficit and run the risk of 
insolvency.”586   
 
The Court of Justice decided that the customs agents’ activities were “economic” in 
character because they offer services for payment, assume the financial risks and 
must bear any deficit.587 In its view, in such circumstances, the intellectual nature 
of the work, the requirement for authorisation and the fact that the work “can be 
pursued in the absence of a combination of material, non-material and human 
resources, is not such as to exclude it from the scope” of competition law.588 In 
Pavlov, the Court of Justice readily classified as “undertakings” self-employed 
medical specialists because they provided economic services on a market and were 
“paid by their patients and assume the financial risks attached to the pursuit of their 
activity.”589 Similarly, in Wouters, the Court of Justice remarked on how members 
of the Bar offered legal services for a fee and bore the risk of any deficit between 
expenditure and receipts and were, thus, “undertakings.”590 Echoing earlier 
judgments, the Court averred that this conclusion could not be altered by the 
“complexity and technical nature of the services they provide and the fact that the 
practice of their profession is regulated.”591  
 
It is clear that persons, including professionals, who are self–employed, and/or in 
control of a business, engage in “economic activity” and, therefore, are 
“undertakings.” Thus, EU competition law may apply (if there is sufficient effect 
on interstate trade) where professionals act, for example, as independent 
contractors, specialists, consultants or independent providers of exclusive services 
                                                 
586 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851,  para 55. 
587 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851,  para 37. 
588 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851,  para 38. 
589 Joined Cases C-180- 84/98 Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische 
Specialisten [2001] 4 CMLR 1, [2000] ECR I-6451, para 76. 
590 Case C-30/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad Van De Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] 4 
CMIR 27 [2002] All ER (EC) 193, para 48. 
591 Para 49. This echoes Joined Cases C-180-184/98 Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds 
Medische Specialisten [2001] 4 CMLR 1, [2000] ECR I-6451, para 77.  
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and either i) enter into anti-competitive arrangements or ii) are subject to anti-
competitive decisions of their professional associations. A similar range of persons 
could be “undertakings” under the Competition Act 1998. Consequently, many 
professionals if classified as “undertakings” could face a problem, if, for the 
reasons detailed in Chapters Four and Five, the application of competition law to a 




6.4 EMPLOYEES AS “UNDERTAKINGS” in EU COMPETITION LAW?  
 
Whether any professional in employment can be classified as an “undertakings” is 
the key question for this chapter. This question is crucial because classifying an 
employee as an “undertaking” has potentially very serious implications for the 
degree of overlap and interface between the ROTD and competition law in England 
and Wales.  
 
The orthodox position is that employees are not “undertakings” for the purpose of 
competition law. For example, Bellamy and Child state that “[A]n employee is not 
an undertaking.”592 Jones and Sufrin state that “it seems that employees acting as 
employees are not undertakings.”593 This chapter suggests that the orthodox view is 
not so solidly founded that it will persist if seriously challenged. Three arguments 
are next offered to challenge the view that employees cannot be classified as 
“undertakings.” These are that the orthodox view, firstly, lacks solid support in 
judgments, secondly, leads to uncertainty and, thirdly, produces economically 
inconsistent outcomes. 
 
6.4.1 Orthodox View is not Solidly Supported by Case Law   
 
The first argument is that there is no EU Court judgment or European Commission 
Decision holding that employees cannot be regarded as “undertakings” for the 
                                                 
592 D. Bellamy & Child (Ed. P Roth and V Rose) European Community Law of Competition 
(Oxford University Press 6th ed. 2008) para 2.021. 
593 A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 4th ed. 2011) 134 
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purposes of competition law. The EU Courts have not ruled conclusively that no 
employee can ever be an “undertaking” even where it was faced with cases 
involving employees.  
 
Regrettably, the Court of Justice in Wouters did not express its view as to whether 
employed lawyers could be “undertakings.” This is perhaps because the referring 
national tribunal expressly stated that lawyers registered in the Netherlands were 
“undertakings” and the interveners did not challenge this point. The Commission’s 
Decision in CNSD specifically records that customs agents may be either 
employees or independent agents.594 Although the Court of Justice judgment in 
Commission v. Italy (CNSD) mentioned the possibility of customs agents being 
employees, its analysis focused on the arguments of the Italian government that not 
all self-employed persons are “undertakings.”595 Suiker Unie is sometimes cited as 
the authority for the view that employees are not “undertakings.”596 However, the 
facts in Suiker Unie did not involve employees and the particular issue at stake was 
whether an agent was an “undertaking?”  When answering this question the Court 
of Justice stated:   
“….if such an agent works for the benefit of his principal he may, in 
principle, be treated as an auxiliary organ forming an integral part of the 
latter’s undertaking, who must carry out his principal’s instructions and 
thus, like a commercial employee, forms an economic unity with this 
undertaking.”597  
On a close reading of this quotation, it may be argued that the Court of Justice was 
not making a determination that an employee is never an “undertaking” but, 
instead, simply drew an analogy between some agents and some employees.  The 
italicised dicta from the judgment do not support the conclusion that no employee, 
in any circumstance, can ever be classified as an “undertaking.”  
                                                 
594 Commission Decision 93/438 CNSD OJ [1993]  L 203/27: [1995] 5 CMLR 889. 
595 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851, para 37. 
596 See for example, D. Bellamy & Child (Ed. P. Roth and V. Rose) European Community Law of 
Competition (Oxford University Press 6th ed. 2008)   para 2.021 where the authors  cite Cases 40-48 
/73 Suiker Unie v. Commission  [1975] ECR 1663. 
597 In Joined Cases C-40—48/73 Suiker Unie v. Commission [1975] ECR 1663, para 539(emphasis 
added). 
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Advocate General Jacobs expressed a compelling view when he observed that that 
the Court of Justice in Suiker Unie:  
“merely had to draw the line between employees and independent 
commercial agents in their respective relations to third parties. Thus, it 
could base its reasoning mainly on the attributability of employee’s 
activities to their employer.”598  
Advocate General Jacobs rightly highlighted that the attribution of illegality as 
between principal and agent is only one of the tasks performed by the concept of 
“undertaking” and the other function is the more obvious one of determining “the 
categories of actors to which the competition rules apply.”599 Recently, Jones 
pointed out how the concept of “undertaking” has been developed incrementally in 
two streams of jurisprudence (one stream dealing with the substantive reach of Art 
101 and the other with the attribution of liability as between entities) and that each 
stream is, arguably, underpinned by different policy objectives and that, 
interpretations of “undertaking” in one line of cases may occur without full regard 
for the consequences for the other line of cases.600     
 
 
6.4.2 Orthodox View Creates Uncertainty and Some Forced Reasoning 
 
The second criticism of the view that an employee cannot be an “undertaking” is 
that it creates uncertainty about the applicability of Art 101 to measures of 
associations of professionals. Under the orthodox position, an association whose 
members are all self–employed is an “association of undertakings” but an 
association of employees is not.601 The orthodox view is uncertain as to whether an 
association comprising both employees and self-employed persons (for example 
accountants or architects) is an “association of undertakings.”602 In practice, where 
                                                 
598 C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensionenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] 
ECRI-5751 [2000] 4 CMLR 446, para 209. 
599 C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensionenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] 
ECRI-5751 [2000] 4 CMLR 446, para 206. 
600 A. Jones, “The Boundaries of Undertaking in EU Competition Law” (2012) 8(2) European 
Competition Journal 301, 304.  
601 See Case C-30/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad Van De Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] 
ECR I-1577, [2002] 4 CMLR 27,138 where Advocate General Léger stated “… it is not necessary 
for a body to carry out any economic activity in order to be classified as an association of 
undertakings (van Landewyck 87-88 and IAZ 19-20). 
602 See Case C-30/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad Van De Nederlandse Orde van Advocates [2002] 
ECR I-1577,[2002] 4CMLR 27, para 53 where Advocate General Léger conceded it is “in reality, 
trickier to ascertain” whether or not it is an association of undertakings.   
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the percentage ratio of employed to self employed persons is low, the European 
Commission has, in effect, ignored the existence of employees.603 An approach to 
classification that is based on percentage ratio is undesirable. Its shortcomings are 
well demonstrated by situations where the data on the employment status of 
individual members are not available. For example, the founding legal instrument 
of the European Patent Institute (EPI) did not distinguish between self-employed 
and employed patent representatives. Thus, when deciding that the EPI was an 
“association of undertakings” the Commission inelegantly (and perhaps 
unconvincingly) commented that the: 
“fact that salaried professional representatives are also members of the EPI 
and have a say in determining the provisions of the code, which might not 
even concern them, does not prevent it from being considered that these 
provisions are the expression of the collective will of the EPI members who 
carry on the profession on a self employed basis.”604  
 
Here, the Commission denied the admitted influence of the salaried employees on 
the substantive content of the Code to deflect its classification of the association’s 
members as “undertakings.” Similarly, in COAPI, no attention was paid as to 
whether the industrial property agents were self-employed or employed. The 
judgments on the customs agents association (CNSD) failed to tease out the 
significance of some customs agents being in employment.605  In its Report on 
Competition in Professional Services, the Commission expressed the view that a: 
“professional body acts as an association of undertakings for the purposes 
of Article [101] when it is regulating the economic behaviour of the 
members of the profession. This is true even where professionals with 
employee status are admitted, since professional bodies normally and 
predominantly represent independent members of the professions.” 606  
 
This reasoning appears to be strained. Turning a blind eye to the existence of  some 
employees not only makes the applicability of Art 101 to decisions of  
“associations of undertakings” uncertain but also leads to some forced reasoning 
where Art 101 is applied to professional associations whose members comprise 
both employees and self-employed persons. 
                                                 
603 See for example, Belgian Architects [2005] OJ L 4/10 where the Commission noted that 91.5% 
of the members of the Belgian Architects’ Association’s were in independent practice, 5.9% were 
civil servants and the remainder were salaried. 
604 Para 24. 
605 Case C- 35/96 Commission v. Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECR I- 3851 




6.4.3 Orthodox View Creates Economically Inconsistent Immunities  
 
The third criticism of the orthodox view is that it creates economically inconsistent 
immunities from the prohibition in Art 101. Some of these inconsistencies may be 
illustrated with the following three examples. 
  
Firstly, post-termination restrictions in a contract for the sale of a partnership (e.g. 
veterinarians) fall outside the reach of competition law if both partners are salaried 
employees. However, if the partners have enough equity shareholding they might 
be “undertakings” and competition law could be applicable. The second example is 
that Art 101 will not apply to any measure of an association of professionals if all 
its members are employees irrespective of the distortive market effects of the 
measure but Art 101 applies if the members are self-employed. From an economic 
perspective, the measures of both associations could be equally anti-competitive 
(e.g. a boycott) but Art 101 will not apply to an association if it is wholly 
composed of employees (e.g. stockbrokers/radiographers). The third example 
concerns post-termination restrictions in an employment contract. Competition law 
will not apply if the ex-employee takes up a new employment but will be 
applicable if the ex-employee starts a new business.607 This is because the ex-
employee becomes an “undertaking” when he pursues his own economic interests 
on cessation of employment. However, from an ex-employer’s perspective, there 
may be no meaningful distinction between an ex–employee competing against him 
as part of a small-scale new employment or in self-employment. Moreover, as 
Townley points out, distinctions based on whether a person works with or against 
the employer’s interests engender distortions that may undermine efficiency by, for 
example, encouraging firms to “bring functions in-house in order to avoid” 
competition law. 608    
                                                 
607 See I. Van Bael and F. Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community (The Netherlands; 
Kluwer Law International, 4th ed. 2005) 35 where the authors state “from the moment an employee 
pursues his own economic interests different from his employers’ interests he might well become an 
independent undertaking.”   
608 C. Townley, “The Concept of an ‘Undertaking’: The Boundaries of the Corporation - A 
Discussion of Agency, Employees and Subsidiaries” in G. Amato and C-D Ehlermann (eds) EC 
Competition Law: A Critical Assessment (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007) 15. 
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These examples show that immunity from the applicability of Art 101 is created on 
the basis of an employment relationship with another party and that this leads to 
outcomes that do not make economic sense. It is inconsistent to put some anti-
competitive restrictions in personal contracts outside the reach of competition law 
on the purely formal grounds that the professional has an employer.  
 
6.4.4 Advocates General Recognise “atypical” Employees 
 
There are Opinions from two Advocates General that articulate the possibility of 
some professionals in employment being regarded as “undertakings.”  
 
In Albany, Advocate General Jacobs noted the basic principle that employees are 
not “undertakings” before he went on to predict that this principle would be tested 
in “borderline” areas, such as, perhaps, professional sport.609 In Pavlov, Advocate 
General Jacobs discussed whether medical specialists could be “undertakings”.610 
As all the medical specialists were self-employed they were readily classified as 
“undertakings.” Interestingly, Advocate General Jacobs specifically comments how 
it is more difficult to classify employed than self-employed medical specialists. He 
elaborates as follows:  
“[I]n principle, employees who offer labour against remuneration fall 
outside the scope of Art [101] (1). Employed professionals are, however, 
not typical workers. Sometimes their pay is directly linked to the profits and 
losses of their employer and they do not really work under the direction of 
that employer. They, therefore, constitute one of the borderline categories 
envisaged in my Opinion in Albany.”611 
  
In Wouters, Advocate General Léger noted that, in the Netherlands, lawyers can act 
either as independent agents or as employees.612 He subdivided the employed 
lawyers into two categories. His first group comprised employed lawyers who 
                                                 
609 Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensionenfonds Textielindustrie 
[1999] ECRI-5751 [2000] 4 CMLR 446, 459. 
610 Case C 180-184/98 Pavlov v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR I-
06451, [2001] 4 CMLR 1. 
611 Case C 180-184/98 Pavlov v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR I-
06451, [2001] 4 CMLR 1, para 112 (emphasis added). 
612 Case C-30/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad Van De Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR 
I-1577, [2002] 4 CMLR 27,para 48. 
 170
“perform their services for, and under the direction of, another person who pays 
them remuneration…in that case [they] are workers and as such do not fall within 
the scope of Community competition law.”613  This categorisation accords with the 
traditional conception of a person who is employed on the basis of receiving 
direction and remuneration from the “boss.” More interestingly, Advocate General 
Léger’s second group comprises employed lawyers who “do not really work under 
their employer’s direction and that their remuneration is directly linked to the 
latter’s profits and losses.” Advocate General Léger stated that such persons came 
within the borderline categories first articulated by Advocate General Jacobs. It 
seems that Advocate General Léger is making a finer subdivision than Advocate 
General Jacobs because he draws a distinction within a group of lawyers in 
employment based on their de facto circumstances.  
 
The Opinions in Albany and Pavlov highlight two aspects that make the 
employment relationship “atypical’. Firstly, the employee does not really work 
“under their employers’ direction” and, secondly, remuneration is linked to 
employers’ profits/losses. The basis and potential scope of these two criteria are 
next explored in order to tease out the contours of this so-called “borderline” 
category so as to understand its potential scope.  
 
The first criterion of “not working under the direction of the employer” connotes 
independence in the employee’s performance of the services. As such, it deviates 
from the conventional view of employment in the classic terms of a master and 
servant.614 It seems clear that medical and legal professionals come within this 
category. The interesting question is whether the requisite level of independence 
from employer is found outside the traditionally defined liberal professions such as 
“occupations requiring special training in the liberal arts or sciences.”615  
 
                                                 
613 Para 52. 
614 See C-22/98 Criminal Proceedings against Becu [1999] ECR I-5665, [2001] 4 CMLR 26, para 
26. Where the Court of Justice states “[t]he employment relationship …is characterised by the fact 
that they  perform the work … for and under the direction of each of those undertakings…” 
615 See European Commission Report on Competition in Professions, COM (2004) 83 final, para 1 
which studies lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers and pharmacists and referred to tax 
advisers and estate agents as “neighbouring professions.” 
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There is research in the area of employment relations616 that challenges the 
depiction of employees as dependent labour whose employers act as caretakers 
providing long term job security.617 That research draws on theories of 
organizational behaviour and the sociology of work which examine the 
psychological618 employment contract and ownership of human capital.619 For 
example, Stone argues that certain employment relationships are no longer based 
on a psychological contract whereby the employer is the caretaker of the 
employee.620 She highlights the creation by employers of new types of employment 
relationships which are contingent in two aspects: firstly the work is formally 
defined as short-term or episodic and, secondly, “the attachment” between the 
employer and employee “has been weakened.”621 She records that the 
“recasualization of work” is not limited to “blue collar workers” but extends all 
along the employment spectrum to include “high end professionals and 
managers.”622 She gives the example of Silicone Valley technicians who “are 
expected to chart their own path, face their own fortunes and manages their own 
careers in a “boundaryless”623 workplace.”624 These independent employees 
assume that they own their newly acquired knowledge based skills. Stone’s 
research is interesting for this chapter because it shows that various types of 
                                                 
616 K. Stone, “The new Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor 
and Employment Law (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev 519;  K. Stone, “Knowledge at Work: Disputes 
Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace” (2002) 34 Conn L. Rev 721.  
617 See M. Roehling, "The Nature of the New Employment Relationship(s): A Content Analysis of 
the Practitioner and Academic Literatures" (1998) 39(4) Hum. Resource Mgmt, 305. 
618 Organizational theorists coined this term to describe the employee’s beliefs about the terms of 
the employment contract. See further S.L. Robinson and D. Rousseau “Violating the Psychological 
Contract; Not the Exception but the Norm” (1994) 15 J. Org. Behav 245 and also, M. Cavanaugh 
and R. Noe “Antecedents and Consequences of Relational Components of the New Psychological 
Contract” (1999) 20 J. Org. Behav 323.   
619 D. Neef, “Rethinking Economics in the Knowledge Based Economy” in D. Neef, G. Siesfeld 
and J Cafola (eds) The Economic Impact of Knowledge (Butterworth Heinemann 1998) .  
620 K. Stone, “Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the 
Changing Workplace” (2002) 34 Conn L. Rev 721,731 quotes from M. Cavanaugh and R. Noe, 
“Antecedents and Consequences of Relational Components of the New Psychological Contract” 
(1999) 20 J. Org. Behav 323, 327. 
621 K. Stone, “Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the 
Changing Workplace” (2002) 34 Conn L. Rev 721, 725. 
622 K. Stone, ”Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the 
Changing Workplace” (2002) 34 Conn L. Rev 721,726. 
623 See A. Miner and D. Robinson, “Organizational and Population Level Learning as Engines for 
Career Transitions” (1994) 15 J. Org Behav 345, 347  where the authors define a  “boundaryless” 
career as a “career which unfolds unconstrained by clear boundaries around job activities, by fixed 
sequences of such activities, or by attachment to one organization.”  
624  K. Stone, “Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the 
Changing Workplace” (2002) 34 Conn L. Rev 721,732. 
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employees (including ones who are not liberal professionals) do not work under the 
direction of their employer and operate in an unattached manner. Arguably, such 
professionals in employment, on account of their functional independence, may 
well come within the “atypical” category and be liable to be classified as 
“undertakings.” 
 
The second indicator of borderline employment cited by the Advocates General is 
that the employee’s “remuneration is directly linked to the [employer’s] profits and 
losses.” The level of exposure to financial volatility is set at a low level. It appears 
to be lower than the standard accepted by the Court of Justice in CNSD and 
Wouters which noted the individual’s obligation to make good any imbalance 
between expenditure and receipts which is quite close to the responsibilities of the 
self- employed. Moreover, the threshold in the Opinions of the Advocates General 
is also lower than the level of financial risk that would be required in order to 
render an agent independent from his principal.625  The threshold stated in the 
Opinions potentially includes many situations where the employee has an 
opportunity or incentive to make money for his employer and, consequently, for 
himself. Examples could include situations where the employee is well 
remunerated by means of profit-share schemes and performance bonus 
arrangements.  
 
On this basis, it would be a mistake to infer from the label “atypical” or 
“borderline” that only a small set of employees could potentially be classified as 
“undertakings.” It is possible for the approach of the Advocates General to 
“undertaking” to capture not only some traditional professionals but also some 
newer types of professionals in employment who perform independently of their 
employers’ directions and whose remuneration is linked somehow to employers’ 
profits. The “atypical” professionals in employment may not be limited to the 
liberal professions but could include estate agents, stockbrokers and sellers of other 
financial products, writers, artistic performers and IT specialists who enjoy 
autonomy in the execution of their daily work and are remunerated with a 
                                                 
625 See T- 325/01 Daimler Chrysler AG v. Commission [2005] ECR II-3319 on the level of risk 
borne by agents.  
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percentage share of the sale or “purse,” performance bonuses or commissions 
calculated as percentage of profits.  
 
The cited Opinions of the Advocates General, the flexible approach of the EU 
Courts and the European Commission allied to this chapter’s criticisms of the 
orthodox approach means it is unsafe to assume that professionals in employment 
can never be “undertakings” in EU competition law. One author sees some merit in 
the possibility of considering “all employees whether they act for or against their 
employer, as “undertakings” in their   own right.”626  
 
The next question is whether a similar expansive interpretation of “undertaking” 
could be reached under the UK competition legislation As detailed earlier in 
Chapter Three, EU competition law exerts considerable influence on the 
interpretation of UK competition legislation. S.60 of the Competition Act 1998 
imposes particular duties of consistent interpretation.  
 
 
6.5 EMPLOYEES AS “UNDERTAKINGS” in UK COMPETITION LAW?  
 
Whether employees may be “undertakings” under UK competition law is a crucial 
question when identifying the potential overlap and interface between national 
competition law and the ROTD. This section explores this question by examining 
some formal determinations on “undertakings” issued by courts and other 
organisations before considering other sources such as OFT Guidelines. 
 
 
6.5.1 Formal Decisions. 
 
There have been few judgments discussing whether individuals are “undertakings.” 
In Hendry, it was common ground between the parties that self-employed 
professional snooker players were “undertakings” and that the WPBSA was an 
                                                 
626 See C. Townley, “The Concept of an ‘Undertaking’:The Boundaries of the Corporation- A 
Discussion of Agency, Employees and Subsidiaries” in G. Amato and C-D Ehlermann (eds) EC 
Competition Law: A Critical Assessment (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007) 15 
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“association of undertakings.”627 In Qualifying Insurers Subscribing to the ARP 
and Capita London Market Services Limited v. Ross & Co and the Law Society, the 
High Court did not have to decide whether Law Society members and the Society 
itself constituted “undertakings.”628 This is because the Vice Chancellor, firstly, 
concluded that the professional indemnity insurance scheme was not anti-
competitive and, in effect, this disposed of the case without having to consider the 
“undertaking” issue. More recently, in ET Plus S.A., Gross J. made some 
interesting remarks in an application for a stay for arbitration.629 The claimants 
disputed the jurisdiction of the arbitration by submitting various grounds including 
an argument based on Art 101. The essential element of this claim is that particular 
employees constituted “undertakings independent of their employers” (the 
Claimants) who engaged in unauthorised conduct with the individual defendants. 
While the judge readily accepted that some individuals may be “undertakings” he 
decided it was “fanciful” to regard these particular employees as “undertakings.”630 
In reaching this conclusion, he found it “instructive that the examples given in 
Bellamy & Child, European Community Law of Competition (5th ed.) are far 
removed from the facts” of this case.631 However, it could be argued that the type 
of judgment (application to stay) and the nature of the dispute (alleged post-
termination disclosure of confidential information by individuals employed by 
claimants) mean that the ET Plus S.A.  judgment cannot be treated as an 
authoritative conclusion that no employee may be an “undertaking.”  
 
Safeway Stores Ltd. V. Twigger & Ors considered the issue of liability as between a 
business (which was clearly an “undertaking”) and its employees.632 The particular 
issue was whether the “undertaking” [employer] may recover damages from its ex-
employees who were responsible for an infringement of s.2(1) of the Competition 
Act 1998. The Court of Appeal decided that the liability was personal to the 
“undertaking” and that the employer “undertaking” could not pass on the liability 
to its employees. Specifically, it noted that the Act (s.36) provides that an 
“undertaking” is liable to a penalty from the OFT and the “undertaking” can appeal 
                                                 
627 Hendry v. WPBSA [2002] UKCLR 5. 
628 [2004] EWHC 118 (Ch), para 45.  
629 ET Plus SA v. Welter [2005] EWHC 2115, [2006] 1 Lloyds Rep 251. 
630 Para 84. 
631 ibid. 
632 2010 EWCA Civ 1472 
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the penalty (s.46).633 In reaching his decision, Pill LJ averted to the Act’s policy 
which is to protect the public by imposing obligations specifically on the 
“undertaking.” In his view:  
“ the policy of the statute would be undermined if undertakings were able to 
pass on the liability to their employees or … their employees’ insurers. 
Only if the undertaking itself bears the responsibilities and meets the 
consequences of their non-observance are the public protected. A deterrent 
effect is contemplated…”634   
It is important to appreciate that the judgment did not generally discuss the concept 
of “undertaking” but, instead, examined the basis of the liability of an 
“undertaking.”  
 
The OFT in Anaesthetists, decided that a group of anesthetists constituted one 
“undertaking” and that the constituent individual members were not 
“undertakings.”635 It based its conclusion on the fact that the group presented itself 
on the market as a single entity and the members “generate profits for the common 
benefit of the group, operate under a common name, share administrative functions 
such as joint billing, have a bank account (or accounts) in the name of the group 
and/or a single set of accounts is produced in respect of the group's commercial 
activities.”  It decided that the individual professional members of one group 
(GAS) conducted themselves as individual “undertakings” on the market.  Later, 
the OFT investigated the admission rules of Glasgow Solicitors Property Centre 
which comprised solicitor estate agents on the basis that they were measures of an 
“association of undertakings’.  Regrettably, the decisions do not deal discretely 
with the question as to whether employed solicitors are “undertakings.” In 
Northern Ireland Livestock and Auctioneers Association the members of the 
association operated marts and, as such, were clearly “undertakings” in the view of 
the DGFT.636 The CAT ruled in Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers v. DG 
of Fair Trade that the General Insurance Standards Council (GISC), an industry 
                                                 
633 Pill LJ contrasted the 1998 provisions with those in Part 6 of the Enterprise Act 2002 which 
created a criminal offence of dishonesty which may be committed only by individuals. Para 41  
634 Para 44. 
635 “Where the general business practices of a group of individuals are such that the group engages 
in commercial or economic activity on a market and its individual members do not engage in that 
same commercial or economic activity on a market other than through the group for as long as they 
continue to be members of the group, then the group will be treated as a single undertaking rather 
than as an association of several undertakings for the purposes of the Competition Act 1998.” 
636 OFT 03/02/2003 [2003] UKCLR 433 para 24. 
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self regulator, was an “undertaking” but did not decide whether or not its individual 
members were “undertakings.” 637 
 
6.5.2 Guidelines and Opinions 
 
When dealing with the question of whether a particular body or person is an 
“undertaking”, the OFT Guidelines may be relevant. S. 60 of the 1998 Act provides 
not only a link to EU competition law but, also, explains the structure of the Act in 
terms of providing general provisions requiring elaboration, which is not in the Act 
but in OFT Guidelines.638 While the legislation does not accord legal effect to OFT 
Guidelines, they have, at least, “some persuasive authority.”639 It is clear that Court 
of Justice case law on “undertaking” undoubtedly influenced the content of the 
OFT Guidelines 400 (on the “Major Provisions’) and Guidelines 401 (on the 
Chapter One Prohibition). Each of these Guidelines states, in identical terms, that 
an “undertaking”:  
“includes any natural or legal person capable of carrying on commercial or 
economic activities relating to goods or services, irrespective of its legal 
status. It includes companies, firms, businesses, partnerships, individuals 
operating as sole traders, agricultural cooperatives, trade associations and 
non-profit making organisations.”’640 
 
The OFT Guidelines provide a non-exhaustive illustrative list of inclusions and do 
not contain any exclusions. The UK Guidelines include putative economic activity 
by virtue of the phrase “capable.”641 Arguably, this phrase could include an 
employee who is not actually engaged in commercial activity but has the necessary 
capability. OFT Guidelines 408 on Trade Associations, Professions and Self 
Regulating Bodies note there is no statutory definition of trade associations, 
professions or other self regulating bodies and that the boundaries among the three 
                                                 
637 Case Nos 1002/2/1/01, 1003/2/1/01, 1004/2/1/01) [2002 Comp AR 62. See B. Rodger, “Early 
Steps to a Mature Competition Law System” [2002] ECLR 61where the author notes that the 
“robust” judgment will have implications for many areas of self regulation. 
638 I. Maher, “Juridification, Codification and Sanction in UK Competition Law” (2000) 63 MLR 
544, 550.  
639 K. Middleton, B. Rodger et al, Cases and Materials on UK and EC Competition Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 122. See further. I. Maher, “Juridification, Codification and 
Sanction in UK Competition Law” (2000) 63 MLR 544, 551. For a discussion of “soft law” and its 
contribution to the evolution of competition law see H. Cosma and R. Whish, “Soft Law in the Field 
of EU Competition Policy” (2003) 14(1) European Business Law Journal 25. 
640 OFT Guidelines 400 para 1.9 and OFT Guidelines 401 para 2.5 (emphasis added). 
641 Guideline 400, para 2.5 (emphasis added). 
 177
terms may be “imprecise.”642 They state that any body formed to represent its 
members in commercial matters may be an “association of undertakings” and that 
self regulating bodies are “associations of undertakings.”643 The Guidelines are 
potentially more expansive than EU sources on “associations of undertakings” as 
they do not limit “associations of undertakings” to associations comprising only or 
mostly self-employed.  
 
An interesting question is how, in the absence of a statutory definition of 
“undertaking”, UK courts may deal with the Opinions of Advocates General that 
some professionals in employment may be classified as “undertakings.” In general, 
as noted in Chapter Three, UK institutions have exhibited a generally receptive 
attitude to various EU materials in excess of the obligations imposed by s.60 of the 
Act.  Considerable deference has been shown by some UK organisations to 
Opinions of Advocate General even though they are not expressly mentioned by 
s.60 when setting out the obligations of consistency with EU law.  The Court of 
Appeal expressly reserved the issue as to whether Opinions come within the 
obligations of s.60 but noted they are “important and authoritative” and are 
“respectfully viewed by this court.”644 This attitude suggests that the courts may be 
receptive to the views of Advocate General Jacobs and Advocate General Léger on 
the possible classification of employees as “undertakings.”  
 
The CCAT judgment in Bettercare Group Ltd took an interesting approach to 
deciding whether a particular body was an “undertaking.”645 It stated that “…we 
conceive it our duty under s.60(1) to approach the “undertaking” issue in the 
manner in which we think the European Court  would approach it, as regards the 
principles and reasoning likely to be followed.”646 It not only echoed647 the Court 
                                                 
642 Para 1.2. 
643 Para 7.2. 
644 Buxton LJ in Napp Pharmaceuticals Holdings Limited v  Director General of Fair Trading 
[[2002] EWCA Civ 796; [2002] 4All E.R. 376, para.37. In Intel Corporation v. VIA Technologies 
Inc [2003] ECC 16, [2002] EWCA Civ 1905 para 43 the Court of Appeal had regard to an Opinion 
of an Advocate General which described the similarities between the European Commission 
practice and a US antitrust doctrine. 
645 Bettercare Group Limited v. Director General of Fair Trading [2003] ECC 40 
646 The CCAT readily brought its task within the remit of s.60 by deciding that the “question 
whether a particular body is or is not an “undertaking” for the purpose of the Chapter II prohibition 
( or indeed the Chapter I prohibition) of the Act  is a question which, in a broad sense, 
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of Appeal’s view that Opinions are “important and authoritative’648 but specifically 
considered the Opinions of Advocate General Jacobs on “undertakings.”649 While 
the particular issue at stake in Bettercare was the classification of public bodies 
(not employees) the CCAT noted as “a key consideration” Advocate General 
Jacob’s remark that “the underlying question is whether the entity is in a position to 
generate the effects which the competition rules seek to prevent.”650 It is here 
suggested that this functional or teleological interpretative technique would admit 
some employees to be treated as “undertakings.”  
 
UK courts, if minded, do not face any serious domestic obstacles to interpreting the 
concept of “undertaking” to include employees. The prompt or catalyst may come 
from an EU judgment that a professional in employment is an “undertaking.” Then, 
national courts could follow the EU approach given the express provisions in the 
Act (EU derived concept of “undertaking’” and s.60). Even if there is no judgment, 
a UK court faced with the question may be guided by Opinions envisaging that 
“atypical” employees may be “undertakings.” 
 
The question of whether an employee may be an “undertaking” could arise where it 
is sought to apply UK competition law to a measure of an association whose 
members include mostly employees, for example, if an individual professional is 
unhappy about an industry wide restriction contained in rules of his professional 
association. If an association of employees is treated as an “association of 
undertakings” then the extension of national competition law to contracts with 
employees may be hard to resist.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
“corresponds” to the question of whether a particular body is or is not an “undertaking” for the 
purposes of Arts 101 and 102 of the Treaty, para 31 
647 [2003] ECC 40  para 37  
648 Buxton LJ in Napp Pharmaceuticals Holdings Limited v  Director General of Fair Trading 
[2002] EWCA Civ 796; [2002] 4All E.R. 376, para.37 
649 C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensionenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] 
ECRI-5751 [2000] 4 CMLR 446, para 91  
650 Bettercare Group Limited v. Director General of Fair Trading [2003] ECC 40 citing C-67/96 
Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensionenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECRI-5751 
[2000] 4 CMLR 446, paras 102 and 190 
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In practice, the overlap between ROTD and UK competition law is greater than the 
overlap between ROTD and EU competition law. This is because bilateral 
contracts attract the application of national competition law more readily than EU 
competition law due to the absence of jurisdictional criteria requiring an 
“appreciable” effect on inter-state trade.651 Additionally, the cumulative effect 
within the national context could be relatively great.652 The de facto filters in EU 
competition law (appreciable effect on interstate trade) that render employment 
agreements below the EU law radar cannot be relied on to keep employment 
agreements below the range of domestic competition law. Thus, a more extensive 
overlap between ROTD and UK competition law is likely and a more extensive 
overlap based on broadly interpreting “undertaking” increases and widens the scale 





This chapter explored the scope of the concept of “undertaking.” It identified the 
possibility of some employees being classified as “undertakings” under EU 
competition law and under UK competition law. Any expansion in the 
interpretation of “undertakings” accords with the understandable inclination of the 
EU organisations to extend rather than to confine the reach of EU competition 
law.653 
 
This chapter cast doubt on the sustainability of the orthodox view that employees 
cannot be “undertakings.” It highlighted the view of some Advocates General that 
“borderline” employees may be “undertakings.” It argued that this category could 
include more than members of the liberal professionals. Moreover, it suggested that 
                                                 
651 EU competition law applies only if there is an adequate effect on interstate trade, see Case 
56/65 Societe La Technique Miniere v. Maschinebau Ulm GhbH [1966] ECR 234. 
652 As the Irish Competition Authority opined “ While such an agreement between one individual 
and an employer may not have a substantial impact on competition, the existence of such 
agreements in many sectors of the economy mean that their combined effect would be to greatly 
restrict competition.”Notice on Employee Agreements and the Competition Act, Iris Oifigiuil No 75, 
18 September 1992. 
653 J. Mashaw, “Agency Statutory Interpretation” in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation” Issues in 
Legal Scholarship Article 9 (2002) (bepress). Also see P. Strauss “When the judge is not the 
Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative 
History” (1990) 66 Chi-Kent L. Rev 321. 
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even if the Court of Justice itself does not issue a judgment deciding that an 
employee is an “undertaking” there is a possibility that the UK institutions may 
come to that conclusion on the basis of the Opinions of Advocates General.  
 
If employees are regarded as “undertakings” under national competition law then 
the scale of the overlap with the ROTD becomes more extensive than initially 
envisaged. This extension of overlap also increases the scale of the interface 
between ROTD and competition law. It is important to recall (from the discussion 
in Chapter One) that the ROTD offers a very high level of protection to employees 
and quasi-employees who are subject to “restraints of trade” and that this is valued 
protection which is not inevitably provided by competition law. This is especially 
the case where an unreasonable restraint on a professional is within the reach of 




















Part II (Chapters Four to Six) of this research examined the interfaces between the 
ROTD and competition law in England and Wales. It identified acute problems 
where a professional is not allowed to rely on the ROTD to resist an unreasonable 
restriction in situations where the restriction comes within the reach of but does not 
infringe competition law.  
 
Part III (Chapter Seven) searches for and offers viable proposals for judge to 
resolve the most acute problems for professionals who are subject to restrictions 
that come within the overlap areas created by the intersections of the ROTD with 
competition law in England and Wales. Section 7.2 considers the ROTD’s 
interfaces with UK competition law. Section 7.3 discusses the ROTD’s interfaces 
with EU competition law. Section 7.4 offers two general and seven specific 
proposals that aim to resolve interface problems for professionals who wish to rely 
on the ROTD to resist restrictions that do not infringe competition law in England 
and Wales. 
 
In its search to resolve the ROTD’s problematic interface with UK competition 
law, Section 7.2, firstly, considers the possibility of UK competition law not 
following EU competition case law. Secondly, it explores whether some canons of 
statutory interpretation offer mechanisms to delineate the ROTD’s interface with 
UK competition law in a more satisfactory manner for restrained professionals. It 
discusses, firstly, the “presumption against casual change” and, secondly, the 
“mischief rule.”  
 
Section 7.3 identifies Art 3 of EU Reg. 1/2003 as the mechanism that offers the 
most satisfactory delineation of the ROTD’s interface with EU competition law.  In 
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particular, it suggests that Art 3(3) offers a viable route to a solution because it 
allows national courts to apply stricter national law that “predominantly pursues” a 
different objective to the one pursued by EU competition law.  
 
Section 7.4 presents proposals for judges in England and Wales which will allow 
the ROTD to benefit from the mechanisms identified in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. The 
proposals intend to ensure that judgments under the ROTD will clearly convey 
significant differences between the ROTD and competition law. The proposals 
articulate the ROTD’s essential differences in terms of its concern for the 
protection of restrained persons rather than for market competition. Studies of key 
judgments delivered under the ROTD are threaded throughout the presentation of 
the proposals in order to show that the proposals are realisable. Articulating the 
ROTD’s distinctiveness is the key to securing its legitimate application to 
restrictions within the overlap areas that are not proscribed by competition law in 
the UK. 
 
The proposals (presented in Section 7.4) aim to ensure that the ROTD will benefit 
from, as appropriate, either the canons of construction (detailed in Section 7.2) 
and/or the saving provision made in Art 3(3) of EU Reg. 1/2003 (detailed in 
Section 7.3).   
 
7.2 INTERFACE WITH UK COMPETITION LAW 
 
Section 7.2 explores two separate routes to solve the ROTD’s interface problems 
with UK competition law. The first route (Section 7.2.1) explores the possible 
deviation by UK competition law from EU competition law. The second route 
(Section 7.2.2) considers interpreting UK competition law according to particular 
canons of statutory interpretation in order to curtail the legislation’s negative 
impact on the availability of the ROTD.   
 
7.2.1 UK Competition Law not copy EU Competition Law 
 
The extent to which UK competition law must closely copy EU competition law is 
an important issue. Undoubtedly, s.60 of the Competition Act 1998 impedes 
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courts’ freedom to interpret UK competition law. Nonetheless, it might not present 
an insuperable obstacle to interpretations under UK competition law that do not 
exactly mirror EU competition law. It is notable that the s.60(2) obligation is only 
to “secure that there is no inconsistency” with the EU judgments.654 Moreover, 
Parliament intentionally chose this phrase and rejected a specific proposal 
providing that the application of domestic competition law “must conform with” 
EU competition law.655 During debates Lord Kingsland enquired why the proposed 
legislation did not provide that it must conform to EU competition law 
jurisprudence.656 In reply, Lord Simon declined to make the proposed duty “yet 
tighter” because of the impossibility of creating an exact copy of the EU system 
which has “elements which cannot simply be transposed into the domestic 
system.”657 Parliament accepted that those applying domestic competition 
legislation must “be able to produce a sensible translation” of the EU case law into 
the domestic system.658 
 
Different interpretations of UK competition law are permitted by s.60 where 
“relevant differences” exist. Literally interpreted, “relevant differences” are ones 
existing “between the provisions concerned” which means the Treaty Articles and 
the Act. Nonetheless, “relevant differences” have been identified between other 
texts, for example, between Director’s Guidance and the Commission 
Guidelines.659 Given that a wide attitude has already been taken to identifying 
“relevant differences,” courts might accept differences in context and purpose as 
between the EU rules and the national rules as amounting to “relevant differences.”  
 
Arguably the EU threshold rule, based on the potential effect on inter-state trade, 
creates a peculiar context within which EU competition law developed. In 
particular, the threshold test means that many personal contracts do not routinely 
come within the remit of Art 101 and, consequently, that there is not a thoughtful 
EU jurisprudence on the application of Art 101 to restraints on persons. This 
                                                 
654 Opinions of Advocates General are not mentioned in s.60.  
655 25 Nov 1997, Col. 960. 
656 25 Nov 1997, Col. 960. 
657 25 Nov 1997, Col. 961. 
658 25 Nov 1997, Col 961 (emphasis added). 
659 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited v. The Director General of Fair Trading  (No 4) 
[2002] ECC 13 CCAT at para  503. 
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lacuna did not emerge following any policy to exclude them but, rather, as an 
incidental consequence of a threshold test that, in practice, excludes many personal 
contracts that are not part of a network of similar agreements. Arguably, this 
creates a contextual “relevant difference” with the national legal environment 
where national competition legislation is applicable to many more personal 
contracts. It could be argued that because EU competition law develops in a 
different context (one that did not greatly involve restrictions on individuals) it 
cannot be thoughtlessly copied when national competition law is applied to 
restrictions on professionals, a fortiori when contained in personal contracts. This 
is especially the case if the UK competition legislation does not prohibit a 
restriction but prevents it from being challenged under a different national law.  
 
Thus, s.60, if interpreted literally and according to Parliamentary intention, allows 
domestic competition legislation to be construed in ways that do not exactly copy 
EU competition law.660 The possibility of UK competition law taking a different 
approach than Art 101(1) to certain restrictions on persons is next explored.  
 
One possibility is for courts to apply any “necessity” approach under s.2 of the 
Competition Act 1998 in a stricter manner than occurs under Art 101(1). Two such 
options are next explored. These are for s.2, firstly, to apply a more stringent test of 
“necessity” and, secondly, to take a sterner attitude to justifications. 
 
The first option is for UK competition law to interpret the standard of “necessary” 
in a way that is closer to “essential.” It may be recalled from Chapter Three that 
Morgan J. in Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services quoted Commission 
Guidelines stating that the concept of “necessity” could be satisfied “by something 
which is not strictly essential” but is difficult to implement.661 However, under s. 
                                                 
660 See The Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers v. The Director General of Fair Trade 
[2001] CAT 4, para 215 where the Tribunal states “.. although s.60 of the Act enjoins us to construe 
s.2 consistently with Community law, our primary task, as a United Kingdom tribunal, is to construe 
the statute with which we are concerned.” 
661 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated Racing [2008] EWHC 1978,  
para 452 which states “[T]he concept of necessity has some flexibility and in an appropriate case 
can be satisfied by facts which show that it would be difficult to achieve the commercial objective 
without the presence of the restriction.” See further para 336 which states  “[I]f on the basis of 
objective factors it can be concluded that without the restriction the main non-restrictive transaction 
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60(3), courts are obliged only to “have regard” to guidelines from the European 
Commission. A greater obstacle is that the Court of Justice in Pronuptia accepted 
that a restriction on franchisees could be necessary where the restriction avoids 
inconvenience for the franchisor.662 
 
Another option (involving a divergence from EU competition law) might be for 
courts to scrutinise justifications submitted under s.2 that are based on “public 
interest” criteria. Following Wouters, it is unlikely that the national court can refuse 
outright to consider any justifications based on “public interest” criteria. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the High Court in Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound 
Services, citing Wouters, appeared prepared to accept an ancillary restraint may be 
“justified on public interest grounds, notwithstanding its anti-competitive 
effect.”663 However, it may be possible to argue that “public interest” for the 
purposes of national competition law ought to be interpreted in its own context.  
 
It could be argued that the interpretation of “public interest” needs to be grounded 
in the national legal tapestry and, thereby, take account of values such as 
individuals’ freedoms. The freedom of restrained market actors to choose was 
recognised under domestic competition law by the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT) in GISC.664 Here, the Tribunal accepted that the contested scheme limited 
“the freedom of the insurer members of GISC to deal with whom they please. 
Freedom to compete implies the freedom to choose how, where, on what terms and 
with whom to do business.”665 This quotation not only links freedom to compete 
directly with the freedom to choose but, additionally, emphasises the importance of 
freedom of choice for individuals in the conduct of their business. The Tribunal 
took great account of the negative reality of the restrictive effects on the members’ 
                                                                                                                                       
would be difficult or impossible to implement, the restriction may be regarded as objectively 
necessary for its implementation and proportionate to it.” 
662 Case 161/86 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] E.C.R. 353. 
663 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated Racing [2008] EWHC 1978, para 
332 The dispute in this case did not involve restrictions on persons but  involved  a commercial 
venture among businesses for the exclusive and collective sale of media rights which was 
challenged by a third party. 
664 Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers v. The Director General of Fair Trade [2001] CAT 
4 
665 Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers v. The Director General of Fair Trade [2001] CAT 
4, para 183. 
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freedom to do business in their chosen manner.666 Thus, the argument could be 
made that any justification based on “public interest” cannot be accepted under s. 2 
unless it takes account not only of the interests of the general public but, 
additionally, of the restrained person’s interests (including his freedom to choose 
how he conducts his business). In this way, the “public interest” type justification is 
subjected to stricter testing which may result in it being rejected. 
 
However, it must be acknowledged that UK competition law taking a different 
attitude than EU competition law offers, at best, a partial solution as only some 
professionals would benefit. Moreover, UK competition law diverging from EU 
competition law is not a smooth solution. For example, it may be difficult to 
overcome the consistency requirement in s.60. In particular, convincing a court of 
the existence of “relevant differences” may be difficult. Debates in the House of 
Lords predicted this qualification would cause litigants to debate what amounts to 
“relevant differences.”667 Moreover, it may be difficult to persuade the court that 
the divergence is an acceptable “sensible translation.”668 Finally and most 
importantly, producing different outcomes under domestic and EU competition law 
creates fresh and fundamental difficulties such as uncertainty and inconsistency. 
Such solution places a great strain on drawing the jurisdictional line (based on 
effect on trade between Member States) between national and EU competition law. 
It is not desirable that outcomes for persons under competition law vary according 
to different geographical locations in the UK so that some professionals will be 
subject to EU competition law (in which case the Art 101 outcome will prevail). 
With these shortcomings in mind, the search for solutions to the domestic interface 
next takes a different tack.   
 
7.2.2 Canons of Statutory Interpretation  
 
This research next argues that the ROTD’s applicability to restrictions on 
professionals need not be automatically quenched by the concurrent applicability of 
competition legislation. UK competition legislation, unlike, for example, Trades 
                                                 
666 Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers v. The Director General of Fair Trade [2001] CAT 
4, para 189 
667  February 23, 1998 col. 514. 
668 See House of Lords 25 Nov 1997, Col. 961.  
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Union legislation, does not expressly dis-apply or curtail the applicability of the 
ROTD.669 In the 1960s, Wilberforce observed, extra-curially, that the effect of the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 was to render “invalid a wide class of 
agreements which would never have been upset at common law and not to make 
any declaration as to the exclusion of the common law as such.”670 It is next 
suggested that a similar view could be taken of current competition legislation and 
its interface with the ROTD.  
 
This chapter suggests that the relationship between the ROTD and current 
competition legislation is more nuanced than is portrayed by the residual 
applicability approach or “rug” metaphor (described in Chapter Four) which over-
excludes the ROTD as it prevents the ROTD’s application to restrictions where 
competition legislation also applies. Some traditional canons of statutory 
interpretation are next considered as mechanisms that might prevent the ROTD 
from being ousted or unduly muzzled by UK competition legislation. 
 
7.2.2.1 “Presumption Against Casual Change” 
 
The first canon of construction that may protect the ROTD’s sphere of operation is 
the “presumption against casual change.” This is a “well established principle of 
construction that a statute is not to be taken as effecting a fundamental alteration in 
the general law unless it uses words that point unmistakably to that conclusion.”671 
To quote Bennion: “[I]t is a principle of legal policy that law should be altered 
deliberately rather than casually, and that Parliament should not change either 
common law or statute by a side wind, but only by measured and considered 
provisions.”672  
 
                                                 
669 S. 11 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1991. See further Goring v. 
British Actors Equity Association (1987) IRLR 122 and Boddington v. Lawton [1994] ICR 478. 
670 R. O Wilberforce, A. Campbell, The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell 1966) 14.   
671 National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson [1952] QB 648, 661. 
672 See F.A.R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (London: Butterworths 1992) 561 where the 
author states that the court, when considering “which of the opposing constructions of the enactment 
would give effect to the legislative intention, should presume that the legislator intended to observe 
this principle. The court should therefore strive to avoid adopting a construction which involves 
accepting that Parliament contravened this principle.”  
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The “presumption against casual change” may reinforce the concept of 
“undertaking” in UK competition law acting as a firewall to protect the ROTD 
against the encroachment by UK competition law following expansive 
interpretations in EU competition law to include employees. “Undertaking” is not 
defined in the Competition Act 1998. Parliament specifically declined to insert a 
definition into the legislation based on the EU case law.673 It may be argued that 
“undertaking” does not capture employees if the legislation is interpreted according 
to the “presumption against casual change.” To characterise employees as 
“undertakings” could, against all expectations, bring employment contracts within 
the reach of competition law and, consequently, upset the longstanding exclusive 
applicability of the ROTD which offers unique protection to employees. However, 
this route offers only a partial solution to interface problems. A wider based 
argument is next explored. 
 
The “presumption against casual change” supports the argument that competition 
legislation should be interpreted so that it does not oust the ROTD’s applicability 
because this is too radical an outcome to be effected in an incidental or casual 
fashion. If competition law determinations negatively affect actions conducted 
under a different legal instrument, this would radically change the legal landscape 
by means of a “side wind” as Bennion termed it.674 In particular, any determination 
that an unreasonable “restraint of trade” does not infringe s.2 or s.18 of 
Competition Act 1998 should not affect the force of the ROTD. Similarly, the 
ROTD should not be affected by any determination that a particular “restraint of 
trade” is permitted by s. 9 of Competition Act 1998 or by a block exemption. This 
approach also accords with the literal rule of statutory interpretation under which 
exemptions/exceptions should not produce an effect that is wider than their express 
terms which are expressly limited to the prohibition in s.2 of the Competition Act 
1998. It is accepted that an exemption from s.2 cannot protect against the reach of 
the prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position contained in s.18 of the 1998 
Act. Under the “presumption against casual change” it could be argued that no 
determination under the competition legislation should provide a general protection 
                                                 
673 Feb 23 1998 Lord Fraser of Carmyllie col 510 withdrew amendments in the face of certain 
defeat.  
674 F.A.R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (London: Butterworths 1992) 561. 
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against the applicability of a stricter and longstanding common law doctrine such 
as the ROTD. The “presumption against casual change” is a canon of interpretation 
which refuses to interpret legislation in ways that produce, in a casual fashion, 
fundamental changes to the legal landscape. 
 
For the ROTD to benefit from this canon of interpretation, it is essential that the 
ROTD and competition legislation are clearly understood to be different. It must be 
clear that any displacement of the ROTD by competition law would amount to 
significant change. To this end, the proposals contained in this chapter (in Section 
7.4) intend to ensure that the ROTD is not seen as being equivalent to competition 
law. 
 
7.2.2.2 “Mischief Rule” 
 
 The “mischief rule” offers an additional canon of statutory interpretation for 
delineating the ROTD’s interface with competition legislation in a more 
satisfactory mode for restrained professionals. This, the oldest rule of statutory 
interpretation, interprets legislation on the basis that it provides a cure to a 
“mischief” or problem.675 As such, it curtails the effect of legislation to remedying 
only the recognised “mischief.”  Recently, this approach to statutory interpretation 
was expressly used by the Court of Appeal in relation to s.188 of the Enterprise Act 
2002 which creates the “cartel offence.” In R. v. B (I), Hughes L.J. stated that 
preparatory documents are “of course admissible to demonstrate the mischief in 
contemplation.”676 To this end, he took account of “numerous statements made 
before and at the time of its creation” including a White Paper677 and an OFT 
commissioned Report678 which was, he noted, “substantially accepted by the 
government.”679 This judgment, it is suggested, shows that a broad range of 
materials may be consulted when ascertaining the “mischief” sought to be cured by 
competition legislation. 
 
                                                 
675 See further R. Cross, Statutory Interpretation (Butterworths, 3rd ed.1995). 
676 R. v. B (I) [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, para 21(emphasis added). 
677 Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition Regime (July 2011).  
678 Proposed Criminalisation of Cartels in the UK (Hammond and Penrose, November 2001)  
679 Para 22 
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The “mischief rule” supports interpreting the concept of “undertaking” so that it 
does not include employees. Under the “mischief rule”, it could be argued that 
employment contracts were never a problem that was intended to be cured with the 
competition legislation. There was no intention of Parliament to bring employment 
relationships with the reach of competition legislation.  The 1989 White Paper 
stated that employment relations would be excluded.680 It is suggested that courts in 
England and Wales could interpret “undertaking” to include only an entity or 
person engaged in economic activity for himself. Implying the two words “for 
himself” is a purposive interpretation which would reflect the legislature’s 
intention. However, a solution based on defining “undertaking” offers only a partial 
solution because it only assists employees. Thus, a broader solution is next 
canvassed. 
  
It is essential to identify the “mischief” that the competition legislation intended to 
rectify. There are many official statements that throw light on the ambition of the 
1998 Act. Some statements refer to the shortcomings of the pre-1998 legislative 
models (discussed in Chapter Four). For example, the Green Paper Review of 
Restrictive Trade Practices Policy stated that the “system is inflexible and slow, 
too often concerned with cases which are obviously harmless and not directed 
sufficiently at anti-competitive agreements. The scope for avoidance and evasion 
considerably weakens any deterrent effect the system has and enforcement powers 
are inadequate.”681 Other statements evidence Parliament’s desire to align domestic 
competition law with the EU model for the benefit of businesses. For example, in 
Parliament, Lord Simon of Highbury emphasised “the critical importance in 
minimising burdens on business. The problems for business in having two similar 
but, in their detail, different prohibitions interpreted according to two different 
bodies of case law could be very burdensome.”682  
 
                                                 
680 Opening Markets:New Policy on Restrictive Trade Practices Policy Cm 727 1989 
681 Department of Trade and Industry Cm 331, Mar 1988.para 3.8 
682  Lord Simon of Highbury. Hansard (HL), October 30th 1997, Col. 1145 and also see  
November 25th 1997 col. 960 where he noted  that the purpose of  s. 60 was “to ensure that as far as 
possible the UK prohibitions are interpreted and develop consistently with EC prohibitions. That is 
of crucial importance in minimising burdens on business.”  
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Political scientists have offered some explanations for the protracted delay in  
reforming UK competition law.683As early as 1962, the Board of Trade had 
reported that in the long term it would be “desirable … on the grounds of policy, as 
well as legal convenience, for the member states to harmonise their domestic 
legislation with that of the Community legislation.”684 Official documents dating 
from the 1970s set out a number of proposals for reform.685 In the Green Paper 
(“Review of Restrictive Trade Practices: A Consultative Document”) the DTI 
proposed repealing the registration model and enacting EU style provisions.686  The 
1989 White Paper687 confirmed this intention and a Green Paper in November 
1992688 set out some options.  
 
It seems clear that the 1998 competition legislation was intended to create a more 
effective and efficient system to tackle anti-competitive market practices689 which 
would reduce compliance costs for businesses by reducing the differences between 
the national models and EU competition law.690  Thus, the “mischief” related to the 
operational shortcomings of the investigation and registration models which 
included their poor fit with EU competition law.691 It must be emphasised that the 
“mischief” was not any interface problem with the ROTD. There does not appear 
to be any Parliamentary intention to enact competition law as a licencing solution 
to a perceived problem of too strict determinations under the ROTD. During the 
protracted period for reform there seems to have been no discussion of any 
                                                 
683 See K. Suzuki, “Reform of British Competition Policy: Is European Integration the Only Major 
Factor” European Institute of Japanese Studies (EIJS) (2002) Working Paper No. 94 Stockholm 
School of Economics for a study of interest configurations pertaining to UK competition policy. 
684 PRO EW 27/5 Board of Trade Report 1962 p 26 cited in S. Eyre and M. Lodge “ National 
Tunes and a European Melody ? Competition Law Reform in the UK and Germany” (2000) 7(1) 
Journal European Public Policy 63, 68. 
685 Green Paper A Review of Monopolies and Mergers  Policy Cmnd 7198 ( May 1978): A Review 
of Restrictive Trade Practices Policy Cmnd 7512 (March 1979) which resulted in some changes in 
the Competition Act 1980. 
686 A Consultative Document Cm 331 (London HMSO March 1988). 
687 Opening Markets: New Policy on Restrictive Trade Practices. 
688 Abuse of Market Power DTI Review of Restrictive Trade Practices Cm 2100. 
689 See J.P. Cunningham, The Fair Trading Act 1973: Consumer Protection and Competition Law 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1974) 427 for criticism of the Fair Trading Act 1973 and a call to 
repeal the 1956 system and to put in its place an integrated comprehensive administrative 
organisational approach to cartels, monopolies and mergers. Also see R. Whish, Competition Law  
(Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th ed. 2003.) 306 where the author noted the legislation’s 
ineffectiveness in punishing cartels, the weak powers of DGFT to obtain information and the little 
control over unilateral conduct of firms possessing market power. 
690 Lord Haskel, Hansard November 17th 1997, col. 417.  
691 Following Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593, 634 Courts may refer to Ministerial statements made 
in parliamentary debates if the legislation is ambiguous, obscure or would result in absurdity. 
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problems with the ROTD. The implications for the ROTD of enacting EU model 
were not greatly debated in Papers and Reports.692 The Green Paper of March 1988 
did not consider the interface between the common law and the proposed 
legislation.693 The absence of a considered debate in the literature suggests that 
there was no sense of a problematic interface with the ROTD that needed to be 
remedied with competition law.  
 
Chapter Four traced the development of the ROTD’s current problematic interfaces 
and suggested they evolved as an incidental consequence of the enactment of the 
EU style competition law model. This chapter propooses that, under the “mischief” 
rule, competition legislation need not be interpreted in ways that curb the ROTD’s 
application to unreasonable “restraints of trade.” It could be argued that 
competition legislation was enacted to do a particular task (to tackle anti-
competitive practices effectively and to fit with EU competition law model) and is 
not intended to cure any “mischief” such as a too strict attitude taken by the ROTD 
to unreasonable restrictions on persons. This argument will only succeed if the 
ROTD and competition law are not seen as equivalent legal measures.  
 
 
Either or both of the two canons of interpretation (discussed above) might create, 
from the perspective of restrained professionals, a better interface for the ROTD 
with competition legislation. In cases where competition legislation prohibits a 
restriction that falls foul of the ROTD, both laws could remain applicable. Where 
an unreasonable “restraint of trade” is not prohibited either by s 2. or s.18 of the 
Competition Act 1998,  the ROTD could retain its cogency to determine that the 
restriction is unenforceable. The “presumption against casual change” and the 
“mischief rule” depend on the differences between the ROTD and competition 
legislation being articulated clearly.  
 
                                                 
692 R.J. Taylor, “UK Competition Law and Procedures - An Overview” [1988] 9(4) ECLR 446,  
457. 
693 See R.J. Taylor, “UK Competition Law and Procedures - An Overview” [1988] 9(4) ECLR 
446.  457 where the author  argued the need for “some dovetailing” between the ROTD and the 
1998 Act. 
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The proposals, detailed in Section 7.4, intend to ensure that the ROTD is seen as 
different to competition law and, thus, not incidentally ousted by the concurrent 
applicability of UK competition legislation. However, as indicated in Chapter Four, 
the ROTD’s interfaces with UK competition law may be affected by EU 
competition law. This is due to logical and practical arguments in favour of the 
ROTD having the same interface with EU competition law and with national 
competition law.694 For this reason, the search for solutions to the ROTD’s 
interface with EU competition law is next pursued.  
 
 
7.3 INTERFACES WITH EU COMPETITION LAW 
 
Chapter Five pinpointed two sources which, in combination, create problematic 
interfaces between the ROTD and EU competition law. These sources are, on the 
one hand, Art 3 of EU Reg. 1/2003 and, on the other hand, High Court judgments 
including  Days Medical Aids Ltd.695 In particular, the “convergence rule” in Art 
3(2) stipulates that restrictions which do not infringe Art 101 may not be prohibited 
by “national competition law.” The High Court expressed the view that Art 3(2) 
may operate vis-a- vis the ROTD.696 The most problematic EU law interface with 
the ROTD is with Art 101. 
 
This section looks to Art 3 of EU Reg. 1/2003 as a mechanism that would allow the 
ROTD to prohibit restrictions that come within the reach of but are not prohibited 
by Art 101. It starts by examining how the term “national competition law” was 
recently approached by a Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) judgment on Art 3. 
Next, it explores whether Art 3(2) offers a solution for the ROTD. Finally, it 
examines Art 3(3) which allows the application of stricter national law which 
predominantly pursues a different objective to EU competition law. It argues in 
favour of interpreting Art 3(3) with the assistance of Recital 9 of Reg. 1/2003. It 
emphasises the relevance of Recital 9’s statements on the scope of Art 3(3) in 
                                                 
694 A. Scott, “The Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in the United Kingdom”, LSE 
Working Papers 9/2009 p 5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344807 
695 Days Medical Aids Ltd v. Pihsiang [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm) Langley J and also Jones v. 
Ricoh (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch) Roth  J. 
696 Days Medical Aids Ltd v. Pihsiang [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm) Langley J. and also Jones v. 
Ricoh (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch) Roth  J. 
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relation to, firstly, the objective of EU competition law and, secondly, the type of 
national law that does not predominantly pursue a competition law objective. 
 
7.3.1 Court of Appeal’s View of “National Competition Law”  
 
In 2009, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R. v. B(I) discussed the 
meaning of “national competition law” for the purposes of Art 3(3).697 The 
judgment involved an appeal from the Crown Court’s decision that it enjoyed 
jurisdiction to try the “cartel offence” created by s.188 Enterprise Act 2002. The 
appellant argued that s.188 was “national competition law” for the purposes of Art 
3 of Reg. 1/2003 and, therefore, only “national competition authorities” designated 
in accordance with Reg. 1/2003 could enforce it. S.188 creates a criminal offence 
that involves an element of dishonesty. Hughes L.J. noted that the arrangements 
caught by s. 188(2) and (3) are “within but narrower in scope than those caught by” 
Art 101.698 The decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) that s.188 (a 
law it described as “one arrow in the UK legislative quiver designed to prevent 
anti-competitive practices”) is not “national competition law” may appear, at first 
sight, to be good news for those arguing that the ROTD is not “national 
competition law.”699  
 
However, in order to see whether this judgment could save the ROTD from being 
classified as “national competition law,” it is important to examine the basis upon 
which the Court of Appeal reached its conclusion. While Hughes L.J. states that 
there was “no doubt whatever” that s.188 was enacted in order “to provide a 
stronger deterrent to such practices to threaten executives with imprisonment than 
was achieved by threatening undertakings with civil financial penalties...” he also 
finds that this fact did not conclude the question whether s.188 is “national 
competition law” in the sense intended by Reg. 1/2003.700 
 
Hughes L.J. noted that the Court had earlier decided (in R. v. Goldshield Group 
plc) that “Art 3 had no impact on a prosecution for an established criminal 
                                                 
697 [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, [2010] Bus L.R. 748, Hughes L.J., David Clark J., Judge Morris QC. 
698 [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, para 15. 
699 [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, para 23. 
700 [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, para 24. 
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offence... and the fact that the offence was alleged to have taken place in the course 
of a price-fixing did not mean otherwise” in relation to the common law offence of 
conspiracy to defraud.701  Hughes L.J. quoted as follows from the judgment of 
Moses L.J. in Goldshield who had stated that:  
“...the Serious Fraud Office and the Crown Court are not seeking to apply 
competition rules at all... Both the eigth recital and article 3(3) merely 
reaffirm that which is plain from the whole of Regulation 1, namely that it 
has no application to laws other than those which constitute the rules on 
competition within the Community.”702  
Although Hughes L.J. agreed with the Moses L.J., he clearly asserted that this 
quotation from Goldshield did not determine whether s. 188 is “national 
competition law” because the s. 188 cartel offence, unlike conspiracy to defraud, 
“is plainly targeted at anti-competitive behaviour.”703 
 
Hughes L.J. noted that the concept of “national competition law” found in Art 3 
appears rarely in the Regulation (only in Art 12 (2) and Recitals 8 and 16).704 
Recital 8 provides that Reg. 1/2003: 
 “does not apply to national laws which impose criminal sanctions on 
natural persons except to the extent that such sanctions are the means 
whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced.”  
 
Hughes L.J noted that the final sentence of Recital 8 is not “directly repeated” in 
Art 3.705 He then expressed the view that it:   
 “may or may not have been thought in some circles that this sentence [in 
Recital 8] demonstrates that a national law such as section 188 is outside 
the scope of the Modernisation Regulation. Taken by itself, however, its 
meaning seems to us to be obscure. It begs the question whether section 
188, which is transparently a new law designed to strengthen local 
prevention of anti-competitive behaviour, is a means of enforcing 
competition rules applying to undertakings or an ancillary law which 
bolsters the effectiveness of competition rules but is not concerned with 
directly enforcing them against undertakings. In order to answer that 
question it is necessary to read the Modernisation Regulation as a 
whole.”706 
 
                                                 
701 [2007] EWCA Crim 2659. 
702 [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, para 24. 
703 [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, para 24. 
704 [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, para 28. 
705 [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, para 29. 
706 Para 30. 
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Clearly the Court took a contextual approach to interpreting Art 3 by reading Reg. 
1/2003 as a whole. On this basis, the Court decided that Reg. 1/2003 “is concerned 
with the direct enforcement of articles [101] and [102], that is to say with decisions 
whether agreements (etc) are valid or rendered invalid for infringements of those 
articles.”707 The validity of an agreement does not arise in relation to s.188. 
 
However, the question of the validity or invalidity of agreements is at the core of 
disputes where it is sought to rely on the ROTD. The Court of Appeal’s task was 
helped by the fact that the “risk of inconsistency arising between a prosecution 
under section 188 and a decision on the validity of an agreement (etc) under article 
[101/102] is likely to be small.”708 However, the same observation cannot be made 
about situations involving the application of the ROTD.  Given this difference 
between s.188 and the ROTD, this research takes the view that the judgment in R. 
v. B(I) does not provide a solid basis for arguing that the ROTD is not “national 
competition law.” The Court specifically rejected the argument that the test for 
what amounts to “national competition law” is:  
“as broad as whether the law in question pursues the objective of preventing 
anti-competitive practices. The relevant objective is applying articles [101] 
and [102], that is to say deciding whether there has or has not been an 
infringement of them.”709  
 
It is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal is prepared to take account of a sentence 
that appears in a recital but not in an article in Reg.1/2003. The Court did not 
demean or disregard the sentence in Recital 8 on the grounds that it is merely part 
of a non-binding recital. This approach supports this chapter’s argument that the 
recitals in Reg. 1/2003 may assist the interpretation of Art 3. Attention is next paid 
to Art 3(2) and Art 3(3) in order to explore if they offer any solution if the ROTD 
is regarded as “national competition law” and, thus, activates Art 3(2)’s 
“convergence” rule. 
 
7.3.2 Implications of Art 3(2) 
 
                                                 
707 Para 34. 
708 Para 36. 
709 Para 32. 
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Chapter Five discussed the evolution of problematic interfaces between the ROTD 
and EU competition law. It detailed the emergence of the most problematic 
interface between Art 101 and stricter national law. The problem is that the 
application of Art 101 must prevail over stricter national competition law (which 
apparently includes the ROTD).  The focus of this section is on the intended scope 
of paragraphs (2) and (3) of Art 3 in order to explore possible solutions to the 
interface problem. 
  
Arts 3(1), (2) and (3) evolved incrementally in opposition to the European 
Commission’s initial proposal. Its text would have been highly exclusionary of 
national competition law as it proposed: 
“[W]here an agreement… within the meaning of Article [101] of the 
Treaty, or the abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 
[102] may affect trade between Member States, Community competition 
law shall apply to the exclusion of national competition laws.”710  
 
Some Member States expressed formal reservations about the negative effect that 
this proposal would exert on national law.711 A Working Party on Competition 
(comprising representatives from the European Commission and Member States) 
was established to conduct an in-depth review of the proposed Regulation, 
including Art 3. The Working Party produced several Reports that proposed 
compromise texts and, also, recorded some discordant views of Member States.712  
Similar views of Member States were also recorded in Reports published by the 
Presidencies in 2001 and 2002. The November 2001 Report from the Presidency 
records the view of France that Art 3 must not put into question the application of 
specific national laws permitting domestic reactions to problems arising in a 
Member State that EU competition law cannot deal with suitably.713 The May 2002 
                                                 
710 Proposal for Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82 and amending Regulations. (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 
4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87.COM (2000) 582 final. OJ C 365 19.12.2000.  
711 The most enduring reservation was expressed by Germany. Other Member States that expressed 
reservation included Austria, France and Finland. 
712 The Working Party on Competition had meetings on June 19th, July 1st, July 22-23, September 
4th, October 21-22 and November 5th. See Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 11791/02, p12. 
Available at  http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st11/st11791.en02.pdf 
713 Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 13563/01 p 20 available at  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st13/st13563.en01.pdf. The Report also noted that 
Germany and Austria had expressed reservations. 
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Report from the Presidency notes the support of Finland and Sweden for the view 
of France.714 
 
As adopted, Art 3(2) contains the “convergence” rule in its first sentence and an 
exception in its second sentence. The latter specifically allows the application of 
“stricter national laws” to prohibit unilateral conduct. It is not clear what national 
laws come within this exception. Recital 8 of Reg. 1/2003 offers the example of 
abusive conduct towards economically dependent undertakings. 
 
The Commission has discussed the scope of this exception in terms of national 
laws that prohibit the exploitation of superior bargaining power in the context of 
distribution agreements in the retail sector (e.g. tie-ing) and resale below cost or at 
a loss.715 It gives the example of the French law on the abuse of economic 
dependence contained in Article L.420-2 of the Code de Commerce which, to 
quote the Commission, “prohibits, where the functioning or the structure of 
competition may be affected, the abusive exploitation of the condition of economic 
dependence in relation to a customer company or a supplier by non-dominant firms 
that have a powerful position with regard to their commercial partners.”716 
 
While it is possible that the exception in Art 3(2) may benefit the ROTD, this is far 
from certain as many “restraints of trade” are not unilaterally imposed and the 
ROTD is applicable outwith a relationship of economic dependency. This chapter 
next suggests that Art 3(3) is a more viable mechanism to rely on in cases where 
Art 3(2) is activated by the application of ROTD.  To this end, it pays close 
attention to the intended scope of Art 3(3). 
                                                 
714 Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 8383/02 Report from Presidency to Permanent 
Representatives Committee/Council., available at  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st08/st08383.en02.pdf. 
715 See the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and Council - Report on the functioning of Regulation 
1/2003 {COM(2009) 206 final} para 162 et seq. Para 164 notes that some national laws on the 
abuse of economic dependence apply to exclusionary conduct and normally require that there is no 
reasonable alternative source of supply/demand of the product or service. Para 170 discusses laws 
banning resale at cost or at a loss as an example of unilateral conduct. The Paper  is available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009SC0574:EN:NOT 
716 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and Council- Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 




7.3.3 Evolution of Art 3(3) and Recital 9 
 
Art 3(3) has the effect of dis-applying the “convergence” rule of Art 3(2). It 
provides:  
 
“[W]ithout prejudice to general principles and other provisions of 
Community law, paragraphs 1 and 2 do not apply when the competition 
authorities and the courts of the Member States apply national merger 
control laws nor do they preclude the application of provisions of national 
law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by 
Article [101] and [102] of the Treaty.”  
 
Art 3(3) allows the unimpeded application of stricter national law that 
“predominantly pursues” a different objective to the one pursued by Arts 101 and 
102. If the ROTD comes within this saving provision its interface problem with Art 
101 is solved. In order to understand the scope of Art 3(3) it is essential to examine 
why and how paragraph (3) was enacted. The next discussion aims to shine some 
light on the type of national laws that Member States intended to protect with Art 
3(3).717  
 
As noted above, the Commission had proposed an exclusionary one paragraph 
provision in 2000 which was later amended incrementally following contributions 
from Member States. The May 2002 Report from the Presidency records a specific 
suggestion from France to add a new paragraph to Art 3 to provide:  
“[T]his provision is without prejudice to the implementation ...of national 
law that mainly pursues a different or complementary objective from that 
assigned to Articles [101] and [102]….”718  
 
It seems that this suggestion from France is the genesis of Art 3(3). France, 
additionally and contemporaneously, offered a detailed proposal, to amend Recital 
8.719 Recital 8, at that time, provided that:  
                                                 
717 See further M.C. Lucey, “Europeanisation and the Restraint of Trade Doctrine” (2012) 32 No. 4 
Legal Studies 632 
718 Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 8383/02 Report from Presidency to Permanent 
Representatives Committee/Council. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st08/st08383.en02.pdf 
719 Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 8383/02. Available at  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st08/st08383.en02.pdf 
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“.. provision must be made... to regulate the relationship between Articles [101] 
and [102]  and national law by excluding the application of national law to 
agreements … within the scope of Articles [101] and [102].”  
France proposed to amend the Recital to provide:   
“[T]he Treaty assigns to Articles [101] and [102] an objective of protecting 
competition within the common market. Member States can take 
appropriate measures to protect other legitimate interests…...... To the 
extent that such a law mainly pursues a different or complementary 
objective from that assigned to Articles [101] and [102], national 
competition authorities or national courts can apply it on their territory in 
parallel with and independently from articles [101] and [102].”720 
 
After slight amendment, these two proposals from France became a new paragraph 
to Art 3 and new Recital [8(a)] in the September 2002 Report.721 Finally, they 
appear (with some amendment) in Reg. 1/2003 as Art 3(3) and Recital 9. The 
shared evolution of Recital 9 and Art 3(3) supports the argument that close regard 
should be had to Recital 9 when interpreting Art 3(3).  It is clear that Art 3(3), at 
the insistence of some Member States, is intended to allow the application of 
stricter national law that “predominantly pursues an objective different from that 
pursued” by EU competition law. As Art 3(3) does not provide specific guidance 
on the objective pursued by EU competition law, regard should be had to Recital 9 
when applying Art 3(3) on the grounds of their intertwined evolution.  
 
7.3.4 Recital 9 on the “Objective” of EU Competition Law 
 
Art 3(3) does not detail what objective is pursued by EU competition law. Recital 9 
states that Member States may apply national law that “pursues predominantly an 
objective different from that of protecting competition on the market.” This view of 
the objective of EU competition law is undoubtedly pithy. It gives no hint of the 
debates surrounding attempts to define the objectives of EU competition law.722  
                                                 
720 Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 8383/02 p 12. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st08/st08383.en02.pdf 
721 Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 11791/02 p 6-7 and p12.Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st11/st11791.en02.pdf 
722 For a discussion of  the role played by  EU competition law in liberal democracy see G. Amato,  
Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Hart Publishing 1997). See D. Gerber, Law and Competition in 
Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998)  for an 
argument that Austrian and German traditions of Ordo-liberalism influenced the drafters of  EU 
competition law. A different view is offered by  P. Akman, “Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of 
Article 82” (2009) OJLS 267. On  EU competition law and public policy, see G. Monti, “Art 81 EC 
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The objective of competition law has been articulated by the European 
Commission in market terms such as the efficient allocation of resources, 
“consumer welfare”723 along with the market integration goal.724 As recently as 
October 2012, the Vice President of European Commission responsible for 
Competition Policy, Joaquin Almunia, stated that “[H]alf a century after its 
establishment, EU competition policy has not lost its force as a factor of 
integration.”725 The aim of competition law to integrate the EU market is also 
expressed in judgments from the 1960s to the present decade.726 The range of 
objectives that may be pursued by EU competition law is neatly conveyed by 
Odudu’s question which asks “ … whether Union competition law exists to 
promote efficiency, to achieve the Union objective of market integration or to 
promote certain market freedoms desirable in a democracy or to achieve any Union 
objective?”727 That quotation lists various goals with economic and political 
                                                                                                                                       
and Public Policy 39 (2002) CMLRev  105 and  C. Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009). 
723 M. Monti  “European Competition  Policy for 21st Century” in B. Hawk (ed.) [2000] Fordham 
Corp. L. Institute chapter 15. The meaning of “consumer welfare” has attracted debate, especially as 
it is not commonly found in Court of Justice  judgments as pointed out by P. Akman, “Consumer 
Welfare and Art 82 EC: Practice and Rhetoric” (2009) 32(1) World Competition 71. In Joined 
Cases C501/06P, C513/06P, C515/06 P and C 519/06P GlaxoSmith KlineServices Unlimited 
formerly GlaxoWellcome plc v. Commission [2009] ECR I-9291[63] the Court of Justice stated that 
Art 101 “aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers but also the structure 
of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.”  
724 A hierarchy of objectives is set out by the European Commission Annual Report on 
Competition  Policy 2000. The first objective is the “maintenance of competitive markets” while the 
second is the “single market objective.” The 2004 Guidelines on the Application of Art 81(3) in para 
13 provide that “[T]he objective of Art [101] is to protect competition on the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. Competition and 
market integration serve these ends since the creation and preservation of an open single market 
promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefit of 
consumers.” 




726 Cases 56 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission 
[1966] ECR 299 is an early example of EU competition law’s pursuit of market integration 
objectives. Also see  Case C- 126/97 Eco Suisse China Time Limited v Benetton International NV 
[1999] ECR-I- 3055, [2000] 5 CMLR 816  para 36 where the Court of Justice states that Art [101] 
“constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks 
entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market.”  More 
recent judgments on the single market goal include Cases C- 403/08 and C-429/08 Football 
Association Premier League Ltd v. QC Leisure judgment Feb 03, 2011 (not yet reported).  
727 See O. Oduku “The Wider Concerns of Competition Law”  (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies no. 3, 599, 600 and at fn 4 for lengthy citation of bibliographical sources on competition 
valued variously for efficiency, for integration and freedoms. Also see C.-D. Ehlermann and L. 
Laudati (eds) Objectives of Competition Policy European Competition Law Annual 1997 (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 1998). 
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resonances. This research does not intend to advance the complex debate on the 
legitimate objectives of EU competition law. It takes the position that, for the 
purposes of Art 3(3), Recital 9 (albeit cryptically) articulates the objective of EU 
competition law as “the protection of competition in the market.” Thus, the 
distinctive focus of competition law, for the purposes of Art 3(3), is market 
competition. 
 
Furthermore, it is useful, when exploring the particular objective of EU 
competition law, to reflect on the categories of persons that it intends to protect. 
Part I of this research argued that EU competition law does not pursue, as a 
priority, the safeguarding of the freedoms of restrained professionals.728 Chapter 
Two discussed cases where EU competition law was applied to restrictions on 
persons in ways that sought to benefit consumers.729 The Commission’s Report on 
Competition in Professional Services of 2004 states that “[M]ore efficient and 
competitive professional services will benefit consumers directly.”730 It is 
regrettable that the term “public” is sometime used in competition law cases where 
the term “consumers” is both more accurate and more appropriate for its 
connotation of actors in the market.731 For example, in Pronuptia, the Court of 
Justice expressly noted the benefit that would accrue to the public from the 
exclusive purchasing obligation on franchisees, but, in reality, the only 
beneficiaries would be consumers.732 In any event, it seems that the objective 
pursued by EU competition law is primarily centred not on protecting restrained 
persons but on protecting market competition with the aim of protecting consumers 
and the so-called “public.” 
 
                                                 
728 T-193/02 Piau [2005] ECR II 209,  appeal from PIAU COMP /34 124 15 April 2002 para 29 
and  para 106 where the General Court specifically rejected the arguments of the players’ agent 
(Piau) that the licencing regulations restricted his “freedom to conduct business.” 
729 This research agrees with the view expressed by G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2007) 1057 that the notion of consumer protection encompasses more 
than “mere economic interest, and embraces also health and safety as well as the right to 
information.” 
730 Report on Competition in Professional Services COM (2004) 83 final, para 104 
731 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007) 1076 describes 
as “problematic” decisions (e.g. Phillips Osram) in which the Commission “substitutes the 
consumers’ interest with the interest of the public” on the grounds that Art. 101(3) explicitly 
mentions the consumer but not the general community or public at large. 
732 Case 161/86 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] E.C.R. 353, para 21. 
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7.3.5 Recital 9 on the National Laws Saved by Art 3(3) 
 
Recital 9 offers some illustrations of national law that Members States may apply 
because they predominantly pursue a different objective to EU competition law. It 
states, inter alia, that: 
“[T]his Regulation does not preclude Member States from implementing ... 
national legislation which protects other legitimate interests provided that 
such legislation is compatible with the general principles and other 
provisions of Community law.…Accordingly, Member States 
may…implement  …national law that prohibits ... acts of unfair trading 
practices, be they unilateral or contractual. Such legislation pursues a 
specific objective, irrespective of the actual or presumed effect of such acts 
on competition in the market. This is particularly the case for legislation 
which prohibits undertakings from imposing on their trading partners, 
obtaining or attempting to obtain from them terms and conditions that are 
unjustified, disproportionate or without consideration.”733  
 
The above list of national laws that pursue other (i.e. not competition law) 
objectives includes laws prohibiting “unfair trading practices.” Such legislation 
which is distinct from competition legislation is found in some Member States. For 
example, Germany has a long tradition with its Gesetz Gegen den Unlauteren 
Wettbewerb (UWG).734 In Germany, revised UWG legislation came into effect in 
July 2004 and, inter alia, replaced the older concept of “gute Sitten” (honest 
practices) with “Unlauterkeit” (unfairness) but intentionally does not define 
“unfair.”735 In France, there are laws which prohibit unfair trading practices 
(pratiques commerciales déloyales). It is important to emphasise that these are 
distinct from the French laws prohibiting the abuse of economic dependence 
(which are regarded as anti-competitive practices), that they concern restrictive 
trade practices in contracts or torts and are enforced by civil courts and not by the 
competition law institutions.736 This research does not suggest that every provision 
                                                 
733 Emphasis added. 
734 The first Gesetz Gegen den Unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) was adopted  in 1896 and replaced 
in 1909 and in 2004. The 1909 Act provided a template for countries including Austria, Belgium, 
Spain and Poland, see further F. Henning-Bodewig, Unfair Competition Law (Kluwer 2006).  
735 F. Henning-Bodewig, “A New Act against Unfair Competition in Germany” (2005) 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 421, 425.   
736 See the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and Council- Report on the functioning of Regulation 
1/2003 {COM(2009) 206 final} para 165. The Paper  is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009SC0574:EN:NOT 
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of the German or French unfair trading practices law invariably comes within Art 
3(3) but, rather, that they give some flavour of the type of national law that the 
drafters of Art 3(3) and Recital 9 may have had in mind.  
 
Recital 9’s phrase “irrespective of the actual or presumed effect of such acts on 
competition in the market” is a useful yardstick for identifying the national laws 
saved by Art 3(3). It appears to envisage laws that strike at a measure regardless of 
the measure’s consequence for the market. It has been suggested by de Smijter and 
Kjoelbye that Art 3(3) covers national laws whose objective “is to regulate 
contractual relationships between undertakings by stipulating the terms and 
conditions rather than their competitive behaviour on the market.”737 This formula 
offers useful support for the argument that Art 3(3) saves the ROTD. 
 
 
7.3.6 Art 3 and ROTD 
 
It is significant that Art 3 was recast so radically from the European Commission’s 
proposal by means of interventions and reservations of Members States. Its radical 
revision indicates that the scope intended by Member States for Art 3 differs from 
the wholly exclusionary version proposed by the Commission. Furthermore, it 
evidences Member States’ intention to preserve the applicability of some stricter 
national law in cases where EU competition law does not prohibit a particular 
measure. Reservations of Member States on the draft versions of Art 3 were 
recorded as late in the process as September 2002.738 These reservations included 
the view of Finland that Art 3 must not put into question the application of specific 
national law dealing with specific national problems and the general  reservation of 
Germany (supported by Spain and Finland ) about EU competition law having  
absolute priority and insisting that the application of stricter national law should be 
                                                 
737 See Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and Council- Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 
{COM(2009) 206 final} para 181  available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009SC0574:EN:NOTciting E. de Smijter 
and L. Kjoelbye, “The Enforcement System under Regulation 1/2003” in J. Faull & A. Nikpay, The 
EC law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) part 2.59. 
738 Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 11791/02 pp 6-7 and  p12. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st11/st11791.en02.pdf 
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possible.739 This chapter takes the view that Art 3(3) offers a route to save the 
ROTD from the “convergence” obligation of Art 3(2). 
 
This research suggests that Recital 9 provides three touchstones against which the 
ROTD may be assessed in order to argue that it comes within the saving provision 
of Art 3(3). The first of these relates to the type of contractual terms that the 
national law prohibits and it focuses on criteria such as unfair, unjustified and 
disproportionate. The second touchstone shines light on any imbalance of power in 
the relationship between the restrained and the restraining party/entity which meant 
that terms were more imposed than thoroughly negotiated by equals. The third 
touchstone is the national law’s disinterest in the market implications of the 
restrictive measure. With these touchstones in mind, the next section offers detailed 
proposals regarding judgments under the ROTD. If judges keep these proposals in 
mind, then, the ROTD’s distinctive objectives will be clearly conveyed. The result 
is that Art 3(3) will allow the ROTD to resist restrictions that are not prohibited by 




7.4 PROPOSALS  
 
Sections 7.2 and 7.3 identified distinct mechanisms that would allow the ROTD to 
resist a restriction which also comes within the reach of but is not prohibited by UK 
competition law and/or EU competition law. The most viable section 7.2 
mechanisms are the traditional canons of statutory interpretation that apply to 
domestic competition legislation. The preferred mechanism identified in section 7.3 
is Art 3(3) which determines the interface with Art 101 and, in practice, may also 
be relevant to national competition legislation. Section 7.4 offers proposals that 
seek to ensure the ROTD benefits from either or both sets of mechanisms. It 
presents general proposals and specific proposals for courts in England and Wales 
which aim to articulate the ROTD’s concern for the protection of the interests of 
restrained persons rather than for market competition. These proposals assist 
                                                 
739 Interinstitutional file 2000/0243(CNS) 11791/02, p12 fn 30. Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st11/st11791.en02.pdf 
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judges to convey the ROTD’s distinctiveness so that the ROTD may legitimately 
be applied to a restriction which does not infringe competition law.  
 
In order to demonstrate the viability of the proposals, studies of key judgments 
delivered under the ROTD are presented along with the proposals. The studied 
cases are: Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd;740  A. 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. 
Macauley (formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd; 741 
Proactive Sports Management Ltd v. Wayne Rooney, Stoneygate 48 et al;742 
Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd and Ors;743 Macken v. O’ Reilly744 
and  Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League.745 The selection of cases is a 
balanced one as the first three cases involve “restraints of trade” in personal 
contracts and the final three cases deal with “restraints of trade” in rules of an 
association or other entity. 
 
This section starts by offering two general proposals. The first of these is that 
courts must advert to the public policy dimensions of the ROTD. The second 
general proposal is for courts to use the language of fairness and justice and to refer 
expressly to the personal liberties and rights of the restrained persons. The seven 
subsequent more specific proposals give particular expression to the general 
proposals when courts pronounce on the ROTD’s i) availability/scope and ii) its 
test. The specific proposals direct courts towards emphasising that the impact of the 
restriction on the restrained person is a crucial issue when deciding whether the 
ROTD is available and/or when applying the ROTD’s test. The ambition of these 
general and specific proposals is to ensure that the ROTD is not regarded as 
competition law and, therefore, can be applied to resist restrictions on professionals 
that do not infringe competition law in England and Wales. 
 
                                                 
740 [1968] AC 269. 
741 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308; 1315 [1974] 3 
All E.R 616 HL affirming [1974] 1 All ER 171 CA. 
742 [2010] EWHC 1807 (QB) Manchester District Registry Mercantile Court, Judge Hegarty  
QC,on app [2011] EWCA 1444. 
743 [1964] Ch 413. 
744 [1979] ILRM 79. 
745 Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League (1991) 31 FCR 242.   
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7.4.1 General Proposals 
  
The general proposals focus on how judgments under the ROTD are drafted 
because they need to differentiate themselves patently from competition law 
judgments. To this end  it is, firstly, proposed that judgments expressly advert to 
the unique public policy foundations of the ROTD. Secondly, it is proposed that 
judgments clearly identify the freedoms and liberties that may be affected by the 
restrictive measure. That these two proposals can operate in combination is 
succinctly demonstrated by Lord Reid’s observation that: 
 “...as the whole doctrine …is based on public policy, its application ought 
to depend less on legal niceties or theoretical possibilities than on the 
practical effect of a restraint in hampering that freedom which it is the 
policy of the law to protect.”746  
This type of language gives a ROTD judgment a tenor and texture that clearly 
differentiates it from competition law.  
 
 
7.4.1.1 General Proposal No. 1: Emphasise Public Policy Foundations  
 
The first general proposal is for judgments to emphasise how the ROTD’s public 
policy foundations shape its attitude towards safeguarding persons against 
unreasonable restrictions. Lord Pearce expressly identified “public policy [as] the 
ultimate basis of the courts’ reluctance to enforce restraints.”747 Judgments should 
clearly show how public policy is the platform that informs decisions as to i) 
whether the ROTD can be applied to a particular measure and ii) how the 
reasonableness test is applied.  When reaching these decisions courts should 
expressly draw on the ROTD’s public policy roots. This proposal will help courts 
convey the ROTD’s objective of making widely available an effective mechanism 
to allow persons to resist the enforcement of unreasonable restrictions. Courts 
                                                 
746 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 501 (emphasis 
added). 
747 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 324. 
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could, for example, explain that the intervention of the ROTD to appraise the 
reasonableness of consensual clauses is founded on public policy considerations.748  
 
The ROTD has to calibrate compromises among broad ranging principles of public 
policy. In Esso, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest stated that in the tussle between 
different applicable principles “that which makes certain covenants in restraint of 
trade unenforceable will, in some circumstances, be strong enough to prevail. 
Public policy will give it priority.”749 When deciding whether the ROTD is 
applicable to a particular measure (which is outside the traditional categories of 
employment and sale of business agreements) the ROTD has to reconcile public 
policies such as “ ... on the one hand, the principle that persons of full age who 
enter into a contract should be held to their bond and, on the other hand, the 
principle that everyone should have unfettered liberty to exercise his powers and 
capacities for his own and the community’s benefit.”750 When applying the 
ROTD’s test courts should expressly call on public policy, for example, by noting 
that an employee’s skill is in “no sense the employer’s property and it is contrary to 
public policy to restrain its use in any way.”751 In cases involving employment and 
quasi-employment contracts, the ROTD pursues the public policy of allowing 
employees to leave and to use their acquired skills for other employers.752 The 
Court of Appeal has stated that it would be “contrary to public policy” if the 
solicitor was prevented from acting for his client by a clause insisting on loyalty to 
a former employer.753 The Court of Appeal has expressly drawn on public policy in 
order to end the “vice” of ex-employees being subjected to apparently excessive 
restraints.754  
 
                                                 
748 See R.A. Buckley, Illegality and Public Policy (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed. 2009) 188 
where the author argues that  a court “is even prepared to embark upon an examination of the 
‘reasonableness’ of the contract as between parties to it indicates that an interventionist approach is 
being adopted which is quite distinct from that which governs the enforceability of contracts 
generally.”   
749 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 305.  
750 Vancouver Malt & Sake Brewing Co v. Vancouver Breweries [1934] AC 181, 189 (Lord 
Macmillan  for Judicial Committee) and later cited by High Court of Australia in Peters (WA) Ltd v. 
Petersville Ltd [1999] ATPR 41, para 17.   
751 Strange (SW) Ltd v. Mann (1965) 1 WLR 629, Stamp J. 
752 Countrywide Assured Financial Services Ltd v. Deanne Smart, Marc Pollard  [2004] EWHC 
1214, Laddie J., para 7. 
753 Oswald Hickson Collier v. Carter-Ruck [1984] 2 All ER 1518.  
754 J.A. Mont (UK) Ltd. v. Mills [1993] FSR 577, 584 (CA) Simon Brown LJ.  
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These examples of judicial expressions on public policy portray, in distinctive 
terms, the ROTD’s concern for protecting restrained persons. The Irish High Court 
neatly articulated the public policy based connection between society and the 
individual when it described the ROTD’s objective as being “from the standpoint 
of the public good, to protect the right to work of weaker parties from abuse and to 
gain the economic benefits of preventing such abuses.”755 Even if the ROTD does 
not confer a positive “right to work,” the doctrine vindicates, at least, an 
individual’s liberty to earn income without unreasonable impediment.756 
 
As shown in Chapter One, the protection offered by the ROTD is not limited to 
employees or quasi-employees but extends to other persons in relatively weaker 
bargaining positions. In Schroeder, Lord Diplock stated that when courts refuse to 
enforce provisions “whereby one party agrees for the benefit of the other party to 
exploit or to refrain from exploiting  his own earning power, the public policy 
which the court is implementing is not some 19th century economic theory to the 
general public of freedom of trade, but the protection of those whose bargaining 
power is weak against those whose bargaining power is stronger...”757 This 
quotation makes the important point that the public policy basis of the ROTD is not 
an obsolete or historical element but is one with a contemporary currency. For this 
research, the importance of public policy lies in how it can guide the ROTD 
towards defining and articulating itself in distinctive terms. 
 
 
7.4.1.2 General Proposal No.2: Use Language of Rights and Fairness 
 
The second general proposal is for ROTD judgments to cite principles such as 
justice and fairness and, where possible, comment on the rights of the restrained 
person. This proposal should be acted upon when courts i) make initial 
determinations as to whether the ROTD applies to a particular measure and also ii) 
decide whether the “restraint of trade” has been justified as being reasonable.  For 
                                                 
755 Kerry Cooperative Ltd v. An Bord Bainne [1991] ILRM 851, 869. 
756 J.D. Heydon,  The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (Sydney: Butterworths, 2nd ed. 1999) 63. See 
further B. Hepple, “Right to Work” (1981) 10 ILJ 65. 
757 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1315. 
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example, in Greig v. Insole, Slade J. remarked it would be a serious and “unjust 
step” to deprive a professional cricketer of the opportunity to make his living in a 
very important field of his professional life.758Another illustration is where Lord 
Wilberforce identified the “freedom to use to the full a man's improving ability and 
talents” as lying “at the root of the policy” of the ROTD.759 This language of 
personal rights and freedoms distinguishes the objective of the ROTD from the 
more market focussed ambitions pursued by competition law. 
 
These two general proposals orient the tenor of judgments so that the ROTD is 
seen as a protector of restrained persons (rather than of markets). Wilberforce J. in 
Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd and Ors exhibited remarkable 
determination, based on public policy, to vindicate the rights and liberties of a 
restrained professional.760  In his view, it was unnecessary to cite specific authority 
to show that it was contrary to public policy for the “retain and transfer system”  to 
restrict the footballers’ liberty without being justified and stated that it would be 
unjust if they could not seek a declaration on the basis that the system threatened 
their “liberty to seek employment.”761  
 
The foregoing two general proposals support the next more specific proposals. 
Seven specific proposals are next offered to courts to implement when reaching 
decisions in relation to the ROTD’s availability and its test. 
 
                                                 
758 Greig v. Insole [1978] 1 WLR 303, 354 (emphasis added). 
759 Stenhouse (Australia) Ltd. v. Phillips [1974] A.C. 311. Another  example  is where the High 
Court in  Hughes v. Architects Registration Council of the United Kingdom [1957] 2 QB 550, 563  
adverted to the “right of every man to earn his living in whatever way he chooses unless by the law 
or his own voluntary submission his way is taken from him.” This view was cited by Lord Hodson 
in Dickson v. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1970] AC 403, 430. 
760 [1964] Ch 413. 
761 [1964] Ch 413, 442. 
 212
 
7.4.2 Specific Proposals 
 
The next proposals are more specific as they direct courts in their approach to, 
firstly, the ROTD’s availability/scope and, secondly, its test. They steer courts to 
emphasise how the ROTD takes keen account of the impact of a restriction on 
restrained persons and that this focus distinctively shapes not only the ROTD’s 
reach/scope but also its requirement that “restraints of trade” must be justified as 
reasonable before they can be enforced. The first of these specific proposals deals 
with the scope/availability of the ROTD and the remaining six specific proposals 
pertain to how the test is applied.   
  
 
7.4.2.1 Specific Proposal No 1: Explain the Basis of the ROTD’s Scope 
 
 
The borders of the ROTD are intentionally flexible because courts have 
consistently maintained that the classification of a “restraint of trade” must remain 
“fluid and the categories can never be closed.”762 Consequently, courts often have 
to decide “where to draw the line?”763  How the answer to this question is 
approached will convey the heart of the ROTD. The ROTD has been applied not 
only to express non-competition clauses in employment contracts but, also, to 
diverse provisions in various contracts and rules on the grounds that they may 
negatively impact an individual.764 This reason distinguishes the ROTD from 
competition law and, for this reason, should be expressed clearly in judgments.  
 
The basis for the ROTD’s applicability to restrictions falling outside the traditional 
categories (of employment contracts and transfer of business agreements) must be 
made explicit in judgments by explaining that the ROTD aims to protect persons 
                                                 
762 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 337 Lord 
Wilberforce.  
763 This is the phrase used by Lord Pearce in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage 
(Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 325. 
764 Chapter One detailed many instances including clauses making pensions conditional on not 
competing, clauses clawing back commission or deferring discretionary bonuses and provisions 
preventing sports professionals playing for their preferred club or tournament.  
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who are disadvantaged by de facto shackles and impediments. It is here proposed 
that courts must highlight that they take account of the potential impact of a 
measure on the restricted person by considering the restriction’s terms and the 
circumstances in which it was negotiated or concluded when they decide whether a 
measure is a “restraint of trade.” This specific proposal finds strong support in the 
four cases that are next analysed.  
 
The first study is of Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd.765 
The judgments of the House of Lords, in this case, make interesting remarks about 
the applicability of the ROTD outside the traditional categories of employment and 
sale of business agreements. Here, the ROTD was raised in defence against an 
application for injunctions restraining garage operators from sourcing petrol in 
breach of  “solus” (exclusive purchase) obligations contained in two standard 
motor fuels supply agreements.766 
 
In the House of Lords, some judgments took the view that the ROTD may apply in 
situations where an existing freedom of the restrained person is restricted. Lord 
Reid stated that the ROTD applies where someone “contracts to give up some 
freedom which he would otherwise have had” and he pointed to the limitation on 
the garage owners’ freedom to sell petrol purchased from third parties.767 Lord 
Reid also commented that restrictions regulating existing trade may be a more 
severe restraint than those preventing the person undertaking a new trade.768 
Kamerling and Osmann suggest that this means that the ROTD will apply even if 
the restrained party had not previously enjoyed a particular freedom but is required 
“under a positive duty to do something which restricts his current freedom.”769  
                                                 
765 [1968] AC 269. 
766 The obligation on one garage was less than five years in duration while the other garage was 
subject to a “solus” agreement of 21 years and a mortgage.   
767[1968] AC 269, 298. See [1968] AC 269, 309 where Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest stated that 
there is “a clear difference between the case where someone fetters his future by parting with a 
freedom he  possesses and the case where someone seeks to claim a freedom other than that which 
he possesses or arranged to acquire.” For Lord Hodson’s view see [1968] AC 269, 317. 
768 Lord Reid (at p298) drew attention to the additional positive obligation on the garage owner to 
keep the station open to sell the petrol “at all reasonable hours”  in addition to the duty not to sell 
other suppliers’ petrol.  
769 A. Kamerling and C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2004) 10. 
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Lord Pearce took a different approach. In his view, the ROTD does not apply to: 
 “ordinary commercial contracts for the regulation and promotion of trade 
during the existence of the contract, provided that any prevention of work, 
outside the contract, viewed as a whole, is directed towards the absorption 
of the parties’ services and not their sterilisation.”770 
 Thus, in his view, the ROTD does not apply to restrictions during the contract 
which are “only those which are incidental and normal to the positive commercial 
arrangements at which the contract aims, even though those ties exclude all 
dealings with others.”771 Nonetheless, he stated that the ROTD applies “if during 
the contract one of the parties is too unilaterally fettered so that the contract loses 
its character of a contract for the regulation and promotion of trade and acquires the 
predominant character of a contract in restraint of trade.”772 Lord Wilberforce took 
another approach to deciding whether the ROTD applied. After re-iterating that the 
scope of “restraint of trade” is broad and is public policy based, he articulated the 
possibility of dispensation for some measures from the justification requirement. 
He stated that: 
“judges have been able to dispense from the necessity of justification under 
a public policy test of reasonableness such contracts or provisions of 
contracts as, under contemporary conditions, may be found to have passed 
into the accepted and normal currency of commercial or contractual 
relations. That such contracts have done so may be taken to show with at 
least strong prima facie force that moulded under the pressures of 
negotiation, competition and public opinion, they have assumed a form 
which satisfies the test of public policy as understood by the courts at the 
time....”773 
It must be emphasised that when Lord Wilberforce created the dispensation, he 
made it subject to qualifications and clearly stipulated that there is no absolute 
exemption.774 In this case, Lord Wilberforce refused to grant the dispensation. It is 
important to highlight why it was not granted. Obligations similar to those at issue 
in this case were contained in 35,000 supply contracts with 36,000 stations in the 
UK and about 6,600-7,000 garages were so tied to Esso. Lord Wilberforce denied 
                                                 
770 [1968] AC 269, 328 (emphasis added). 
771 ibid 
772 ibid 
773 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 332-3 (emphasis 
added). 
774 See Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 332-3 where 
Lord Wilberforce stated that “[A]bsolute exemption for restriction or regulation is never obtained. 
Circumstances, social or economic, may have altered since they obtained acceptance in such a way 
for a fresh examination; there may be some exorbitance or special feature in the individual contract 
which takes it out of the accepted category; but the court must be persuaded of this before it calls 
upon the relevant to justify a contact of this kind.” 
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the dispensation in this case because the agreement was “not of a character which, 
by pressure of negotiation and competition has passed into acceptance or a balance 
of interest between the parties or between the parties and their customers.”775 This 
statement is important because it, firstly, shows that dispensations from 
justification are not available just because the restriction is statistically prevalent 
and, secondly, shows that how the restriction was negotiated is decisive. This 
attitude indicates that the ROTD’s deep concern, based on public policy, is for the 
interests of the less able negotiating party. This concern is also to the fore in the 
Schroeder judgments that are next examined.  
 
 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. 
Macauley (formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Lt 776  involved a 
standard form exclusive services contract between an unknown songwriter and a 
music publishing company. The songwriter obtained a declaration that the contract 
was void under the ROTD. The decision was affirmed by Court of Appeal and 
unsuccessfully appealed to the House of Lords.  
 
In order to decide whether the ROTD could be applied to this situation, Lord Reid 
took a two stage approach. Firstly, he asked whether the contractual terms are so 
restrictive that they cannot be justified at all. His second question was whether the 
restraining party has proved justification which is normally done by “showing that 
the restrictions were no more than was reasonably required to protect his legitimate 
interests”777 Lord Reid examined each clause of the agreement and considered their 
cumulative effect on the songwriter. The contractual terms included the full 
assignment of copyright globally in every musical composition “composed created 
or conceived” by him for potentially ten years. No payment (apart from an initial 
small sum) was payable unless his work was published but the publishers were not 
obliged to publish. The songwriter had no right either to terminate the contract or to 
get the re-assignment of copyright in the event of non publication. Lord Reid stated 
the ROTD normally did not apply to a contract of exclusive services but “if the 
                                                 
775 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 337.  
776 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308; 1315 [1974] 3 
All E.R 616 HL affirming [1974] 1 All ER 171 CA. 
777 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1310. Viscount Dilhorne agreed with Lord Reid. 
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contractual restrictions appear to be unnecessary or to be reasonably capable of 
enforcement in an oppressive manner then they must be justified before they can be 
enforced.”778 Lord Reid concluded that he did not need to consider “whether in any 
circumstances it would be possible to justify such a one-sided agreement. It is 
sufficient to say that such evidence as there is falls short of justification.”779 In his 
view, it was an unreasonable restraint to tie the composer for this period “so that 
his work will be sterilised and he can earn nothing from his abilities as a composer 
if the publisher chooses not to publish.”780  
 
Lord Reid’s expansive approach to the scope of the ROTD seems to be founded on 
his concern for the effect of restriction on the restrained person. In his view, the 
ROTD can apply, in circumstances that do not amount to coercion or undue 
influence, where the terms are “one-sided” and where the contract is capable of 
being enforced oppressively. This expansive approach to the ROTD’s availability 
demonstrates that the objective of the ROTD is to safeguard less able parties. Lord 
Reid’s characterisation of the ROTD as national law that strikes down restrictions 
that are unnecessary and/or capable of oppressive enforcement aligns with the 
illustration given in Recital 9 of national law prohibiting the imposition of 
unjustified or disproportionate terms that is saved by Art 3(3). 
 
Lord Diplock delivered the other key judgment in Schroeder. Without 
equivocation, he asserted that the contract was in “restraint of trade” and that the 
courts had power to relieve the songwriter of his legal duty to fulfil the promises he 
made. In his view, the Court must:  
“ ... assess the relative bargaining power of the publisher and the song 
writer at the time the contract was made and .. decide whether the publisher 
had used his superior bargaining power to exact from the song writer 
promises that were unfairly onerous to him.”781  
This approach envisages qualitative assessments of the power balance within the 
relationship and the identification of “unfairly” onerous burdens. The centrality of 
the qualitative impact of the restrictions on the restrained professional is very 
                                                 
778 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1314.  
779 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1315. 
780 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1313-1314. The concept of “sterilisation” echoes back to Lord Pearce  
judgment in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 325. 
781 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1315 (emphasis added). 
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evident in Lord Diplock’s core question which is: “[w]as the bargain fair?”782 He 
explained that the test of fairness is “whether the restrictions are both reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the promisee and 
commensurate with the benefits secured to the promisor under the contract?”783 
This enquiry evidences the ROTD’s concern to ensure that the restrained party 
makes a fair bargain. National laws that prohibit conditions/terms on the basis that 
they were unfairly exacted from a weaker party are in line with Recital 9’s 
examples of national laws falling within Art 3(3). Lord Diplock agreed with Lord 
Reid’s analysis of the terms of the contract and that the contract was unenforceable. 
In his view the contract did not satisfy the fairness test.   
 
The third case is Proactive Sports Management Ltd v. Wayne Rooney, Stoneygate 
48 et al.784 Here, the dispute between Proactive and Stoneygate 48 concerned the 
exclusive rights contained in an Image Rights Representation Agreement to 
represent professional footballer Wayne Rooney.785 Whether the agreement was “in 
restraint of trade” was contested. The High Court (Hegarty QC) admitted difficulty 
in extracting from the case law “any judicial definition which can be applied to all 
situations.”786 The judge emphatically rejected the argument that the ROTD did not 
apply on the grounds that the agreement only restricted image rights and did not 
restrict footballing activities. It had been argued that the professional footballer 
could earn a very good living from his primary skills (playing football) and that, 
consequently, his earning capacity was not really sterilised by the contract.787  
 
In deciding that the ROTD could apply, the High Court cited and applied the 
principles from the House of Lords’ judgments in Esso and Schroeder. The Court 
interpreted Esso to mean that whether the ROTD applies to an exclusivity contract 
depends on factors such as whether it is a “common and accepted form of 
commercial arrangement” and whether there is any “exorbitance or special 
                                                 
782 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1316 . 
783 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,1315. 
784 [2010] EWHC 1807 (QB) Manchester District Registry Mercantile Court, Judge Hegarty  QC: 
on appeal [2011] EWCA 1444. 
785 Proactive sued Stoneygate 48  for arrears of commission due under the agreement. In defence, 
Stoneygate 48 argued, inter alia, that the agreement was contrary to public policy as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.  
786 [2010] EWHC 1807, para 624. 
787 [2010] EWHC 1807, para 652. 
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feature”788 which may arise where there is inequality of bargaining power.789 Then, 
it cited Lord Reid’s view that courts have greater freedom to find restrictions 
unreasonable in situations where although the restrained party accepted the main 
contractual terms he is at a disadvantage as regards other terms. For example, 
where a set of conditions had been incorporated which has not been the subject of 
negotiation.790 In addition, the Court quoted extensively from and applied the 
judgments of Lord Reid and Lord Diplock in Schroeder. It accepted Lord Reid’s 
readiness to apply the ROTD if the restrictions appear to be unnecessary or 
reasonably capable of oppressive enforcement and Lord Diplock’s test of fairness 
and the significance of unequal bargaining power.791  
 
The High Court and Court of Appeal closely reviewed the terms and the 
negotiating circumstances of the Image Rights Representation Agreement. The 
High Court found that the terms were “effectively dictated” by one party (the 
company). Moreover, the contract was not a standard tried and tested one and was 
unique in its lengthy duration.792 The High Court and Court of Appeal gave 
considerable attention to the impact of the lengthy duration of the restrictions on 
the footballer. They specifically noted that the obligations began when the 
footballer was 17 years old, new to football and could continue for eight years, a 
period that would “probably cover about half of his career.”793 The Courts 
highlighted the inequality in bargaining positions between the parties.794 Although 
(unlike the situation in Schroeder) there were “quite extensive obligations” on the 
restraining party, the High Court had no doubt that the contract imposed very 
substantial restraints on the professional footballer’s “freedom to exploit his 
earning ability over a very long period of time on terms which were not 
commonplace in the market and which were not the outcome of a process of 
                                                 
788 [2010] EWHC 1807, para 633. The phrase  “exorbitance or special feature”  was mentioned by 
Lord Wilberforce in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 
333 as a ground for denying a dispensation from justification. 
789 [2010] EWHC 1807, para 633.  
790 [2010] EWHC 1807, para 633 citing Lord Reid in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage 
(Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 300. 
791 [2010] EWHC 1807, para 633.  
792 [2010] EWHC 1807, para 650. 
793 [2010] EWHC 1807 para 647 and similarly [2011] EWCA Civ 1444, para 2. 
794 See [2011] EWCA Civ 1444, para 17 where the Court of Appeal stated that the footballer and 
his parents were “wholly unsophisticated in legal and commercial matters.” 
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commercial negotiation between equals.”795 The High Court was satisfied that the 
contract terms were not justified796 and the appeal on this point failed.797  
 
In the appeal, it was argued, inter alia, that the ROTD could not apply to this image 
representation rights agreement because it only restricted the professional’s off-
pitch activities and not his footballing career. This point was emphatically rejected 
by the Court of Appeal on the grounds of public policy. Lady Justice Arden stated:  
“ ... a person’s ancillary activity of exploiting his image rights is just as 
capable  of protection under the doctrine of restraint of trade as any other 
occupation. Public policy is concerned with the manner in which a person 
may properly realise his potential, not only for the good of that individual 
but for the economic benefit of society generally.”798  
This recent judgment clearly demonstrates that the ROTD, on the basis of public 
policy, safeguards some persons who agree to unfair obligations that were not 
properly negotiated by equals. 
 
The fourth judgment that is examined in detail in order to show the public policy 
based objective of the ROTD is the “seminal decision”799 of Wilberforce J. in 
Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd and Ors.800 
 
Eastham, a professional footballer, refused to sign again with his football club 
which placed him on the “retain” list. The “retain” mechanism allowed a club to 
retain a player for the next season if it offered him a minimum wage. Wilberforce J. 
found that if a player, who does not want to re-sign with his club, is placed on the 
“retain” list, it substantially interfered with the player’s “right” to seek other 
employment at a time when he is no longer an employee of the retaining club.801 
Wilberforce J. decided that the  “retain” scheme operated substantially in “restraint 
of trade.” 802  
 
                                                 
795 [2010] EWHC 1807, para 651. 
796 [2010] EWHC 1807, paras 640 and 651. 
797 [2011] EWCA Civ 1444. 
798 [2011] EWCA Civ 1444, para 58 (emphasis added). 
799 J.D. Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (Sydney: Butterworths, 2nd ed. 1999) 205. 
800 [1964] Ch 413. 
801 [1964] Ch 413, 430.  
802 [1964] Ch 413, 430. 
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This judgment radically enhanced the ROTD’s availability to individuals who are 
restrained by third party measures. Wilberforce J. allowed the footballer to sue not 
only his former club but, also, the Football League and Football Association. This 
is highly significant because strangers or “third parties” do not ordinarily have 
locus standi under contract law which means that litigation would occur only if a 
party sought to enforce a contractual provision. This judgment has been followed 
so that other authoritative sporting authorities have been sued by either a restrained 
sports professional803 or by another non-party litigant, such as a rival seeking a 
declaration and/or injunction.804  
 
The relevant point of this locus standi development for this chapter is the basis 
upon which the ROTD was made available because it evidences the ROTD’s 
peculiar objective. Wilberforce J. rejected arguments that the professional 
footballer, as a stranger, could not take action.805 Tellingly, he asked whether the 
“the defence” of the footballer’s interest is:  
“to be left exclusively in the hands of the employers themselves, who have 
set up a ring against the employees and who have (as here) shown every 
intention of maintaining it as long as they can; left to the chance that one 
day there may be a blackleg among the employers who will challenge it.”806  
It seems clear that Wilberforce J. wanted the ROTD to redress the interference 
with the rights of the professional. Yuen commented that in “typical common law 
fashion it was remedy before right. If the plaintiff could ask for relief, he had a 
‘right to work.’”807 It is here suggested that this judgment reveals that the ROTD’s 
                                                 
803 Hendry v. World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association Ltd. Sub.nom. Hendry v. 
WPBSA [2002] U.K.C.L.R.5; [2002] E.C.C. 8 Ch D, the plaintiffs were two snooker players 
restricted by the association’s ban on participating in tours organised by rival tour organiser. Also 
see Buckley v. Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353, 373 HC (Aus). 
804 In Greig v. Insole [1978] 3 All ER 449 Slade J. granted a declaration to one promoter in respect 
of the exclusive arrangements between another promoter and individual sports professionals. Slade 
J. noted that the restraints were “specifically directed against that company, in the sense that one of 
their principal objects is to persuade cricketers not to perform their existing contracts with it and to 
prevent others from contracting with it in the future.”    
805 [1964] Ch 413,  441. Wilberforce J. deftly treated earlier cases as authority for preventing 
actions for damages for conspiracy He averred, at p 446, that the declaratory judgment “ is a 
comparatively modern remedy which is being found to have a usefulness which was probably not 
appreciated when those cases were decided.” Wilberforce J. held that to grant a declaration to “ the 
persons whose interests are vitally affected would be well within the spirit and intent of the rule as 
to declaratory judgments.”  He relied on dicta of Denning M.R. in Boulting v. Association of  
Cinematographers [1963] 2 QB 606, 629 noting  the “ power of the court in its discretion to make a 
declaration of right  whenever the interest of the plaintiff is sufficient to justify it.” 
806 [1964] Ch 413, 443. 
807 C. Yuen, Exclusive Purchasing at Common Law and under Antitrust Law: A Re-examination of 
the Restraint of Trade Doctrine “ (1987) 16  Anglo Am Law Rev 1, 22. 
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objective, based on public policy, is to be widely available to assist comparatively 
weaker individuals. 
 
The foregoing four studies show that an expansive and inclusive approach can be 
taken, on public policy grounds, when courts decide on the ROTD’s scope. Whish 
has drawn attention to the ROTD’s extension to situations where “various 
organisations exercised de facto monopoly power over entry to a trade or 
profession” and their activities might otherwise be challenged only under the 
benign provisions of fair trading legislation.808 It is notable that the ROTD is made 
available to resist not only contractual restrictions but, on the basis of justice, 
various restrictions of associations that have been imposed on “captives.”809 In 
order to ensure the ROTD’s differentiation from competition law, courts must 
explain why the ROTD takes an inclusive attitude to its scope and “locus standi” by 
emphasising its public policy basis. 
 
The next six specific proposals suggest how courts should apply the test. They aim 
to ensure that the ROTD distinctiveness is clearly conveyed. These proposals give 
specific expression to the ROTD’s public policy based objective of allowing 
restrained persons to resist unreasonable restrictions on their freedom. They are  
i) express antipathy towards “restraints of trade”; ii) take a broad and personal view 
of the interests of the restrained party; iii) examine the negotiating circumstances; 
iv) analyse the “public interest” in distinctive terms; v) stipulate that the restraining 
entity must justify and vi) keep separate the two limbs of the reasonableness test. 
  
 
                                                 
808 R. Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 1993)  53. See also Nagle v. 
Fielden [1962] QB 633, [1966] 2 WLR 1027;  Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Dickson 
[1970] AC 403, [1968] 3 WLR 286 affirming [1967] Ch. 708 (CA) affirming [ 1966] 1 WLR 1539, 
[1966] 3 All ER 404 and  Cheall v. Professional Executive Clerical and Computer Staff [1983] 2 
AC 180. Mogul Steamship Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Mc Gregor Gow & Co [1892] AC 25 decided that  
where the restriction was contained in a third party measure, a tortious action by a restrained non 
party plaintiff could only be maintained if malice was established. R. Whish, Competition Law 
(London: Butterworths, 3rd ed. 1993) 58 notes the ROTD’s value to many sports professionals 
where the regulatory bodies were not subject to judicial review.  
809 Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League (1991) 31 FCR 242,  para 31 Gummow J. 
describing the rules agreed by clubs that restrict rugby players freedom to choose which club to play 
for. 
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7.4.2.2 Specific Proposal No. 2: Express Initial Antipathy 
 
It is here proposed that judgments commence by noting the ROTD’s general 
antipathy towards “restraints of trade.” Courts need to re-iterate that the ROTD 
presumes all “restraints of trade” to be void unless they have been justified. Such 
an opening observation sets the tone and shows that the ROTD “leans against 
covenants in restraint of trade and there are sound reasons for doing so.”810 A court 
in England or Wales could echo the Australian High Court’s statement that “…the 
common law has fixed the appropriate balance between the competing claims and 
policies generally in favour of striking down restraints unless they can be 
justified.”811Recently, in Proactive Sports Management Ltd v. Wayne Rooney, 
Stoneygate 48, the Court of Appeal judgment on the ROTD commenced by stating 
that public policy:  
“is an important but amorphous concept which the courts must keep within 
its proper limits. However, the courts have repeatedly held that it is against 
the public interest and policy of the common law for there to be restraints 
on trade unless there are special circumstances.”812  
 
The proposal is for courts to accentuate this starting position for analysis because it 
conveys the ROTD’s distinctive objective of resisting unreasonable restrictions.  
  
7.4.2.3 Specific Proposal No. 3: Broad and Personal view of Interests  
 
The third specific proposal relates to the interests that are taken into account when 
the inter partes reasonableness of a “restraint of trade” is assessed. It is here 
proposed that courts take a broad attitude to the types of interests of the restrained 
and not confine themselves to assessing only economic interests.  
  
In the Australian case of Adamson, two judges stated that the ROTD was not 
confined to considering the economic effect of the rules and insisted that non-
economic effects of the rules “ought not be disregarded.”813 This approach would 
allow courts to take into account any injury to social or domestic interests and other 
                                                 
810 Office Overload Ltd v. Gunn [1977] FSR 39 (CA). 
811 Peters (WA) v Petersville Ltd [2001] HCA 49, para 37. 
812 [2011] EWCA 1444, para 53 (emphasis added). 
813 Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League (1991) 31 FCR 242 Wilcox J. and Gummow J. 
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freedoms of the restrained person. In Adamson, Wilcox J. emphasised the 
significance of the right to choose between prospective employers because it “is a 
fundamental right of a free society. It is the existence of that right which separates 
the free person from the serf.”814 This approach of describing the personal impact 
of a restriction in the language of freedom and justice clearly differentiates the 
objective of the ROTD from the market centred objective mainly pursued by 
competition law. Similarly, in Vendo plc v. Adams,815 the High Court of Northern 
Ireland remarked that the restraint deprived the franchisee “effectively of earning a 
livelihood in a field where he has acquired an expertise.”816 The Court 
distinguished between franchises for services and franchises for goods. This 
distinction implicitly recognises that the franchisee’s personal expertise plays a role 
in a service franchise (unlike a franchise for goods which sell themselves) and this 
personal dimension merits protection from undue restriction. Paying attention to 
the inherent skills of the individual (and accepting it needs protection) indicates the 
distinctively personal aspect of the ROTD’s objective and, for this reason, should 
be emphasised. 
 
Some of the judgments in Esso are interesting for how they cast or articulate an 
obligation in personal and restrictive terms. Esso argued that the ROTD was not 
applicable because the restrictions related to land. This argument was not accepted 
by Lord Pearce who rejected the earlier reasoning of Mocatta J. who decided that 
the restrictions did not come within the ROTD as they were merely restrictive of 
the use to be made of a particular piece of land. Lord Pearce took a different tack. 
He noted that the garage owner had a positive obligation to carry on the business 
(or find a transferee) and the “practical effect was to create a personal 
guarantee.”817 Similarly, Lord Morris of Borth–y-Gest refused to accept the 
argument that the ROTD did not apply where land was involved. He characterised 
the restrictions are being more of a personal character than of a property character 
because they affected how the garage owner ran his business.818 Lord Wilberforce 
emphatically stated that this is “not a mere transaction in property... it is not a mere 
                                                 
814 Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League (1991) 31 FCR 242  para 60 . 
815 [2002] NI Ch D 5. 
816 [2002] NI Ch D 5, 8 (emphasis added). 
817 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 327. 
818 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 309. 
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transaction for the exclusive purchase of a commodity - if it was there would be a 
strong case for treating it as a 'normal commercial agreement of an accepted 
type.’”819 Lord Wilberforce took account of the other restrictive elements of the 
agreement which included a tie with no provision for termination by notice. He 
emphasised the importance of ascertaining the reality of the restriction over any 
theoretical freedom such as, for example, the possibility that the garage owner 
could either find a successor or trade freely at other locations while tied to Esso in 
these two locations. In his opinion, the reality of the restraint on the garage owner 
was more relevant than his “theoretical liberty to depart.”820 Characterising the 
obligation according to its personal impact on the restrained indicates the ROTD’s 
objective is oriented more towards the restrained person rather than towards 
markets and, thereby, distinguishes the ROTD. 
 
 
7.4.2.4 Specific Proposal No. 4: Examine the Negotiations 
 
The fourth specific proposal is for courts to pay express attention to and draw 
inferences from the whole circumstances in which a contested “restraint of trade” 
came into existence. The quality of the negotiating process is an important factor 
when the ROTD is applied. In Esso, Lord Reid recognised that there may be 
situations where the restrained party accepted the main contractual terms but would 
be at a disadvantage regarding other terms, “for example where a set of conditions 
had been incorporated which has not been the subject of negotiation” and that, in 
such cases, the court has greater freedom to find these terms unreasonable.821 This 
focus on the reality of how the whole deal was negotiated and how this focus 
adjusts the courts’ attitude to the question of its justification is significant because 
it shows the ROTD’s concern for the less able party.   
 
The quality of negotiating was central in deciding whether the restrictions received 
the dispensation from justification. In Schroeder, Lord Reid rejected the argument 
                                                 
819 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 337. 
820 Relying on  McEllistrem (1919) AC 548, 565), Lord Wilberforce in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. 
Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 338  dismissed as “artificial and unreal” the 
appellant’s argument that the covenant is not in restraint of trade because it relates to the use of the 
respondent’s land. 
821 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 300.  
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that every standard form agreement benefits from the dispensation envisaged by 
Lord Wilberforce in Esso822 and noted his stipulation that the contracts must be 
“moulded by negotiation, competition and public opinion.”823 Lord Reid found no 
evidence that the restrictions on the songwriter were so moulded. Lord Reid further 
limited the dispensation, by quoting from Lord Pearce’s reference in Esso, to 
“contracts made freely by parties bargaining on equal terms.”824 In effect, Lord 
Reid narrowed the availability of any dispensation to contracts freely negotiated by 
parties on equal bargaining terms.825 This tight approach to the dispensation based 
on the quality of the negotiation shows the concern of the ROTD for the interests of 
relatively weak persons.  
 
In Schroeder, Lord Diplock rejected the publishing company’s argument that every 
standard form contract in common use must be presumed to be fair and reasonable. 
He went so far as to categorise standard form contracts into two groups. The first 
group comprises common place mercantile transactions such as insurance contracts 
and charter parties whose widely adopted clauses had been negotiated over many 
years and their terms were presumed to be fair and reasonable. By contrast, his 
second group comprises “take it or leave it” standard contracts that originated from 
“the concentration of particular kinds of businesses in relatively few hands.”826 
Typically their terms were not negotiated and were “dictated by that party whose 
bargaining power enables him to say: ‘If you want these goods or services at all, 
these are the only terms on which they are obtainable. Take it or leave it.’”827 Lord 
Diplock commented that while the strength of bargaining power necessary to 
“adopt this “take-it-or-leave-it” attitude did not raise a presumption that it was used 
to drive an unconscionable bargain,”  in the field of restraint of trade, it called “for 
                                                 
822 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 332-3. 
823 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1315. 
824  A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,1314, referring to 
Lord Pearce in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 323. 
825 In Watson v. Praeger [1991] 3 All ER 487, Scott J.  did not grant a dispensation to an exclusive 
services contract in the standard form prescribed by a regulatory association (i.e. British Boxing 
Board of Control). 
826 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1316. 
827 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone ) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,1316. 
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vigilance on the part of the court to see” that it did not.828 This remark is notable 
for the active responsibility of vigilance it places on courts when they are presented 
with “take it or leave it” type terms and it evidences the ROTD’s objective of 
safeguarding persons. The Schroeder judgments have been followed in many cases 
involving restrictions on professionals in the music business.829 They have also 
been followed in other professional sectors. Moreover, the High Court, when 
assessing a more mainstream commercial contract between two business men, 
referred to the emphasis placed by Lord Reid in Esso on the importance of whether 
the clause had been negotiated.830 It further commented on how the lack of 
reciprocal obligation may be important in deciding the reasonableness of the 
restriction.831  
 
The Court of Appeal in Proactive Sports Management Ltd v. Wayne Rooney, 
Stoneygate 48 conducted very detailed scrutiny of the negotiating circumstances.832 
It expressed the view that the absence of independent legal advice to the restrained 
parties: 
“deprives the fact that [they] were content with the terms of the agreement 
of probative weight on the restraint of trade issue. It underscores the 
inequality of bargaining power between the parties. Moreover, it 
predisposes the agreement to a finding that it was one-sided, unfair and 
oppressive.”833  
The Court further noted that the restraining side had waved aside legal advice that 
the other party should have independent legal advice and that the agreement might 
be unenforceable under the ROTD and went so far as to state that it was “a relevant 
part of the picture” that the restraining party entered the contract knowing there 
was a risk that it might be unenforceable.834 
 
                                                 
828 ibid 
829 Clifford Davis Management v. WEA Records Ltd [1957] 1 WLR 61; Silvertone Records v. 
Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152, 163; Zang Tumb Tuum Records v. Johnson  [1993] EMPL 61.  
830 Societa Esplosivi  Industriali Spa v Ordnance Technologies (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 48 (Ch) 
para 120 referring to  Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269. 
831 Societa Esplosivi  Industriali Spa v Ordnance Technologies (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 48 (Ch) 
para 145.   
832 [2011] EWCA 1444. 
833 [2011] EWCA 1444, para 100 (emphasis added) 
834 Para 101. 
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Enquiring into how a contested restriction was negotiated and drafted is important 
because it shows the concern of the ROTD for the position of the weaker party. 
This is a distinctive aspect of the ROTD which needs to be emphasised.  
 
 
7.4.2.5 Specific Proposal No. 5: “Public Interest” in Distinctive Terms  
 
The fifth specific proposal deals with the “public interest.” If a “restraint of trade” 
is not justified as being reasonable in the parties’ interest, the “public interest” limb 
does not need to be considered. In those cases where the “public interest” is 
considered, it is here proposed that courts determinedly avoid classic competition 
law concepts and language. Instead, the “public interest” should be articulated 
using the distinctive lens and language of the ROTD. Thus, when dealing with 
economic issues, the ROTD should characterise them in its own terms. A good 
example of this proposal is found in the Ontario High Court of Justice’s assessment 
of a post termination restriction in an employment contract of a gynaecologist.835 
Its judgment stated that choosing “.. a physician or surgeon is not akin to 
commercial transaction”836 and expressly refuted the argument that the patients 
“can easily find another specialist.”837 That the Court rejected the economic 
substitutability perspective shows that the ROTD does not follow the classic 
competition law market analysis. 
 
Moreover, a “public interest” analysis under the ROTD should highlight, as far as 
possible, connections between public policy, “public interest” and a restrained 
person’s freedom. For example, a judge in an Australian court stated that where a 
restraint is imposed: 
“which is more than that which is required … to protect the interests of the 
parties, that is a matter which is relevant to the considerations of public 
policy which underlie the whole doctrine, since to that extent the 
deprivation of a person of his liberty of action is regarded as detrimental to 
the ‘public interest.’”838  
                                                 
835 Sherk v. Horwitz [1972] 2 O.R. 451, 454. 
836 Sherk v. Horwitz [1972] 2 O.R. 451 454. 
837 Sherk v. Horwitz [1972] 2 O.R. 451, 454. 
838 Amoco Australian Pty Limited v. Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [1973] 133 CLR 
288, 307 per Walsh J. Early English case law, Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont (1869) 9 Eq.345, 354,  
pithily connected personal interest with the State’s interest with the statement that every man  “ … 
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This stance echoes Lord Reid’s view in Esso that courts will not enforce a 
restriction which goes further than adequately protecting the legitimate interest of 
the restraining party because “too wide a restraint is against the public interest.” 839 
Later, in Schroeder, Lord Reid asserted that it is in the “interests both of the public 
and the individual that everyone should be free so far as practicable to earn a 
livelihood and to give to the public the fruits of his particular abilities.”840 In Bull v. 
Pittney Bowes, Thesiger J remarked on how it “may be very much in the public 
interest that the services of experienced salesmen skilled in a particular technique 
should be available to promote sales from this country overseas in competition with 
other sellers from elsewhere.”841 In Eastham, Wilberforce J. stated that individuals’ 
“liberty to seek employment is considered by the law to be an important public 
interest.”842 Post-employment restraints have been described as threats to 
commonly shared community values because even a “small degree of servitude is 
distasteful” and is “particularly distasteful if there is no effective bargaining 
between the parties.”843 Lord Salmon accepted that the “courts use their powers in 
the interest of the individual and of the public to safeguard the individual’s right to 
earn his living as he wills and the public’s right to the benefit of his labours.”844  
 
These conceptions of the “public interest” are very supportive of the individual’s 
interests. The ROTD’s recognition that restrictions on personal freedom are, as a 
matter of public policy, against the “public interest” should be expressed in 
common law terms. The texture of the “public interest” analysis under the ROTD 
should not follow competition law analyses. Instead the discussion should refer to 
values in terms and language that distinguish the ROTD’s objectives from that 
pursued by competition law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
shall not be at liberty to deprive himself or the State of his labour, skill, or talent, by any contract 
that he enters into.” This sentence was  cited with approval by Younger L.J in  Attwood v. Lamont 
[1920] 3KB 571, 583. 
839 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269,301. 
840 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macauley (formerly Instone ) sub nom. Macauley 
(formerly Instone) v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1313. 
841 [1966] 3 All ER 384, 388. 
842 [1964]Ch 413, 442. 
843 H.M. Blake, “Employee Agreements Not to Compete” (1962) 73 Harv  LR 625, 649. 
844 Nagle v. Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633, 648. 
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7.4.2.6 Specific proposal No. 6: Discharge the Onus of Justification. 
 
The sixth specific proposal pertains to restrictions contained in rules of associations 
or entities. It is here proposed that courts clearly stipulate that the restraining entity 
must discharge the onus of justification. This proposal eliminates the possibility of 
courts misapplying the test by adopting some sort of “balancing” approach to the 
interests of the restrained and the “public interest.”  
 
How the test may, otherwise, be mis-applied (to the detriment of the restrained 
person) is illustrated by a majority judgment of the Irish Supreme Court in Macken 
v. O’ Reilly.845 Here, a professional show-jumper challenged the Equestrian 
Federation of Ireland’s policy which obliged Irish competitors in international 
competitions to use only Irish horses. His action succeeded before the High Court 
because the defendants did not discharge the onus of showing the inflexibly applied 
ban was reasonable.846 The High Court judgment was overturned by the Supreme 
Court majority decision of 3:2. 
 
One of the majority judgments (O’Higgins C.J.) stated that a restraint which is 
reasonable, having regard to all interests affected, including the public cannot be 
unjust and unfair “simply because in its particular application to one individual an 
inconvenience or loss is experienced.”847 In his view, applying the ROTD entails:   
“…. a careful examination of all the circumstances - the need for the 
restraint, the object sought to be attained, the interest sought to be protected 
and the general interest of the public. What is done or sought to be done 
must be established as reasonable and necessary and on balance to serve the 
public interest.” 848  
The Chief Justice apparently placed the restriction’s potential harm to the riders in 
opposition to the potential injury to the horsebreeding industry that would arise if 
there was no restriction. He specifically stated that the potential harm to the 
horsebreeding sector ought to have been considered as a balance to the harm and 
                                                 
845 [1979] ILRM 79. 
846  [1979] ILRM 79, 82 where High Court (Hamilton J.) stated that the policy interfered with the 
rider’s “right to earn a living as he wills” and was  a restriction of his freedom of choice of the 
horses. It accepted that there were insufficient Irish bred horses of the requisite standard to enable 
the professional show jumper to maintain his standing as a world class showjumper but decided that 
the policy inhibiting Macken maintaining this position was unjust and unfair. 
847 [1979] ILRM 79, 91. 
848 [1979] ILRM 79, 90 (emphasis added). 
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inconvenience caused to the plaintiff.849 This balancing approach has been 
criticised on the grounds that if a rule is unreasonable inter partes it is not 
necessary to consider the “public interest.”850 Furthermore, O’Higgins C.J. failed to 
take account of the impact of the restriction on the restrained person who did not 
even have the opportunity of negotiating its terms. This omission is further 
aggravated by O’Higgins C.J. apparently viewing the restraining entity as acting, 
somehow, in the “public interest.” He expressly stipulated that consideration must 
also be given to the “the interest of the public as represented by those concerned 
with the horsebreeding industry in Ireland and also the interests of those already 
engaged in showjumping in this country who are looking for recognition and 
advancement in international events.”851    
 
Balancing the interests of the restrained professional with those of the restraining 
entity (seen as quasi-public interest entity) is a problem if it causes the restriction to 
be assessed unduly benignly. The main danger of a balancing approach, in the 
context of this research, is that, by failing to consider thoroughly the impact on the 
restrained party, the ROTD fails to pursue its distinctive objective. The approach of 
the Federal court of Australia in the next study (Adamson & Ors v New South 
Wales Rugby League & Ors) is to be preferred.852  
 
In Adamson, professional rugby players challenged rules agreed among clubs of the 
Rugby League. Under these rules, a player who played in the prestigious 
“Competition” for one club could not contract with another club to play in the 
“Competition” unless he was selected at an “Internal Draft” meeting. Any players 
who were not so selected were, in practice, severely restricted from negotiating for 
employment with another club.  
 
In this case, Gummow J. stipulated clearly that the Rugby League had to discharge 
the onus of convincing the Court that restrictions on rugby players’ freedom were 
justified as being reasonable.853 He expressly recognised that the restraint struck at 
                                                 
849 [1979] ILRM 79, 91. 
850 R. Clark, Contract Law in Ireland (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 6th ed.2008) 474.  
851 [1979] ILRM 79, 92. 
852 (1991) 31 FCR 242 Federal Court of Australia.  
853 (1991) 31 FCR 242 para 31. 
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players’ freedom to choose a club. On this basis, he decided that the restraint is 
void unless it is shown to provide: 
“no more than adequate  protection to the interests of the sporting body. 
This inquiry... may require the court to have regard to the ‘special interest 
of those concerned with the organisation of professional football.’ In so 
doing, the court, perhaps inevitably will have to consider aspects of position 
of players because what is put forward as constituting those ‘special 
interests’ of the organisers will include contentions as to why their dealings 
with players... have to take, or should take, a particular form. But that is not 
to undertake a “balancing” exercise with a comparative evaluation of the 
weight of the interests of the organisers and players. It is to test the 
justification attempted by those in adverse litigations, to the players.”854  
 
This quotation neatly knits in the reference to “special interest of the organisers” 
(made first by Wilberforce J. in Eastham) with their restrictive effect on the 
players. Most importantly, this approach means that courts do not pit the interests 
of the players in direct balance with the “public interest” as represented by the 
restraining entity. Gummow J. specifically criticised the approach of the primary 
judge who referred to “the legitimate interests of the League and the clubs on the 
one hand and the players on the other” and then balanced those interests.855 
Gummow J. objected to this approach because it impermissibly lightens the burden 
to be discharged by the restrainor.856 The proper approach, he suggested, is for the 
restraining League to convince the Court that the restraint was “reasonably related” 
to its objects and that the “restraint afforded no more than adequate protection to 
the interest of the League and clubs. Otherwise it would fail.”857 This approach 
squarely puts the burden of justification to be discharged on the restraining 
association.  
 
In the same case, Wilcox J. framed the issue as “the more fundamental question is; 
how, in a free society, can anyone justify a regime which requires a player to 
submit such intensely personal decision to determination by others.”858  
                                                 
854 (1991) 31 FCR 242 para 32 (emphasis added). 
855  27 FCR 568,  Hill J. 
856 (1991) 31 FCR 242 para 35. 
857 (1991) 31 FCR 242 para 36. 
858 (1991) 31 FCR 242 para 113.  
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Wilcox J. also took a strict approach to the justification aspect. He stated that 
restraining: 
“a person from entering the employment of a particular person, or from 
following a particular trade or occupation, so as to safeguard the interests of 
the covenantee by whom that person was once employed or to whom the 
covenantor has sold a business is one thing; to compel a person – on pain of 
surrendering his or her occupation altogether - to enter the service of 
someone whom he or she has not chosen is another. If the rule which has 
the latter effect can ever be said to be reasonable, the case in justification 
must be extraordinarily compelling.”859 
 
This insistence on justification is to be commended. Courts in England and Wales 
could take a similar tack in order to safeguard the distinctiveness of the ROTD as a 
protector of professionals restrained by rules of an association.  
 
  
7.4.2.7 Specific Proposal No 7: Separately Assess Each Limb  
 
 
The final proposal is that each of the two limbs of the reasonableness test be 
assessed separately. Courts should not follow Lord Pearce’s global test of “one 
broad question: is it in the interests of the community that this restraint should, as 
between the parties, be held to be reasonable and enforceable.”860 Instead, it is here 
proposed that the two limbs not be amalgamated into a melting-pot type of 
analysis. The reason is that any such amalgamation could obscure the 
distinctiveness of the inter partes assessment which must be preciously guarded on 
the grounds that it renders the ROTD (and its objective) patently distinct from 
competition law.  
 
The two limbs of the test ensure that the interests of the restrained cannot be 
ignored or sidelined. Moreover it confines courts’ consideration of the interests of 
the restraining entity to the inter partes limb and, thereby, prevents it from re-
appearing under the “public interest” tranche. This segregation avoids the risk that 
courts treat the restriction more benignly on the basis that the restraining entity is 
                                                 
859 (1991) 31 FCR 242, para 61. 
860 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] A.C. 269, 324. 
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somehow, a protector of the “public interest.” For example, in Greig v. Insole, 
Slade J. found the Football League and Football Association had interests which 
were entitled to protection, “because the two bodies were, in a sense, custodians of 
the public interest.”861 This attitude must be avoided because it blurs the separation 
between the two limbs. The problem, from the perspective of this research, is that 
conflating the two limbs degrades the perception of the distinctiveness of the 
ROTD’s objective. Simply put, the inter partes element of the test must never be 
undermined or obscured, because it is the single element that clearly and 
unequivocally shows the particular objective pursued by the ROTD. The “public 
interest” limb of the ROTD must be maintained as the supplementary or follow-on 
step to the inter partes element of analysis.  
 
These general and specific proposals aim to copperfasten the distinctiveness of the 
ROTD. This is important within the domestic context because the ROTD should 
not be seen as a doctrine that has been somehow either codified or superceded by 
UK competition legislation. As regards EU competition law,  the proposals intend 
to bring the ROTD within the saving provision of Art 3(3), as interpreted with the 
assistance of Recital 9. 
 
 
7.5 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter sought solutions to problems identified in earlier chapters. Section 7.2 
considered some options that might produce more favourable interfaces for the 
ROTD with UK competition legislation. It, firstly, discussed the possibility of UK 
competition law taking divergent approaches to EU competition law. Secondly, it 
identified two canons of statutory interpretation which would allow the ROTD to 
apply in the overlap area without negative impact from competition legislation. The 
“presumption against casual change” and the “mischief rule” support the argument 
that the ROTD should not be emasculated by the competition legislation, for the 
reason that the legislation was enacted to fulfil different ambitions. This second 
                                                 
861 Greig v. Insole [1978] 1 WLR 302, 317 (emphasis added). 
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route (statutory interpretation) offers the more viable solution than one involving 
UK competition law diverging from EU competition law.  
 
Section 7.3 dealt with the ROTD’s interface with EU competition law. It identified 
Art 3(3) of Reg. 1/2003 as the best mechanism to resolve the ROTD’s interface 
with Art 101.  After tracing the linked evolution of Art 3(3) and Recital 9, it argued 
that Art 3(3) intends to save national laws that, without regard to effects on the 
market, strike down restrictions because they are unfair, unjustified or 
disproportionate and may have been imposed (rather than thoroughly negotiated by 
equals).  
 
Section 7.4 presented proposals designed to ensure that the distinctiveness of the 
ROTD is not doubted. The general and specific proposals intend that the impact of 
a measure on the restrained person is emphasised in ROTD judgments. In this way, 
the ROTD is emphatically distinguished from competition law. This allows the 
argument that it is legitimate for the ROTD, in pursuit of its peculiar mission, to be 
stricter than competition law, whether it is UK or EU competition law.   
 
The two general proposals advocate that courts i) expressly refer to the ROTD’s 
public policy foundations and ii) use the language of rights, freedoms and justice. 
Public policy gives the ROTD a distinctive voice because the doctrine’s peculiar 
objectives can be articulated in the language of rights, choice, fairness and justice. 
These general proposals are intended as foundational ones to be followed in all 
cases where the ROTD is applied.  
 
Seven more specific proposals were advanced to guide the courts’ approach to the 
scope/availability of the ROTD and its test. Essentially, they direct courts towards 
portraying the crucial issue in terms of the restriction’s potential impact on the 
restrained person. The first specific proposal is that the basis for the ROTD’s 
expansive scope must be clearly expressed in order to show its concern for 
restrained persons. In particular, the ROTD’s availability to i) non-employees, in 
the absence of undue influence or unconscionable conduct and ii) to persons who 
are restrained by third parties must be articulated because this reveals the ROTD’s 
objective of safeguarding individuals. The remaining six specific proposals are 
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directed towards  how the test is applied. They aim to ensure that the objective of 
protecting persons is clearly conveyed. It was proposed that judgments start by 
noting the ROTD’s antipathy towards restrictions. When assessing the inter partes 
reasonableness of a restriction, it was proposed that a broad inclusive view be taken 
of the person’s interests to include non-economic interests. Additionally, it was 
advocated that the impact of a restriction be articulated in personal terms. Also, 
close attention should be paid to the realities regarding the negotiation of the 
restriction. When analysing the “public interest,” courts should use the ROTD’s 
traditional language. The penultimate proposal insists that restraining entities such 
as associations must discharge the onus of justification and, importantly, must not 
be regarded as custodians of the “public interest” whose interests deserve to be 
balanced with those of the restrained person under the “public interest” limb. The 
final proposal is to maintain staunchly the separation between the inter partes and 
the “public interest” limbs of the test.  
     
The proposals were supplemented by studies of selected judgments in order to 
illustrate that the ROTD’s objective is more oriented towards restrained persons 
than towards markets. The studies endorse the proposals as regards the ROTD’s 
public policy foundations, its concern for “fairness” to the restrained party, the 
foundations of its scope, its piercing enquiry into the realities of “negotiation,” its 
insistence that restraints be justified as reasonable in the parties’ interests and in the 
“public interest.” The studies show that decisions under the ROTD can be reached 
without taking any account of the “actual or presumed effect” of the measure on 
competition in the market.    
 
The proposals aim to ensure that the ROTD is not seen as a version of competition 
law. The ROTD’s person-oriented objective is evidenced by its deliberately 
expansive jurisdictional reach, its generous delineation of locus standi and its 
preparedness to offer remedies to persons who may not otherwise have any 
possibility of redress. The inter partes component is a pivotal element of the 
ROTD test because it is patently distinct from the competition law test. This 
component insists that discrete consideration be given to the implications of the 
restriction for the parties which contrasts with competition law’s focus on the 
effect of the restriction on the market.  The ROTD’s interest in the fairness of 
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restrictions and in whether a contractual clause was truly negotiated by parties on 
equal bargaining terms must be emphasised because it shows its aim of prohibiting 
one party “imposing on their trading partners, obtaining or attempting to obtain 
from them terms and conditions that are unjustified, disproportionate ...” The 
proposals ensure that the ROTD is seen to operate without either defining markets 
or identifying any implications of the measure for the market  
 
This chapter sought and presented solutions to the ROTD’s interface problems with 
competition law in England and Wales. It identified mechanisms in Section 7.2 
(domestic interface) and in Section 7.3 (EU interface) that would allow courts to 
delineate a more satisfactory interface for restrained professionals between the 
ROTD and competition law. These mechanisms will succeed only if the ROTD is 
seen as being different to competition law. Section 7.4 presented proposals to assist 
courts to portray the ROTD as a distinct legal regime that pursues a different 
function or objective to that pursued by competition law. They aim to ensure that 
the ROTD may be called on by restrained professionals to resist the enforcement of 
unreasonable restrictions that do not infringe competition law in England and 






The focus of this research has been the interfaces between the longstanding 
common law restraint of trade doctrine (ROTD) and competition law in England 
and Wales. These interfaces are interesting because they can be problematic for 
some restrained professionals. This research aimed, firstly, to show why these 
interfaces are significant and, secondly, to propose solutions for the resolution by 
courts of interface problems.  
 
The interfaces are important because the ROTD and competition law in England 
and Wales are not equivalent legal regimes. Part I (Chapters One, Two and Three) 
demonstrated how the interests of restrained professionals may be treated 
differently by the ROTD and by competition law. By taking the perspective of 
restrained professionals, Part I examined the different tests and concerns of the 
ROTD and competition law. It highlighted how the interests of restrained persons 
are not as central to competition law analyses as they are to assessments under the 
ROTD. 
 
The analysis of the ROTD (Chapter One) emphasised how widely the ROTD has 
been made available in order to allow professionals to resist the enforcement of 
many types of restrictive provisions contained in either personal contracts or in 
measures of third parties. It remarked on how the potential impact of a provision on 
a restrained person’s economic interests is taken into account by courts when 
deciding whether a provision is a “restraint of trade” and, consequently, subject to 
the ROTD. By recognising de facto burdens on individuals as “restraints of trade”, 
courts have applied the ROTD to a very wide variety of restrictions, even if they 
are not drafted in expressly restrictive terms. The ROTD’s test assesses the impact 
of a restriction inter partes which guarantees that specific attention is paid to the 
interests of restrained persons. The analysis of EU competition law (Chapter Two) 
highlighted how it is can be applied in ways that do not safeguard the interests of 
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restrained professionals. The clearest example is where Art 101(1) does not 
prohibit a restrictive provision on the grounds that it is “necessary.”  This test has 
been applied in practice to permit restrictions that are convenient rather than 
strictly necessary. Such determinations fail to defend fully the interests of the 
restrained persons. The same observation may be made about UK competition 
law’s attitude to restrained persons as it is deeply influenced by EU competition 
law. In order to illustrate some substantive and procedural differences between the 
ROTD and (EU/UK) competition law, Chapter Three discussed judgments 
applying the ROTD and competition law to the same restriction.  
 
Chapters One to Three demonstrated why and how the interests of restrained 
persons are treated differently by the ROTD and by competition law in England 
and Wales (comprising EU competition law and UK competition law). It illustrated 
why some restrained professionals may prefer to rely on the ROTD. In this light, 
the concurrent applicability of the ROTD and competition law in England and 
Wales to some restrictions on persons makes the question of interface an important 
issue. 
 
Part II aimed to identify the extent of the problematic interfaces between the ROTD 
and competition law. It traced how the problems emerged and speculated as to how 
they may further increase with the expansion of the overlap between the ROTD and 
competition law. The most acute problem arises if a person is not allowed to rely 
on the ROTD to resist a restriction in situations where competition law applies but, 
importantly, does not prohibit the restriction. Chapter Four focussed on the 
interface between the ROTD and UK competition law. Chapter Five examined the 
delineation of the interface between EU competition law and the ROTD. Chapter 
Six explored the potential increase in the interface problem if the jurisdiction of 
competition law expands.  
 
In order to identify the problematic interface between the ROTD and UK 
competition law, Chapter Four examined traditional approaches to statutory 
interpretation, including the residual applicability approach which has been 
depicted using a rug metaphor. It showed how this approach can exclude the 
ROTD. This is especially the case where unreasonable “restraints of trade” that 
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would fall foul of the ROTD are not prohibited by competition legislation because, 
for example, of the “necessity” approach. Taking a historical perspective and by 
tracing the traditional interfaces between the ROTD and the restrictive 
practices/fair trading legislation, it was argued that this current problematic 
interface developed as an incidental consequence of legislative reform that did not 
intend to oust the ROTD but to cure other problems under previous legislative 
models (including poor fit with EU competition law). 
   
Chapter Five examined Art 3 of EU Reg. 1/2003 which delineates the interface 
between ROTD and EU competition law. Art 3 intends to secure the priority of Art 
101 over stricter national competition law but allows the unimpeded application of 
stricter national law that “predominantly pursues an objective different from that 
pursued” by EU competition law.  Chapter Five criticised the interpretation of Art 
3 offered by the High Court which stated that a contrary conclusion cannot be 
reached under the ROTD once EU competition law has been applied to a particular 
restriction even if competition law does not prohibit the restriction. This conclusion 
creates a significant problem for persons wishing to call on the ROTD to resist a 
restriction that is not prohibited by competition law.  
 
The same conclusion may, due to obligations on courts to ensure consistency, 
operate in relation to s. 2 of the Competition Act 1998 which is the national 
equivalent of Art 101. The result is to quench the ROTD’s capacity to void 
“restraints of trade” that also come within the reach of either EU and/or UK 
competition law. Thus, some persons are deprived of the protection that may be 
available to them under the ROTD. The scale of this problem becomes even larger 
if the overlap between ROTD and competition increases as the jurisdiction of 
competition law in the UK (comprising EU competition law and UK competition 
law) expands. 
In order to illustrate the possibility of an increased overlap and interface between 
the ROTD and competition law, Chapter Six examined the scope of the 
jurisdictional concept of “undertaking.” It challenged the traditional view that 
employees cannot be “undertakings” and set out arguments supporting the 
classification of some professionals in employment as “undertakings” under EU 
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competition law and, consequently, under UK competition law. It emphasised the 
readiness of some Advocates General to recognise “borderline” employees as 
“undertakings” and argued that this category could extend beyond members of the 
liberal professionals. It concluded that UK courts could, even in the absence of any 
EU Court judgment, decide to take the same approach as the Advocates General. 
The key consequence of classifying an employee as an “undertaking” is to 
increases the overlap between the ROTD and competition law. This extension of 
overlap (to include, for example, employment agreements) would increase the 
range of persons who become affected by the interface problem. 
Part III in Chapter Seven sought and offered solutions to the interface problems 
which are based on conveying the distinctiveness of the ROTD so that it may 
legitimately be applied against restrictions which do not infringe competition law.  
Chapter Seven started by seeking mechanisms or routes under, firstly, national law 
and, then, EU competition law that could safeguard the ROTD’s applicability. 
Section 7.2 explored the viability of s.2 of the Competition Act 1998 taking a 
stricter attitude than has been taken under Art 101(1). While this route may be 
possible, it would entail overcoming obstacles including the obligations of 
consistency contained in s.60 of the Act. Moreover, divergent outcomes under UK 
competition law and EU competition law create uncertainty and inconsistencies for 
some litigants. Thus, other routes were explored. Chapter Seven examined two 
canons of statutory interpretation (the “presumption against casual change” and the 
“mischief rule”) as mechanisms to interpret UK competition legislation so that 
ROTD might apply cogently where it overlaps with UK competition law. This 
option entails interpreting the competition legislation narrowly so that it does not 
casually oust the applicability of the ROTD. Consequently, determinations under 
the domestic competition legislation would not affect the operation of the ROTD. 
This route, it was argued, offers the best solution in cases where there is an overlap 
and interface with only UK competition law.  
Section 7.3 explored solutions for the most problematic interfaces with EU 
competition law. It identified Art 3(3) of Reg. 1/2003 as the most viable solution 
because it allows the unimpeded application of national laws “that predominantly 
pursue an objective different from that pursued” by EU competition law. In effect, 
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Art 3(3) provides an exception to the “convergence” rule of Art 3(2) which 
precludes the application of stricter national competition law than Art 101. It 
argued Art 3(3), interpreted with the assistance of Recital 9 of Reg.1/2002 covers 
national laws that prohibit unfair or unjustified terms irrespective of the terms’ 
effects on the market and that it could save the ROTD. 
Section 7.4 presented two general and seven specific proposals to assist judgments 
under ROTD to articulate its essence in a distinctive manner. They seek to ensure 
that the ROTD is not conflated or, otherwise, confused with competition law in 
order that the ROTD may be legitimately applied within the areas of overlap with 
national competition law and/or EU competition law. The proposals help 
judgments emphasise that the impact of a measure on the restrained person is a 
crucial and distinguishing element of analysis under the ROTD. By highlighting 
this aspect, courts will ensure that the ROTD’s predominant objective is set apart 
from the market oriented objective pursued by competition law.  
The two general proposals advocate that courts, firstly, expressly refer to the 
ROTD’s public policy foundations and, secondly, use its distinctive language of 
rights, freedoms and justice. The seven specific proposals seek to highlight the 
significance of any adverse impact on the restrained person and its indifference to 
market effects. Specific proposals were offered to guide courts’ approach to i) the 
scope/availability of the ROTD and ii) its test. 
The first specific proposal advocated that the basis for the ROTD’s expansive 
scope must be clearly explained because it takes account of the interests of 
restrained persons. This attitude makes it widely available to include, for example, 
persons who are not employees and, also, persons who are restrained by third party 
measures. That the ROTD is available where terms are unfair (even in the absence 
of undue influence or unconscionable conduct) reveals its objective to safeguard 
individuals.  
The remaining specific proposals are directed as how the ROTD’s test is applied 
and aim to ensure that the ROTD’s objective of protecting persons is clearly 
conveyed. They propose that (i) ROTD judgments should start by expressing the 
ROTD’s antipathy towards restrictions; (ii) assessments of the inter partes 
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reasonableness of a restriction should include a broad spectrum of personal 
interests including economic and non-economic interests; (iii) close attention 
should be paid to the realities of the negotiation of the restriction; (iv) any analyses 
in the “public interest” should avoid typical competition law language and 
concepts; (v) judgments should expressly insist that restraining entities such as 
associations discharge their onus of justification: (vi) judgments must maintain the 
separateness of  assessments under the inter partes and the “public interest” limbs 
of the test.      
These proposals were supplemented by studies of cases in order to illustrate clearly 
that the ROTD’s concern is for persons rather than for markets when it analyses 
restrictions on persons. The studies endorse the viability of the proposals in terms 
of the ROTD’s public policy foundations, its concern for fairness to the restrained 
party, the foundations of its scope, its piercing enquiry into the realities of 
negotiation, its insistence that restraints be justified as reasonable in the parties’ 
interests and in the “public interest.”  
By emphasising why and how the ROTD is concerned with persons and not with 
markets, the proposals seek to ensure that the ROTD is not seen as a version of 
competition law. The nature of the objective of the ROTD must be accentuated by 
explaining the basis for its deliberately expansive jurisdictional reach, its generous 
delineation of locus standi and its preparedness to offer remedies to persons who 
may not otherwise have any possibility of redress. The inter partes component is 
the pivotal and crucial component of the ROTD because it is patently distinct from 
the competition law test. This component insists that discrete consideration must be 
given to the implications of the restriction for the parties which contrasts with 
competition law’s focus on the effect of the restriction on the market. The ROTD’s 
interest in whether a measure is fair and truly negotiated by parties on equal 
bargaining terms evidences its objective to prohibit one party from, as Recital 9 
puts it, “imposing on their trading partners, obtaining or attempting to obtain from 
them terms and conditions that are unjustified, disproportionate ...”  
The proposals intend to ensure the ongoing availability of the ROTD as an 
effective instrument to resist unreasonable restrictions which are not prohibited by 
competition law. This outcome is achievable by means of either the principles of 
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statutory interpretation (detailed in Section 7.2) and/or the saving provision in Art 
3(3) of EU Reg.1/2003 (detailed in Section 7.3). The proposals are designed to 
secure either or both routes.  
This research does not accept that the ROTD occupies only a limited and residual 
position in relation to competition legislation. It does not share the view expressed 
by Kamerling and Osman that the ROTD applies only if competition law does not 
apply.862 It dissents, too, from the observation of Furse that “... the common law 
occupies only a residual role in relation to competition law generally.”863  
Moreover, this research does not accept the High Court’s view that the Art 3 
precludes courts from reaching a contrary determination under the ROTD once EU 
competition law is applied.864 This research does not follow some commentators 
who seem to have accepted the High Court’s view without criticism. For example, 
Kammerling & Osman stated that the ROTD has been held to have the same 
objective as EU competition law and that it cannot be relied upon to lead to a 
different conclusion on the validity of an agreement.865 Scott noted that in Days 
Medical Aids the ROTD has “been interpreted as serving the same ends as 
competition law.”866  
This research highlights and addresses the failure by the UK legislature and 
judiciary to appreciate and defend the unique role of the ROTD in the face of 
competition law developments in the UK and at EU level. After reviewing UK and 
EU sources, it argued that the ROTD’s traditional protection is not necessarily 
threatened by competition law. It offered solutions to assist persons who are 
restricted by measures which fall under ROTD and also under UK competition law 
and/or EU competition law. The proposals would allow the ROTD to apply 
meaningfully within the overlap area, however large that area becomes. The ROTD 
                                                 
862 A. Kamerling and C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2004)  Preface xvi. 
863 M. Furse, Competition Law of the UK and EC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 4th ed.)  
361. 
864 Days Medical Aids Ltd v. Pihsiang [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm) Langley J and also Jones v. 
Ricoh (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch) Roth J.  
865 A. Kamerling and C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2004) 289. 
866 A. Scott, “The Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in the United Kingdom”  LSE 
Working Papers 9/2009 p.5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344807 
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based solutions have the advantage that judges enjoy more freedom when 
interpreting the ROTD than UK competition law. For this reason, ROTD solutions 
provide a more complete and more viable resolution of the interface problems than 
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